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THE FLORIDA EXPERIENCE IN PUBLIC EMPLOYEE
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, 1974-1978: BELLWETHER FOR
THE SOUTH
WILLIAM F. MCHUGH*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article is written basically for labor relations practitioners in
Florida, as well as for labor scholars interested in comparative state
law. One primary purpose is to provide information to public offi-
cials in the Southeast, where public sector labor legislation may be
contemplated.
Florida is the first southern state with a comprehensive public
employment relations act covering all public workers. Pressure for
such legislation may be characteristic of rapidly growing states,
such as Florida, with expanding urban populations. In the past
decade, both state and local governmental services in Florida have
substantially expanded, and the number of public employees has
increased to the extent that government has become a major em-
ployer in the state's economy.'
In order to summarize the overall Florida experience, it is impor-
tant to include details of the law, to give examples of its practical
application, and to focus on those peculiar legal traditions which
have influenced the state's labor policy. Specifics are necessary in
order to provide the concreteness sought by comparative state law
scholars, but an encyclopedic case summary was rejected as likely
to induce myopia. The general perspective is historical, with de-
* Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law; B.A., Colgate University,
1956; J.D., Union University, Albany Law School, 1959. The author wishes to acknowledge
the helpful research and comments of Larry Gramavot and Mary Eleanor Sweet during the
preparation of this article.
Research for this article was made possible by a 1977 STAR grant from the Florida Legisla-
ture and the Florida Board of Regents. This article is part of the report prepared with that
grant.
1. In 1967, an average of 269,400 people were employed in Florida as state and local
government workers. By 1976, the figure had risen to 469,900. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATIS-
Tics, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FoRM BLS 58-3171 (1977). During these same years, Florida's
population increased from 6,288,700 to 8,551,814. See BUREAU OF ECONOMnc & BUSiNESS RE-
SEARCH, UNnvsrry OF FLORIDA, FLORIDA STATISTICAL AwTsAcr 1975 (1975); Bureau of Eco-
nomic & Business Research, University of Florida, Florida Estimates of Population, July 1,
1977, State, Counties and Muncipalities 34 (Feb. 1978).
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tailed treatment of those areas which have tended to crystallize,
such as unit determinations, and selective omission of areas where
decisional trends and experience seemed uneven or unduly specula-
tive.
Vigorous organizational efforts by firefighters and school teachers,
highlighted by a statewide teachers' strike in 1968, led to collective
bargaining for public employees in Florida.! The Florida experience
is unique in that the right to bargain collectively was not granted
by statute but rather was adopted by the people in 1968 when they
approved a revised state constitution.3 Article I, section 6 of the
Florida Constitution now provides:
The right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on
account of membership or non-membership in any labor union or
labor organization. The right of employees, by and through a labor
organization, to bargain collectively shall not be denied or
abridged. Public employees shall not have the right to strike.'
In 1969, in Dade County Classroom Teachers' Association v.
Ryan, the Florida Supreme Court held that, with the exception of
the right to strike, "public employees" have the same collective
bargaining rights as private employees under the Florida Constitu-
tion.' The Ryan court acknowledged that Florida public employees
have a constitutional right to bargain collectively and public em-
ployers have the right to engage in collective bargaining with em-
ployee organizations. However, more questions were raised than
were answered by Ryan.
For example, the Ryan decision did not resolve the following: How
should organizational rights be protected? What agency would over-
see the collective bargaining process and define bargaining units?
And what procedures should be followed in the event of negotiation
impasse? The court pointed out the need for legislation.'
2. See FLA. STAT. §§ 447.201-.609 (1977), commonly known as the Public Employees Re-
lations Act (PERA). See also note 25 infra. For a comprehensive discussion of the history of
collective bargaining by public employees in Florida prior to passage of PERA, see McGuire,
Public Employee Collective Bargaining in Florida-Past, Present and Future, 1 FA. ST. U.L.
REv. 26, 28-58 (1973).
3. Although three other states make some sort of reference to employees' rights in their
constitutions, only the Florida Constitution specifically grants all employees the right to
bargain collectively. See HAW. CONST. art. XIV, § 2; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 9; PA. CONST. art.
III, § 31.
4. For a detailed legislative history of this provision, see McGuire, supra note 2, at 42.
5. 225 So. 2d 903, 905 (Fla. 1969). The circuit court held, among other things, that public
employee collective bargaining ran counter to the public policy of the State of Florida. The
Florida Supreme Court disagreed. See id.
6. Speaking for the majority in Ryan, the chief justice urged the legislature to "enact
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Ryan further confused matters by holding that a statute substan-
tially restating the constitutional provision precluded a labor organ-
ization from acting as the sole or exclusive bargaining agent for all
employees in a given bargaining unit.7 The court implied that a
proportional representation scheme would be appropriate Collec-
tive bargaining through proportional representation would be very
different from collective bargaining as it is generally understood in
the United States. The doctrine of exclusivity is uniformly ac-
cepted; that is, the certified representative for the bargaining unit
represents all employees in the unit, whether they are members of
the employee organization or not.'
Efforts to use Ryan on behalf of state workers met with initial
resistance. Governor Claude Kirk issued an executive order in 1970
prohibiting state agencies from bargaining collectively with state
workers. 0 This executive order may have been grounded upon du-
bious authority in the light of Florida's cabinet system of executive
government. Kirk's order had to be rationalized primarily upon gub-
ernatorial authority over the budget process and personnel rules."
Even so, it dramatized how little the Ryan decision had done, pract-
ically speaking, to assure collective bargaining for public workers.
Upon succeeding Kirk in 1971, Governor Reubin Askew issued an
executive order echoing the Kirk order in many respects. 2 Unlike
Kirk, however, Askew did not oppose collective bargaining by public
employees. He pointed out in a subsequent executive order in 1972
that the legislature had not implemented the constitutional right of
public employees to bargain collectively which had been recognized
by the supreme court. 3 The legislature then turned its attention to
appropriate legislation setting out standards and guidelines and otherwise regulate the sub-
ject within the limits of said Section 6." Id. at 906.
Private employees' collective bargaining rights are likewise unclear. See McGuire, supra
note 2, at 45. No statute exists in Florida which outlines the rights of private employees who
are not covered under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1970). Bills
have been introduced to cover farm workers, but no bill has yet passed. Florida House Bill
3095, introduced in 1976, would have added a Part M to FLA. STAT. ch. 447 and created an
Agricultural Labor Relations Commission similar to PERC. HB 3095 died in committee. For
an example of a farm labor statute, see CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1140-66.3 (West Supp. 1977).
7. Act of June 3, 1959, ch. 59-223, 1959 Fla. Laws 859 (repealed 1975) (formerly found at
FLA. STAT. § 839.221).
8. 225 So. 2d 903, 907.
9. See I PuB. EMPL. BAnG. (CCH) 1000 (1977). See Lullo v. Fire Fighters Local 1066,
262 A.2d 681 (N.J. 1970) (upholding exclusivity doctrine under New Jersey's public labor act),
for a good discussion of the doctrine of exclusivity in private and public sector labor relations.
10. Fla. Exec. Order (unnumbered) (May 13, 1970).
11. See McGuire, supra note 2, at 48.
12. Fla. Exec. Order No. 71-20 (Apr. 5, 1971).
13. Fla. Exec. Order No. 72-1, 2-3 (Jan. 10, 1972).
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implementing legislation.'
Many local governments refused to bargain collectively absent
statutory guidelines. This resulted in a rash of local court decisions
seeking to clarify the legal responsibilities attending collective bar-
gaining. Piecemeal and inconsistent responses by local circuit courts
proved inadequate to meet what was essentially a statewide prob-
lem. 5 Finally, in November, 1972, the Dade County Classroom
Teachers' Association filed an original petition for a constitutional
writ in the nature of mandamus, requesting the Florida Supreme
Court to order the legislature to show cause "why it has failed and
refused to enact collective bargaining guidelines."' 6
The teachers' union also asked the court to appoint a commission
to recommend bargaining guidelines for adoption by the court if the
legislature did not explain its failure to act. 7 The court concluded
that its intervention would be premature unless the legislature
failed to act within a reasonable time. In that event, the court said
it would have no choice but to develop guidelines by judicial de-
cree. 8 The court noted that, although the legislature faced many
pressing concerns in 1972, it had managed to find time to adopt
standards and guidelines for collective bargaining for firefighters.
Yet no such standards and guidelines were approved for other
groups of public employees. 9
The bill which proved to be the forerunner of the present Florida
Public Employees Relations Act was introduced in the regular legis-
14. See McGuire, supra note 2, at 56-57.
15. See, e.g., State ex. rel. Firefighters Local 2019 v. Board of County Comm'rs, 254 So.
2d 195 (Fla. 1971); State ex rel. Fraternal Police, Orlando Lodge No. 25 v. City of Orlando,
269 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 4th Dist Ct. App. 1972).
In International Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Homestead, No. 72-9285 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct.
1973), the city manager and the union reached accord after 50 hours of negotiation. The
agreement and the recommendation of approval by the city manager were submitted to the
city council, which proceeded to renegotiate the entire contract and change every provision.
One city councilman made statements before the court concerning his dislike of unionism and
his unwillingness to bargain. He promised benefits to the firemen if they would abandon the
union and also promised that the firemen would have salary parity with city policemen if they
would forget the union. The action was brought by the union to enforce the firemen's rights
to bargain collectively. The court held that the city was conducting only surface bargaining
and that its attempt to renegotiate was not made in good faith. The court observed that
public officers should be held to faithful performance of their duties and made to answer in
damages to all persons whose constitutional right to bargain collectively was wilfully denied.
16. Dade County Classroom Teachers' Ass'n v. Legislature, 269 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1972);
see McGuire, supra note 2, at 50 n.94.
17. McGuire, supra note 2, at 51-52.
18. 269 So. 2d at 688.
19. Id. at 687. See generally Act of Apr. 21, 1972, ch. 72-275, §§ 1, 20, 1972 Fla. Laws 998
(repealed 1974) (formerly found at FLA. STAT. §§ 447.20, .35). Firefighters have considerable
political leverage because of the essential nature of their services.
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lative session in 1972.2 Essentially the same bill was reintroduced
in the 1973 legislative session.21 Despite the recommendations of
Governor Askew,2 2 the legislature refused to heed the court's admo-
nition. Once again, the lawmakers failed to provide the needed
guidelines to implement fully the constitutional right of Florida
public employees to bargain collectively.
The Florida Supreme Court then took an unusual step. In the late
fall of 1973, the court appointed the Supreme Court Public Employ-
ees Rights Commission to recommend to the court guidelines for
judicial implementation of collective bargaining.23 In early 1974, the
newly appointed commission held public hearings, inviting com-
ments and suggestions about what should be included in the recom-
mended guidelines. Numerous employee and employer organiza-
tions made proposals. In April, 1974, the commission submitted its
proposed guidelines to the court. These guidelines were somewhat
more favorable to employee unions than either the legislation which
had previously been introduced in the legislature or the legislation
which ultimately was enacted.2 '
This action by the Florida Supreme Court proved a powerful in-
centive. In 1974, the legislature enacted the Public Employees Rela-
tions Act (PERA), implementing the constitutional command of
collective bargaining in Florida.25 A reluctant legislature was prod-
20. For a brief history of Fla. HB 3314's demise in the 1972 session, see McGuire, supra
note 2, at 57-58.
21. For an analysis of the provisions of HB 3314, see McGuire, supra note 2, at 59-129. In
1973, Fla. HB 2028 was on the calendar when the house adjourned. A similar bill, Fla. SB
1060, died in the Senate Judiciary Committee.
22. In his addresses to the legislature in 1972 and 1973, Governor Askew called upon the
lawmakers to "implement state constitutional guarantees . . . of collective bargaining for
public employees." FLA. H.R. Jot. 10 (2d Reg. Sess. 1972); see FLA. H.R. JOUR. 6 (1st Reg.
Sess. 1973).
23. The members of the commission were: Louis de la Parte, President of the Florida
Senate, Tampa, Florida; William McHugh, Professor of Law, Florida State University Col-
lege of Law, Tallahassee, Florida; Albert S.C. Miller, Jr., Attorney, Jacksonville, Florida; Dr.
Jules 0. Pagano, Dean of Program Development & Evaluation, Florida International Univer-
sity, Miami, Florida; Ben Patterson, Chariman, Bureau of Workmen's Compensation, Florida
Department of Commerce, Tallahassee, Florida; Raymond Sittig, Executive Director, Florida
League of Cities, Tallahassee, Florida; Dr. James T. Campbell, Retired Associate Commis-
sioner of Education, State of Florida; and Don Tucker, Speaker of the Florida House of
Representatives, Tallahassee, Florida.
24. For example, the commission recommended that "interest" disputes be subject to
binding arbitration. This recommendation is not reflected in PERA. The report and recom-
mended guidelines are on file with the Clerk of the Florida Supreme Court.
25. Act of May 30, 1974, ch. 74-100, 1974 Fla. Laws 134 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 447.201-
.609 (1977)).
Technically, the act has no title which specifically designates it as the "Public Employees
Relations Act." It had sometimes been called the "Tucker Act" after Don Tucker, Speaker
of the Florida House of Representatives and one of the primary backers of the Act. Speaker
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ded by an insistent court into enforcing the Florida Constitution. A
new era involving a new relationship between public employers and
public employees in Florida had begun.
II. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RELATIONS ACT
A. Recording the Florida Experience Under PERA
Understandably, three years have not produced many significant
appellate court decisions construing the Public Employees Rela-
tions Act (PERA). Likewise, there were few amendments to the
statute until 1977.6 The appellate courts have not yet construed the
1977 amendments. Thus, most of the Florida experience with PERA
has been shaped in the field.
With few exceptions, this experience has not been authoritatively
documented. Unionization has taken place primarily at the local
government level among firemen, policemen, and schoolteachers. At
the state level, with the exception of the university system, union
elections have been held in four units within the past two years; a
fifth election was scheduled for May 18, 1978.2
Whether or not the Florida Public Employees Relations Commis-
sion (PERC) should provide such information as the number of
impasses, means of settlement, contract listings and surveys, eco-
nomic studies, number of unions and their membership, reports on
elections results, or number of unfair labor practice charges pro-
cessed, it has had neither staff nor resources to do so. Rather, the
PERC staff has been occupied primarily with keeping decisions and
orders current. As a result, reliable statistics are often unavailable.s
Tucker was also much involved in drafting Fla. HB 3314 and introducing it in the 1972
legislative session.
26. In 1976, the definitional section of PERA was amended to exclude employees of the
Florida Legislature and school principals and assistant principals from participation in collec-
tive bargaining. Act of June 27, 1976, ch. 76-269, 1976 Fla. Laws 730 (current version at FLA.
STAT. § 447.203(2) (1977)); Act of May 31, 1976, ch. 76-39, 1976 Fla. Laws 75 (current version
at FiA. STAT. § 447.203(3)(e) (1977)).
27. State elections have been held for the law enforcement, human services, health care
professionals, professionals, and operational services units. By comparison, there are teach-
ers' contracts with 64 school districts (out of a possible 67), according to records at the Florida
School Board Association. Statistics on the status of public employee union activity in Flor-
ida are presently being compiled by the author under a grant from the State of Florida and
will become available during the summer of 1978.
28. Since the law was enacted, there have been three chairmen, one acting chairman, at
least six different per diem commissioners, and three general counsel at the Public Employees
Relations Commission. This turnover may have inhibited development of a long-range pro-
gram of statistical information gathering and dissemination.
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B. Key Provisions of PERA
1. Basic Organizational Rights
Rights similar to those included in section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act are also guaranteed to Florida's public workers under
PERA.21 Employees in Florida may form, join, and participate in
any employee organization of their choosing. And they may negoti-
ate and bargain collectively." A corresponding duty to bargain in
good faith is imposed by the statute on the public employer.' Since
the enactment of PERA, there have been no Florida court cases
challenging the right of public employees to organize and bargain
collectively through an elected representative. At the very least,
then, the basic holding of the Florida Supreme Court in Ryan has
now been implemented.
2. Structure, Power and Duties of PERC
The Public Employees Relations Commission is a part of the
Florida Department of Commerce, which is a state agency under the
Governor performing many of the functions of a department of
labor. Although PERC is legally a part of the Department of Com-
merce, PERA provides that in the performance of its duties and
powers PERC "shall not be subject to control, supervision, or direc-
tion by the Department of Commerce." 2
Prior to the adoption of the 1977 amendments, the commission
was composed of five persons appointed by the Governor and con-
firmed by the senate for staggered four-year terms." These guber-
natorial appointees were to be chosen from among persons "repre-
sentative of the public, known for their objective and independent
29. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970) (right of employees to organize and bargain collectively).
30. FLA. STAT. §§ 447.203(14), .301(1)-(2) (1977) (public employees' right to organize and
bargain collectively). FLA. STAT. § 447.03 (1977) likewise guarantees employees the right to
form, join, and assist labor unions and labor organizations or to refrain from such activity.
Although no court decisions have held that this section applies to public as well as private
employees, an argument may be made that it does. FLA. STAT. § 447.17 (1977) provides a
remedy for violation of the rights guaranteed by § 447.03, allowing damages sustained plus
costs of suit and reasonable attorney fees. Provision is made for the award of punitive dam-
ages if the defendant acted "willfully and with malice or reckless indifference to the rights of
others .... " Injunctive relief is also available. In 1977, the Florida Legislature amended §
447.17 by providing that the relief under this section shall not be available to public employ-
ees. Act of June 24, 1977, ch. 77-343, § 9, 1977 Fla. Laws 1476.
31. FLA. STAT. § 447.309(1), .501(1)(c) (1977) (duty of public employer to bargain in good
faith).
32. Id. § 447.205(1), (3).
33. Act of May 30, 1974, ch. 74-100, § 3, 1974 Fla. Laws 134 (current version at FLA. STAT.
§ 447.205(1) (1977)).
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judgment .... -3, They were not allowed to hold any commis-
sion with any governmental unit or any employee organization.
Under the original statute, one commissioner was designated by the
Governor as chairman and served as a fulltime executive officer; the
other four commissioners served part-time and were paid on a per
diem basis.8
The number of commissioners was reduced in 1977 to three full-
time members and one part-time alternate member.37 While in of-
fice, the members may not be employed by nor hold any commis-
sion with any other governmental unit in the state or with any em-
ployee organization.3 The 1977 amendments also provided that no
more than one appointee may be a person who has previously been
a representative of employers nor may more than one who has been
a representative of employee organizations. 9 Full-time commis-
sioners must devote all their time to commission duties and may not
engage in any other business, vocation, or employment while in
office.
The new terms are also for four years. Beginning July 1, 1977, one
member was appointed for a term of one year, one member for two
years, one member for three years, and the alternate member for
four years. In this way, a measure of continuity is achieved.
The commissioners serve at the pleasure of the Governor, who, as
under the previous law, designates one member as chairman. The
chairman is responsible for the administrative functions of the com-
mission. He has authority to employ the necessary personnel to do
the commission's work. He may also call the alternate commissioner
to serve when his presence is necessary to complete a quorum (three
members) to conduct PERC business. 0 The chairman receives an
annual salary of $38,000. The other full-time commissioners are
paid $36,000 per year. The alternate commissioner is paid $200 for
each day spent on commission work.4'
Under the 1977 amendments, deliberations of the commission are
exempt 2 from the provisions of Florida's "Sunshine Law."' 3 How-
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. (current version at FLA. STAT. § 447.205(2) (1977)).
37. Act of June 24, 1977, ch. 77-343, § 7, 1977 Fla. Laws 134 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
447.205(1) (1977)).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 447.205(2) (1977)). The 1977 amendments further make
provisions for certain internal matters such as printing costs, publications, property, offices,
personnel services, rentals, and establishment of a trust fund to receive proceeds from the
sales of records and other publications. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 447.205(5)(a) (1977)).
42. FLA. STAT. § 447.205(10) (1977).
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ever, any hearing or oral argument held by the commission pursuant
to the state Administrative Procedure Act" or chapter 447 of the
Florida Statutes is open to the public. 5 All draft orders developed
in preparation for, or preliminary to, the issuance of a final written
order by the commission are exempt from the provisions of the
Public Records Act.46
The commission is given wide authority to promulgate rules, sub-
poena witnesses and documents, enforce its orders in court, main-
tain lists of and appoint mediators and special masters (fact-
finders), prosecute unfair labor practices, define and approve bar-
gaining units, and certify bargaining agents. 47 A 1977 amendment
directs PERC to promulgate rules providing for an expedited pro-
ceeding to determine questions relating to scope of negotiations or
certain unfair labor practices. Disposition through such promulga-
tion constitutes final agency action for purposes of judicial review.4
As discussed infra,4 PERC has dealt only tangentially with the
scope of negotiation issues. Usually such dealings have been in the
context of alleged violations of good faith bargaining in unfair labor
practice proceedings.
Employee organizations are required by law to register and to file
with PERC financial statements, income and expense statements,
loan statements, bylaws and constitutions, and pledges to comply
with state law and accept members without regard to age, race, or
sex. An organization which does not register with PERC cannot
request recognition from a public employer or submit a petition for
a representation election.2
The fundamental issue of PERC's independence and integrity as
a neutral commission has not yet been addressed fully by the Flor-
ida Legislature or by other state decisionmakers. There are a num-
ber of reasons for this. The turnover among PERC chairmen (three
in two and one-half years) impeded the commission's ability to
43. Id. § 286.011.
44. Id. ch. 120.
45. Id. § 447.205(10).
46. Id. This is in accord with the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Bassett v. Brad-
dock, 262 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1962), discussed at text accompanying notes 392-400 infra.
47. FLA. STAT. § 447.207(1)-(5) (1977). Section 447.207(1) provides that PERC's rulemak-
ing authority must be exercised in accordance with the provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act.
48. Act of June 24, 1977, ch. 77-343, § 8, 1977 Fla. Laws 1476 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
447.207(7) (1977)). PERC has held that this procedure is not applicable to actions which have
already taken place, but rather is designed to "provide guidance with respect to future action
which is contemplated by the requesting party." In re Broward County Employees Local 532,
AFSCME, AFL-CIO, No. DS-77-005, 77D-473 (Fla. PERC Nov. 21, 1977).
49. See notes 232-42 and accompanying text infra.
50. FiA. STAT. § 447.305(1) (1977).
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advocate needed administrative changes and clarify its proper role.
Until recently, there had been a total failure to appreciate PERC's
function as an adjudicatory body, requiring the independence asso-
ciated with such a role. Due to the lack of experience with public-
sector bargaining, PERC initially was perceived as just another
state executive agency.
PERC is not a typical state agency. It must gain increased inde-
pendence if collective bargaining in Florida is to be a productive
process. Maximum freedom in budgetary requests, expenditures,
and job classifications is essential to a neutral and independent
public labor board. Such freedom will be especially critical as
unionization of state workers increases. Gubernatorial control of
PERC, either directly or by means of another state agency, is incom-
patible with PERC's neutral mission. Executive control will inevita-
bly generate conflicts of interest in matters affecting the state as
public employer.
While PERA prohibits administrative control by the Department
of Commerce, PERC is treated like any other state agency in other
respects. For example, the Florida State Department of Administra-
tion (DOA) supervises state budget matters and establishes person-
nel policies for Florida's state agencies. While it is true that DOA
does not administer PERC directly, DOA does approve PERC's
budget and expenditures and classifies its staff and salaries. 51 DOA,
representing the employer, is also responsible for developing and
implementing policies on employee relations for all state agencies.52
This authority includes representing the Governor as chief executive
and the state as employer in collective bargaining negotiations with
state workers' unions.3
For example, assume that DOA sought approval from PERC of
managerial exclusions of certain workers from collective bargaining
at a time when PERC itself was seeking position reclassification
from DOA for PERC's staff attorneys. Steps should be taken to
divest potential administrative influence over PERC by an execu-
tive agency responsible for representing the chief executive in collec-
51. See id. ch. 216 (planning and budgeting, Department of Administration). It should
be noted that PERA was amended in 1977 to set the salaries of PERC commissioners. Act of
June 24, 1977, ch. 77-343, § 7, 1977 Fla. Laws 1476 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 447.205(2) (1977)).
Previously, DOA set the chairman's salary. FLA. STAT. § 216.251 (1977).
52. FLA. STAT. § 110.022 (1977).
53. State employees have been divided into seven statewide bargaining units through the
rulemaking process. Four of these units have reached contracts through negotiations with
DOA: the nurses, policemen, human services personnel, and skilled professionals. The agree-
ments are on file with the Florida Department of Administration, Office of Employee Rela-
tions, in Tallahassee, Florida.
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tive bargaining with state workers. Such influence exposes PERC to
political vicissitudes which could undermine the neutral and inde-
pendent PERC role envisioned by PERA.
The legislature has been somewhat ambivalent on this matter. On
the one hand, PERC Chairman Carson and others have been suc-
cessful in persuading the legislature to strengthen both PERC's ad-
judicatory role and its efficiency. Certain of the 1977 amendments
dealing with PERC have been progressive. Creation of three full-
time commissioners at reasonable salary levels and exemption of
PERC deliberations from the "sunshine" provisions of the Florida
Statutes were proper moves toward reinforcing PERC's role as an
adjudicatory body. It is hoped that the legislature soon will take
measures to make the budgetary supervision and the personnel clas-
sification of PERC more closely resemble the fiscal relationship
which exists between the legislature and the appellate courts than
that which prevails between the chief executive and the executive
agencies.
Yet, ambivalence about PERC's independence persists because
the 1977 amendments to PERA also provided that PERC commis-
sioners "shall serve at the pleasure of the Governor." 4 This provi-
sion should be eliminated in order to reduce the possibility of future
political interference and to foster the neutrality of PERC. Once
commissioners are appointed and confirmed, they should be re-
moved during their term of office only for cause. Consideration
should be given to extending the term of office from four to six years.
The integrity of PERC must ultimately be measured by its inde-
pendence from both employer and union interests. The Governor
and the legislature should strive to maintain the independence of
PERC, protect it from dominance by executive agencies, and en-
courage PERC's role as an adjudicatory and neutral body.
3. Definitions
a. "Public Employer"
As defined in the Public Employees Relations Act, "public em-
ployer" includes the state and any county, municipality, or special
district (i. e., school board) of the state. It also includes any subdivi-
sion or agency of one of these entities which PERC determines has
"sufficient legal distinctiveness" to bargain collectively and admin-
ister a collective bargaining agreement.5 The 1977 amendments
54. Act of June 24, 1977, ch. 77-343, § 7, 1977 Fla. Laws 1476 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
447.205(1) (1977)).
55. FtA. STAT. § 447.203(2).
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made the Governor the "public employer" for any statewide bar-
gaining unit composed of career service employees."
PERC is mandated by law to define a functional bargaining unit
in such a way that the appropriate government and its officials will
be able to negotiate effectively and maintain a collective bargaining
relationship."7 If the unit is too large or too small, or if it involves
the wrong combination of officials, this may not be possible. In
defining a proposed bargaining unit, the commission is also required
by statute to consider such factors as "the principles of efficient
administration of government" '58 and the number of employee bar-
gaining units with which the employer might have to negotiate.59
The organizational structure of the public employer must also be
considered. 0
Florida is somewhat unique in that the Board of Regents is desig-
nated by statute as the public employer for the faculty, administra-
tive, and professional employees of the state universities.6" Likewise,
community college trustees are defined as the "public employers"
of all employees of the state community colleges.2
The definition of public employer is critical. The nature of the
bargaining process requires an identification of managerial author-
ity responsible for conducting collective bargaining. In dealing with
statewide employee bargaining units, the negotiating authority for
the government must reside somewhere in the higher levels of the
state bureaucracy. in Florida, the key to the public labor scheme is
to identify the level of authority capable 6f making "an effective
recommendation. 61 3 If a body is capable of making "an effective
recommendation," it is appropriate for designation as a "public
employer."
There are a few states besides Florida which place bargaining
authority for the state university system in the system's governing
56. Act of June 24, 1977, ch. 77-343, § 6, 1977 Fla. Laws 1476 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
447.203(2) (1977)). Prior to 1977, the Board of Regents may have been the "public employer"
for its career service employees because the pre-1977 PERA provided that the Board of
Regents was the public employer of "other public employees of the university system not
otherwise determined" by PERC as properly belonging to a statewide bargaining unit com-
posed of state career service employees. Act of May 30, 1974, ch. 74-100, § 3, 1974 Fla. Laws
134 (current version at FiA. STAT. § 447.203(2) (1977)).
57. FLA. STAT. § 447.307(4) (1977).
58. Id. § 447.307(4)(a).
59. Id. § 447.307(4)(b).
60. Id. § 447.307(4)(e).
61. Id. § 447.203(2).
62. Id.
63. Id. § 447.307(4)(d); cf. id. § 447.309(1) (requiring the chief executive of the public
employer to negotiate the contract and recommend approval to the legislative body).
19781
276 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:263
board." In other states, the public employer for all state workers,
including university faculty, is simply designated as "the State." 5
With the advice of the state agency the Governor's designee negoti-
ates on behalf of "the State," and thus on behalf of the state univer-
sity system." Some states, such as New York, have created a special
office of employee relations to negotiate statewide contracts and
oversee their administration. 7 The head of the office is directly
responsible to the Governor.
While some states provide for collective bargaining to be done
outside the university, it was uncommon before the passage of
collective bargaining statutes for state bureaucracies to become di-
rectly involved in such faculty-university relations. Consequently,
control over faculties is typically vested in autonomous governing
boards. In some states, the autonomy of the university is even guar-
anteed by the state constitution-thus assuring further indepen-
dence from the executive."
The Florida approach of placing control over faculty collective
bargaining in the Board of Regents as the "public employer" is
consistent with the long-accepted national practice of delegating
responsibility for academic employment relations to the separate
governing body of the university. Such bodies are somewhat insu-
lated from political pressures because of staggered terms. They pro-
vide a buffer between the political and academic spheres. The Flor-
ida approach seems sensible, given the potential range of negotiable
subjects involved in faculty collective bargaining-such matters as
tenure, sabbaticals, interfacing collective bargaining with univer-
sity governance, consultation procedures with academic officers,
and faculty evaluation."
64. ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.250 (1975); ME. REv. STAT. tit. 26, § 1022 (Cum. Supp. 1977-
1978); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 1 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 179.63 (West Supp. 1978); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 59-1602 (Cum. Supp. 1977); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 273-A:1 (1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.301 (Purdon Supp. 1978-1979).
65. DEL. CODE tit. 19, § 1301 (1965); NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-801 (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
34:13A-3 (West Supp. 1977-1978), construed in Association of N.J. State College Faculties,
Inc. v. Board of Higher Educ., 270 A.2d 744 (1970); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.81(16) (West 1974).
For a detailed analysis of the problem of university systems, see McHugh, Collective Bargain-
ing with Professionals in Higher Education: Problems in Unit Determinations, 1 Wis. L. REv.
55 (1971).
66. RI. GEN. LAws § 36-11-1 (Cum. Supp. 1977); N.J. STAr. ANN. § 34:13A-3 (West 1974);
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 111.81(16) (West 1974).
67. N.Y. ExEc. LAW art. 24, § 650 (McKinney 1972).
68. M. Moos & F. ROURKE, THE CAMPUS AND THE STATE 17-42 (1959); e.g., CAL. CONST.
art. IX, § 9; MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 3.
69. See McHugh, supra note 65, at 70-73. See generally COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN HIGHER
EDUCATION-THI DEVELOPING LAW (J. Vladeck & S. Vladeck ed. 1975). See also contract
between Board of Regents of the State University System of Florida and United Faculty of
Florida (1976-1978) (on file with Board of Regents, Tallahassee, Florida).
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b. "Public Employee"
"Public employee" is broadly defined in PERA as any person
employed by a public employer. 0 This definition is crucial because
only a public employee has rights under PERA. Those excepted
from the definition and therefore from PERA are those holding ap-
pointment by the Governor, elected officals, agency heads, members
of boards or commissions, persons in the organized state militia,
negotiators representing employers, and, under a 1976 amendment,
persons employed by the legislature and prisoners confined in state
institutions.7
Also excepted are those employees designated by PERC as mana-
gerial or confidential either upon application of the public employer
to PERC or because of a unit determination or approval." Thus,
managerial or confidential employees are not covered by the Act
and may not organize or bargain collectively. The managerial defi-
nitional section has generated some significant decisions relating to
its application and the treatment of supervisory employees' rights
under PERA. These matters will be discussed later.73
c. "Chief Executive Officer" and "Legislative Body"
For the state in its capacity as employer, "chief executive officer"
is defined as the Governor.7' For other public employers, the "chief
executive officer" is that person, whether elected or appointed, who
is "responsible to the legislative body of the public employer for the
administration of the governmental affairs of the public em-
ployer." '75 This definition is significant because PERA places negoti-
ating responsibility on the shoulders of the chief executive or "his
representative. '7 This includes responsibility for keeping the legis-
lative body informed, representing its views in collective bargaining
70. FLA. STAT. § 447.203(3) (1977).
71. Act of May 30, 1974, ch. 74-100, § 2, 1974 Fla. Laws 134, as amended by Act of May
31, 1976, ch. 76-39, § 2, 1976 Fla. Laws 75 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 447.203(3) (1977)). See
also Murphy v. Mack, No. 51,025 (Fla. March 2, 1978), in which the Florida Supreme Court
held that a sheriff is a "public employer" within the definition of PERA, but that a deputy
sheriff is not a "public employee" within the meaning of the Act. The decision on the status
of the deputy sheriffs emphasized the fact that they hold office by appointment, rather than
employment, and are invested with the same sovereign power as the sheriff. The holding
affirmed the holding of the First District Court of Appeal as to the sheriff's status as em-
ployer, but rejected its ruling that deputies were public employees for purposes of collective
bargaining.
72. FLA. STAT. § 447.203(3) (1977). See also id. §§ 447.203(4)-(5), .307.
73. See text accompanying notes 124-67 infra.
74. FLA. STAT. § 447.203(9) (1977).
75. Id.
76. Id. § 447.309(1).
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negotiations, and monitoring budgetary requests related to collec-
tive bargaining contracts." In the event of an impasse, it also in-
cludes presentation of factfinding neutrals' reports to the legislative
body, along with the chief executive's recommendations."
In practice, the following officials are deemed chief executives of
their bargaining units: county school superintendent; community
college president; chancellor of the university system (rather than
a campus college president); county executive (whether appointed
or elected); and city manager or mayor. A person may be appointed
as chief executive for bargaining purposes in a small, local govern-
ment which has no chief executive as such.7 9
"Legislative body" is defined by PERA as the state legislature, a
board of county commissioners, a district school board, a governing
body of a municipality such as a city commission or council, or "the
governing body of an instrumentality ... having authority to appro-
priate funds and establish policy governing the terms and condi-
tions of employment . ".8.."10 Thus, the legislative body is the entity
which (1) funds in whole or in part the collective bargaining contract
on behalf of the employer or (2) makes the final decision, after
conducting a public hearing, with respect to contract impasse by
either rejecting or accepting in whole or in part the recommenda-
tions of the public employer or the factfinder and taking "such
action as it deems to be in the public interest . . . ."I' There are
relatively few problems with this definition. The problems raised
generally result from larger considerations relating to impasse reso-
lutions.
As previously noted, PERA places the responsibility for actual
negotiation in the chief executive, the responsibility for ratification
in the public employer, and final authority for funding contracts
and resolving impasses in the legislative body. This is generally
consistent with the theoretical and traditional division of executive
and legislative authority characteristic of the democratic political
process." Moreover, the collective bargaining process as a system of
77. Id. § 447.309(2).
78. Id. § 447.403(4)(a).
79. It should be noted that the chief executive officer generally does not function as chief
negotiator, but rather appoints his representative to work out the actual details of the agree-
ment with the union. There should be ample communications between the chief negotiator,
the chief executive officer, and the legislative body.
80. FLA. STAT. § 447.203(10) (1977).
81. Id. §§ 447.309(2), .403(4)(d).
82. For a discussion of the implications of collective bargaining on the political process,
see H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTm, THE UNIONS AND THE CrEs 21-30 (1971), in which the
authors distinguish public from private sector collective bargaining by the fact that in the
public sector: (a) there is less negotiation trade-off protection on a total package basis since
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resolving disputes depends in part on mutual acceptance of third
party intervention as a means of encouraging or forcing resolution
of disputes.
There is logic, therefore, in defining separately the executive and
legislative bodies and assigning to them different responsibilities in
the bargaining process. However, at the local government level, for
example, the school board typically combines both legislative and
executive functions. By statutory definition, the school board is the
public employer responsible for sending its chief executive to negoti-
ate a collective bargaining contract on its behalf in an adversary
setting. Presumably, this means seeking to protect the school
board's executive and managerial objectives as a public employer.
Yet, once a contract impasse occurs, the school board must put on
its legislative hat because it is also the legislative body. It must
depart from its adversary role and suddenly become neutral.8 3
Thus, the school board is placed in the awkward position of adju-
dicating disputes as legislative body to which it is a party in interest
as public employer. The fulfillment of the statutory responsibility
to be impartial becomes very difficult in cases of acrimonious con-
tract disputes where the sides have polarized and waged political
war through the news media. In such situations, public hearings on
the factfinder's report conducted by the school board as a legislative
body are not at all likely to instill public or parental confidence in
the educational enterprise. Teachers' unions cry "unfair," arguing
that they have been denied true collective bargaining and are ac-
tually relegated to "collective begging. ' 84 In such a context, it is
difficult to disagree with them.
Another problem arises when the chief executive is an elected
official rather than one appointed by the legislative body. This is
the case in most Florida school districts. Potential conflict between
negotiation issues tend to be viewed in isolation in political terms; (b) parties are dealing with
a service rather than a product; (c) professional employees view themselves as change agents
and hence are seeking to negotiate public policy matters; (d) other interest groups are put at
competitive disadvantage as against the unions which can bargain collectively; (e) strikes
place pressure on elected officials to make expedient settlements without due deliberation in
the state legislative process.
But see Wollett, "The Bargaining Process in the Public Sector: What is Bargainable?'" 51
ORE. L. REv. 177 (1971). The author's thesis is that: (a) teachers do not use collective bargain-
ing to promote social change; (b) the problem-solving approach to table negotiations is of
primary importance; and (c) public employers should avoid conceptual concerns over sover-
eign authority and seek to resolve the problems of their employees.
83. FLA. STAT. §§ 447.203(10), .403(4) (1977). For an example of the difficulty occasioned
by this dual role of the school board, see Madison County Educ. Ass'n, 4 F.P.E.R. 4006, at
16-17 (PERC 1977).
84. "Collective begging" is a phrase commonly used by labor unions to describe
employment-related statutes which give little power to the unions.
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the two may become a problem during contract negotiations. For
example, one of the parties may identify its political interest with
union support. Or the union may exacerbate an existing political or
personality schism between the elected school board members and
the elected school superintendent. Or the chief executive may be
reluctant to embroil himself publicly in a collective bargaining con-
tract dispute and may seek instead to shift public focus to the school
board by encouraging a contract impasse which the board will have
to resolve.
In other cases, the union may seek an impasse in the belief that
it can receive more from a sympathetic school board sitting as a
legislative body than from an unsympathetic school superintendent
as negotiator. There are no easy solutions to such dilemmas. Remov-
ing the legislative body from impasse resolution requires some alter-
native form of impasse resolution. Conceivably, this might take the
form of binding interest arbitration. Or it might require allowing the
union the right to strike as is authorized in the private sector. But
neither of these alternatives is likely to become available to employ-
ees in Florida in the foreseeable future.8s
Some of these problems could be avoided at the local level by
making elected officials appointed. Appointed chief executives at
the local government level are more likely to reflect the views of the
employer and legislative body because their allegiance is to their
appointers rather than to the voters. They are more professional and
less political, generally, than are elected officials. Undoubtedly,
they would lend a greater degree of expertise and stability to the
bargaining relationship between the school board and the teachers'
union because they could not be voted out of office.
The community colleges present a more complicated problem in
terms of deciding whether or not the college trustees constitute the
legislative body. Prior to the 1977 amendments, a literal reading of
the definition of "legislative body" contained in PERA supported
the view that the legislative body for all community colleges was the
state legislature."' We have already seen that contract impasses
85. The Constitution Revision Commission has proposed the elimination of interest arbi-
tration as an impasse resolution procedure. This restriction on the possible methods of set-
tling disputes is detrimental to the smooth operation of the collective bargaining process. It
would hamstring future legislative use of some types of binding arbitration in contract im-
passes. Presently the Florida Constitution, art. I, § 6, makes public employee strikes illegal.
86. 'Legislative body' means the state legislature, the board of county commis-
sioners, the district school board, the governing body of a municipality, or the
governing body of an instrumentality or unit of government having authority to
appropriate funds and establish policy governing the terms and conditions of em-
ployment and which, as the case may be, is the appropriate legislative body for the
bargaining unit.
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between public employers and employee unions are ultimately re-
solved by the government's legislative body after a public hearing.
It would, however, be administratively untenable and inconsistent
with traditional state and local government relations to give more
than thirty community colleges an opportunity to have the state
legislature resolve local contract disputes after complex and lengthy
public hearings.
Instead, the community college trustees have in fact uniformly
assumed a dual role as both legislative body and public employer.
PERA was amended in 1977 to resolve any question on the matter.87
As in the case of school boards, the community college trustees now
are defined by law as both the public employer and the legislative
body.88 The essential problem remains, however: the colleges are
funded at the state level while many of the terms and conditions of
employment are vested in each local governing board of trustees.
Within the university system, negotiations are conducted by the
representatives of the chancellor, as chief executive, and the con-
tract is ratified by the Board of Regents as public employer. The
legislative body is, of course, the state legislature. It is hard to
imagine how these definitional sections could be substantially al-
tered. If problems previously mentioned become large enough to
warrant amendment, negotiation and impasse procedures would
also have to be altered.
C. Unit Determinations
1. Defining Bargaining Units
Before the bargaining process can begin, it is necessary to deter-
mine an appropriate bargaining unit.8 9 Reduced to its simplest
terms, this means identifying the parties to the collective bargaining
process.
With respect to the employee unit, this is largely a matter of
identifying a group of employees who share a community of interest
with respect to terms and conditions of employment. However,
other statutory unit criteria must also be satisfied. Once the appro-
Act of May 30, 1974, ch. 74-100, § 3, 1974 Fla. Laws 134 (current version at FLA STAT. §
447.203(g) (1977)).
87. Act of June 24, 1977, ch. 77-343, § 6, 1977 Fla. Laws 1476 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
447.203(10) (1977)).
88. FLA. STAT. § 447.203(2) (1977) (trustees as public employer); id. § 447.203(10) (trustees
as legislative body).
89. The materials in the introductory section on unit determination are generally ex-
cerpted from McHugh, supra note 65, at 56-63. For an enlightening discussion of the unit
fragmentation problem, see Mack, Public Sector Collective Bargaining: Diffusion of Manage-
rial Structure and Fragmentation of Bargaining Units, 2 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 281 (1974).
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priate group is identified, its members are entitled, often through a
secret ballot election, to reject the bargaining process completely or
to elect a bargaining agent who will represent them exclusively and
negotiate "terms and conditions of employment" in their behalf.
For the employer, defining a unit means identifying "manage-
ment." The identification of management and managerial authority
is critical in public employment-particularly in higher education.
Defining a bargaining unit requires a determination of the appro-
priate level at which a bargaining commitment may be made. The
employer must have authority to make an effective recommenda-
tion. It is fundamental that the public employer have sufficient
authority to negotiate on matters relating to the terms and condi-
tions of employment.
How, then, is a unit determination made? There are two typical
ways: by recognition or by certification. The employer may
recognize an organization or union as the exclusive bargaining rep-
resentative for all employees in the bargaining unit. In such a case,
the parties have agreed to the unit configuration and to the majority
status of the bargaining agent. On the other hand, the employer
may refuse recognition, or recognition may be challenged by a com-
peting organization. Then, a formal representation hearing may be
initiated before an employee relations board which has statutory
authority to make unit determinations. Usually these boards have
wide discretion and may authorize and direct a representation elec-
tion by secret ballot in order to assure that the bargaining agent is
the choice of a majority of the employees. 0 The labor board then
certifies the winner. Thus, recognition is voluntary, while certifica-
tion results from labor board action.
What factors are considered in making unit determinations? The
"appropriate" bargaining unit is at best an elusive concept. There-
fore, while labor boards tend to develop certain working principles,
they resist hard and fast rules. Criteria for establishing an appropri-
ate unit are developed in part on a case-by-case basis. Unit determi-
nation precedents developed under federal legislation by the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (NLRB) are not binding on state
boards. But such boards frequently look to NLRB decisions for guid-
ance. Thus, the community-of-interest principle recognized at the
federal level is also recognized and followed in many states.9'
The labor board of any state is bound by the criteria for unit
determination established by that state's employee relations act.
Many state public employee relations acts include rather detailed
90. See, e.g., N.Y. PuB. EMPL. REL. BD. R.P. pt. 201.
91. See note 171 and accompanying text infra.
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unit determination criteria. Such specification is necessary because
of the diverse functional employee groups characteristic of public
employment and the corresponding difficulty of identifying
"management" and managerial authority in government.
Understanding unit determinations requires an understanding of
the doctrine of exclusivity. Under this doctrine, one bargaining
agent is recognized or certified as the exclusive spokesman for all
the employees in a particular bargaining unit for purposes of collec-
tive bargaining. The doctrine of exclusivity is firmly embedded in
American industrial labor relations and is widely accepted as well
in public employment labor relations. 2
This doctrine does not necessarily preclude an employer from
meeting and conferring with other groups-usually in the presence
of the certified agent. Nor does it require that an employee be repre-
sented only by the recognized or certified bargaining agent in a
grievance matter." As a practical matter, though, the employer
usually looks to the certified bargaining agent to establish collective
and organizational relations and to ascertain collective opinions of
those in the unit. Exclusivity gives the bargaining agent fundamen-
tal legal rights under both the negotiated agreement94 and employ-
ment relations law. 5 Thus, organizations and associations which are
neither recognized nor certified as bargaining agents have relatively
little influence under the doctrine of exclusivity.
The exclusivity doctrine is intended to promote stable collective
relationships between the employer and the bargaining agent. Ex-
clusivity provides organizational security and status to the bargain-
ing agent and minimizes the disruptive impact of dissident factions
within the employee unit. Exclusivity also protects the certified
agent from other organizations created by and oriented toward the
employer. Because the employer must deal with only one organiza-
tion on matters concerning employees in the unit, a good argument
may be made that exclusivity fosters cooperative employer-
employee relationships. Exclusivity reinforces the notion of collec-
tivism-and the bargaining power it brings to the table-which is
at the heart of collective bargaining. Exclusivity strengthens the
92. National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
93. Id.
94. See CrlT UNIVERSITY OF NEW YoRK, AGR MENT BETWEEN THE BoARu OF HIGHER EDUCA-
TION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK AND UNITED FEDERATION OF COLLEGE TEACHERS LOCAL 1460,
AFL-CIO (1969); CITY UNvIsrrY oF NEW YORK, AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE BoAD OF HIGHER
EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK AND THE LEGISLATIrE CONFERENCE (1969).
95. National Labor Relations Act § 9(a) 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
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union, which ultimately gives the individual worker his leverage
against the employer.
Another factor in determining an appropriate bargaining unit in
the public sector is that of fragmentation-the problem of large
versus small employee units." The size and composition of the bar-
gaining unit is often decisive in determining which organization will
win recognition or certification. For example, though a union might
succeed in organizing one employee group at a large governmental
institution (e.g., a state hospital) and petition successfully for certi-
fication based on its organization of that one employee unit, that
union might stand little or no chance of winning recognition or
certification if all employees at the institution were included in the
bargaining unit.
It is also clear that in the public sector the nature of the bargain-
ing unit dictates to a great extent the scope of bargainable issues.
This is less true in private business where the authority to bargain
on all issues is usually centralized or can be easily delegated.97 In
determining an appropriate unit in the public sector, however, it is
essential to consider the subject matter to be bargained for, that is,
the scope of negotiation."
In the public sector, authority is likely to be vested at higher
employer levels. This is especially true of state governments. As a
result, larger employee units are needed." Recent experience sug-
gests that in the public sector "[f]ragmentation into too many
small units can severely limit the scope of bargaining subject mat-
ter, and that in turn might defeat the basic bargaining right.9'
' 0
Proliferation of employee units also tends to promote excessive com-
petition among rival organizations. This produces "whipsawing" in
which employees cite gains at one institution as the minimum con-
cessions acceptable in later negotiations at another institution.
Arguments in favor of smaller units generally emphasize the need
for self-determination and the greater sensitivity of like-situated
employees to mutual needs. There is often an underlying suspicion
that the employer wants a large unit in order to frustrate employee
organizational activities, thereby discouraging bargaining.
However, there are a number of practical advantages to the larger
unit. A large bargaining unit is more likely to be able to afford to
96. For an excellent treatment of the problem of fragmentation in public employment,
see Rock, The Appropriate Unit Question in the Public Service: The Problem of Proliferation,
67 MICH. L. REv. 1001 (1969).
97. Id. at 1006.
98. Id.
99. For further discussion of the pros and cons of this position, see id. at 1005-08.
100. Id. at 1013.
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engage experienced staff and professional advisors in negotiation
and in matters of contract administration. The agent of the larger
unit will have a broader power base. And opinions of large groups
are more likely to reflect those of the total employee population.
From the employer's point of view, there are fewer groups with
which to deal.
The bargaining agent for a larger unit must assume greater re-
sponsibility for the divergent interest groups within the unit.'0 ' On
the other hand, unions representing small units are less likely to be
concerned with larger institutional problems.
2. Florida's Statutory Procedures .for Recognition and
Certification
In Florida, PERC is responsible for approving bargaining units
when the parties agree and for defining an appropriate bargaining
unit when the parties do not agree.' 2 When the parties agree on a
unit, PERC may not change the unit without first conducting a
representation proceeding. This gives all parties an opportunity to
present evidence and explain their positions.'13 The First District
Court of Appeal has held that PERC may not "enlarge, reduce or
redefine a bargaining unit which has been agreed upon by an em-
ployee organization and the public employer."'0 4 PERC may, how-
ever, disapprove such a unit altogether. If this happens, the object-
ing party may file a petition for certification with the commission
and offer proof of its position.0 5
Based on these principles, there are three alternatives for defining
a unit and obtaining certification under PERA. First, the employee
organization may request voluntary recognition by the employer.'0
If the employer agrees to the majority status of the employee organi-
zation and to the appropriateness of the unit, PERC then must
either approve or disapprove the unit. PERC is expressly prohibited
by PERA from questioning the majority status of the employee
organization once it has been recognized by the employer.' 7 If
PERC approves the unit, the employee organization is certified as
the exclusive representative for purposes of collective bargaining.
101. J. HALUHAN & W. Hmsmn, QUESTIONS & ANSWERS ON PuBLic EMPLOYEE NEGOTIATION
17-18 (1967).
102. FiA. STAT. § 447.307(1)(a), (3)(a)(1) (1977).
103. Id. § 447.307(1)(a)-(b).
104. School Bd. v. PERC, 330 So. 2d 770, 773 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (Marion
County); FLA. STAT. § 447.307(1)(a)-(b) (1977).
105. FLA. STAT. § 447.307(2) (1977).
106. Id. § 447.307(1)(a).
107. Id.
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Second, where voluntary recognition is not possible but there nev-
ertheless is agreement on the unit, the parties may, subject to ap-
proval by PERC, hold a consent election." 8 PERC or some other
acceptable party may supervise the election. A majority of votes
cast will be needed to designate a bargaining agent.
Third, when the employer refuses recognition or objects to the
unit, or when a proposed unit is disapproved by PERC, or when the
petitioner chooses not to request recognition, a party may petition
for certification.' 5 This petition must be accompanied by dated
statements signed by at least thirty percent of the employees in the
proposed unit, indicating a desire to be represented by the peti-
tioner." 0 In contested unit cases, a hearing is then held by a PERC
hearing officer who makes a finding of fact and recommendations.
The full commission reviews the hearing officer's report and renders
a decision defining the unit and ordering an election."' This election
order is not considered final agency action from which a petition for
judicial review could be filed challenging the order."' However, the
Second District Court of Appeal has held that once PERC certifies
an employee organization after an election, certification constitutes
final agency action and therefore is subject to judicial review."3
The Florida Supreme Court has held that the Florida Public Re-
cords Act allows a public employer to examine the authorization
cards which are submitted by a union upon petition for certification
as a bargaining agent."' In School Board v. PERC, a schoolteachers'
union filed a petition with PERC for certification as bargaining
agent for certain employees of the school board. The school board
maintained that the petition was not supported by thirty percent
or more of the employees in the unit, as required by statute, and
requested access to the authorization cards. PERC refused access
"because of the need for employee confidentiality in representation
matters.""15 PERC argued that it alone could determine whether
108. FLA. DEP'T COM. PERC R. § 8H-2.01.
109. FLA. STAT. § 447.307(2) (1977). See also School Bd. v. Florida Pub. Employees Rela-
tions Comm'n, 3 F.P.E.R. 30 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (Marion County), in which the
First District Court of Appeal held that an employee organization that can show at least 30%
representation in a proposed unit may file a certification petition with PERC without first
requesting recognition by the public employer.
110. Id.
111. Id. § 447.307(3)(a)(1), (3).
112. School Bd. v. PERC, 333 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (Sarasota County);
FLA. STAT. § 120.68 (1977).
113. Id.
114. School Bd. v. PERC, 334 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 1976) (Marion County).
115. Id. at 583.
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there was a sufficient showing of interest to allow examination of the
cards.
The school board sought a writ of mandamus requiring PERC to
provide access to the cards. The school board argued that section
447.307(2) of PERA and section 119.01 of the Public Records Act"6
gave employers an "absolute right to review authorization cards."",7
Section 447.307(2) provides in relevant part: "Any employee, em-
ployer or employee organization having sufficient reason to believe
any of the employee signatures were obtained by collusion, coercion,
intimidation, or misrepresentation or are otherwise invalid shall be
given a reasonable opportunity to verify and challenge the signa-
tures appearing on the petition."
PERC contended that authorization cards may be reviewed only
where PERC finds factual proof of invalidity. Relying on labor poli-
cies developed under the National Labor Relations Act"8 and the
public employee relations statutes of other states,"' PERC stressed
that disclosure might enable employers to make reprisals and thus
"chill" the exercise of collective bargaining rights. 20 In addition,
PERC contended that since collective bargaining rights of employ-
ees are guaranteed by the Florida Constitution, they operate in an
area which is exempt from the Public Records Act.' 2'
The court rejected PERC's argument. The court emphasized that
section 447.307(2)-(3) of PERA gives the public employer the right
to "verify and challenge the signatures" on the authorization cards
if there is "sufficient reason to believe" that the signatures are in-
valid or were improperly obtained.'2 The court observed that on the
one hand a challenge on the grounds of invalidity is meaningless if
the employer must wait until a hearing, while on the other hand any
abuse of the right of access to the authorization cards could be
116. FLA. STAT. ch. 119 (1977).
117. 334 So. 2d at 583. Section 119.01 provided simply that: "It is the policy of this state
that all state, county, and municipal records shall be all times be open for personal inspection
by any person."
118. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-59 (1970).
119. See notes 64-66 and accompanying text supra.
120. See S.H. Kress, 137 N.L.R.B. 1244 (1962). PERC also received advisory letters sup-
porting its position from public employee relations boards in Hawaii, Michigan, New Jersey,
New York, Oregon, and Wisconsin.
In its brief, PERC described the "chilling effect" as follows:
If an employee knows at the inception of the organizational campaign that his name
and desires for collective representation will be exposed to public scrutiny, public
ridicule, or more basic, reprisal from an employer, he may choose to forego or curtail
the exercise of his constitutional right rather than submit to such pressures. 334 So.
2d at 583 n.3.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 584.
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remedied through the unfair labor practices sections of PERA.'2 3
The court in dicta noted that "bargaining orders may provide a full
remedy," and observed in a footnote that the courts are available
to enforce constitutional rights.'2 3.
3. Managerial Employees and Supervisory Unionism
The definitional section of PERA dealing with managerial em-
ployees is critical because employees designated "managerial" are
excluded from statutory coverage. "Managerial employees" are
those who perform jobs which are not of a routine clerical or minis-
terial nature but which instead require the exercise of independent
judgment. Whether independent judgment is needed to do a job is
indicated by the presence of one of the following: (1) formulating or
assisting in the formation of policy applicable to employees in the
bargaining unit; (2) assisting in preparation and conduct of collec-
tive bargaining negotiations; (3) having a role in contract adminis-
tration; (4) having a significant role in personnel administration or
in employee relations; or (5) having a significant role in making or
administering a budget. '24
In 1976, this provision was amended 2 5 to include certain school
administrator titles enumerated in section 228.041(10) of the Flor-
ida Statutes,' 6 including superintendents, supervisors, principals,
and professional administrative assistants to principals and super-
intendents. The practical result of the 1976 amendment is to pre-
clude unionization of professional supervisory personnel in the
school districts. The 1977 amendments excluded police chiefs, fire
chiefs, and directors of public safety departments as well.'27 In addi-
tion, the 1977 amendments provided that "other" firefighters and
police officers may be determined by PERC to be managerial.1 21
According to this latest amendment, PERC "shall consider . . .
the paramilitary organizational 'structure of the department in-
volved. '"29
House Bill 2028, which formed the basis of PERA, permitted
123. Id. at 584-85.
123.1. Id. at 585 & n.ll (citing with approval NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575
(1969)).
124. FLA. STAT. § 447.203(4) (1977).
125. Act of June 22, 1976, ch. 76-214, § 1, 1976 Fla. Laws 390 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
447.203(4)(a)(6) (1977)).
126. (1977).
127. Act of June 24, 1977, ch. 77-343, § 6, 1977 Fla. Laws 1476 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
447.203(4)(b) (1977)).
128. Id.
129. Id.
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supervisory employees to unionize. 3 ' So did its forerunner, House
Bill 3314.111 Proposed amendments to House Bill 2028, drafted by
the author, eliminated the right of supervisors to organize by ex-
cluding them from PERA and by defining supervisory employees as
one category of managerial employees. The exclusionary language
tracked the definition of "supervisor" in section 2(11) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act.' Other references to the words
"supervisor" and "supervisory" were also struck from PERA.
At an informal conference attended by the author, the firefighters
objected to excluding supervisors under the proposed amendment.
Representatives of the school principals, interested in preserving the
right of principals to organize, also objected. Consequently, supervi-
sory groups were not classified as "managerial" when the exclusion-
ary amendments were introduced in the 1977 legislative session. The
result is curious indeed. PERA is totally silent on the issue of super-
visory unionism; the word "supervisor" appears nowhere in the stat-
ute. However, PERC recognized the problem early after passage of
PERA. Its own regulations compel PERC to consider "the presence
of possible conflict of interest of employees in the proposed unit"'' 33
when determining an appropriate bargaining unit.
PERA's silence on supervisory unionism has caused some confu-
sion. No court decisions have faced squarely the issue of whether
supervisors can or cannot unionize. But the clear indication of the
PERC decisions dealing with school personnel is that they can. 34
Curiously, in defining the state worker units by rule, 35 PERC cre-
ated a statewide unit of supervisory employees. 3 Accordingly, both
the state (as employer and party to the rulemaking procedure) and
130. Fla. (1973).
131. Fla. (1972).
132. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1970). The Act defines supervisor as
any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer,
suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other
employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively
to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such
authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requries the use of
independent judgment.
Id.
133. FLA. DEP'T COM. PERC R. §8H-3.31.
134. Seminole Educ. Ass'n, No. 8H-RA-754-1001 (Fla. PERC Sept. 17, 1975); Marion
Educ. Ass'n., 1 F.P.E.R. 28 (PERC 1975). There is no court decision on the constitutionality
of the 1976 amendment excluding principals and other school supervisory personnel from
PERA coverage as being managerial. Such exclusion may deprive certain employees of the
right to bargain collectively granted by art. I, § 6 of the Florida Constitution where in fact
such employees are supervisory and not managerial.
135. See notes 214-15 and accompanying text infra.
136. State of Fla., 2 F.P.E.R. 166 (PERC 1976).
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PERC have accepted the right of supervisory employees to bargain
collectively in Florida. The rationale is that "public employee" is
broadly defined by PERA, and thus absent express exclusionary
language, supervisory employees should have bargaining rights.
Furthermore, the definitional section excluding employees as man-
agement is not broad enough to exclude all supervisory employees
where constitutional rights are at stake.'37
Often the problem of supervisory unionism is partially resolved
because the parties agree initially to exclude many high-level super-
visory positions. Examples are the department chairpersons in the
State University System' and division chairpersons in the com-
munity colleges. 39 There is a trend toward stipulating supervisory
positions into the employee unit where the supervisory role is some-
what limited or stipulating them out of the unit and dubbing them
"managerial" where they perform a less substantial supervisory
role." 0
Thus, supervisors are excluded as management whenever they
help formulate policy or perform "a significant role in personnel
administration or employee relations.''4 For practical purposes,
this was done in the State University System case with respect to
certain department chairpersons by stipulation of the parties at
the unit determination stage. Recall that, with PERC approval,
stipulation as to the appropriateness of the unit, including manage-
rial exclusions, is permitted under PERA."2
Despite this approach, there may be a residuary group of employ-
ees which does not fall into either class. For example, a union might
want the group excluded from the employee unit for reasons of
expediency: in a consent election case, their vote may be questiona-
ble; or some members of this residuary group might even perceive
themselves as part of "management." This could present a conflict
of interest due to incidental supervisory responsibilities. On the
other hand, the residuary group may be so small in number as to
be insignificant. In situtions where the employer wants the group
excluded as managerial but the union is unwilling to so stipulate,
and the PERC investigation officer is reluctant to exclude them,
137. See notes 232-42 and accompanying text infra.
138. See State Univ. Sys. Bd. of Regents, 3 F.P.E.R. 39 (PERC 1977). Technically, certain
department chairmen were not stipulated out as management, but were merely excluded with
no reason given.
139. Id. at 40.
140. Id.
141. FLA. STAT. § 447.203(4)(a)(4) (1977).
142. Id. § 447.307(1)-(2).
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they may be excluded as possible supervisory employees. This
might typically occur when management is unwilling to oppose ex-
clusion because litigation would delay a desired consent election, or
because the residuary group is not viewed as likely to pose the threat
of unionized supervisors, or the cost of litigating is prohibitive. The
result is to leave a small group of employees out of the unit although
they are not designated managerial employees. This group might
later be unionized as a separate supervisory unit."'
Florida's position on managerial exclusions is curiously ambiva-
lent. Two early PERC decisions moved toward a narrow construc-
tion of the management exclusion section. In Seminole Education
Association, PERC held that principals and assistant principals
were not management."' PERC concluded that mere policy "input"
by school principals, though actively solicited by the superinten-
dent, was not enough to make the positions managerial. PERC
noted that principals do not "possess authority independent of the
superintendent .... ""' Thus, the principals and assistant prin-
cipals could not be said to "[flormulate . . . polic[y] . . . applic-
143. The uniform services (police and firefighters) are examples of the interplay between
managerial and supervisory exclusion. See Northwest Fla. Police Benevolent Ass'n, 2
F.P.E.R. 8 (PERC 1976). In Northwest Fla. Police Benevolent Ass'n, PERC approved a police
unit which included sergeants, since they had relatively few supervisory responsibilities, but
excluded lieutenants, since they exercised a sufficiently high level of iupervision to represent
a conflict of interest with the larger employee group. The lieutenants were not excluded as
managerial but became a residual supervisory group. Another case in the police setting, soon
to be heard by PERC, may test further the extent of PERC's willingness to exclude lower
level supervisory positions from employee bargaining units. Polk County PBA, No. 8H-RC-
766-2128 (Fla. PERC, Hearing Officer's Report Apr. 12, 1977). The parties in Polk stipulated
that lieutenants should be excluded on the basis of a conflict of interest-apparently exclud-
ing them as supervisors. Id. at 3. This left unresolved the issue of the appropriateness of a
unit which includes both sergeants and rank-and-file policemen. The employer contended
that sergeants are managerial and stressed the fact that the sergeants work closely with the
lieutenants in evaluating patrolmen, administer nominal discipline, and provide budget in-
formation. Id. at 6. PERC then ordered an election on a proposed unit including sergeants.
Id. at Order No. 78E-085 (Mar. 15, 1978). PERC found that the sergeant's "supervisory
authority . . . is minimal." Id. at 2. The election has not yet been held nor has a unit been
certified.
In International Ass'n of Firefighters, Local #2157, 2 F.P.E.R. 11 (PERC 1976) (Gaines-
ville), lieutenants were included in the general unit because they received similar fringe
benefits, had no power over promotions and demotions, and had very closely circumscribed
supervisory authority. In Largo Professional Fire Fighters, No. 2427, 2 F.P.E.R. 22 (PERC
1976), PERC allowed captains and lieutenants in the same unit with firefighters because they
did not formulate policy, shared living quarters with other employees, and made only advi-
sory disciplinary recommendations. The fire chief and his assistant were deemed managerial.
But cf. Professional Firefighters of Orlando, Local No. 1365, 2 F.P.E.R. 40 (PERC 1976), in
which PERC excluded captains from a firefighters' unit because they were the sole command-
ing officers on certain shifts and exercised broad authority.
144. No. 8H-RA-754-1001 (Fla. PERC Sept. 17, 1975) (Order No. 75C-89-119).
145. Id. at 2.
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able to bargaining unit employees.""'
PERC observed too that, while principals prepared proposed
budgets, they do so based on formulas determined by the superin-
tendent and school board. '47 The only discretion a principal has in
budget administration is that of allocating within a previously es-
tablished budget figure.'48 PERC viewed this discretion as being
additionally limited by countywide salary ranges. Further, this dis-
cretion, such as it is, is subject to review and approval by the super-
intendent or a budget committee composed of teachers, principals,
and staff."9 Thus, in PERC's view, the principals did not have a
significant managerial role in the preparation and administration of
budgets.150
The statute also calls for the managerial exclusion from the em-
ployee bargaining unit of any employee who "assist[s] in the prep-
aration for the conduct of collective bargaining negotiations."' 5'
PERC, in Seminole Education Association, held that
[plarticipation in collective bargaining signifies more than ex-
pressing opinions regarding . . . [bargaining] . . . demands from
an organization [i.e., Union] . . . . [P1articipation in collective
bargaining connotes a physical presence at the bargaining table or
occupying such a relationship to the negotiating process that the
expression of an opinion will have a significant impact on the
employer's labor relations policies. . . . [T]he statute requires
active participation in the bargaining process.' 2
The statute also compels the exclusion of any employee who plays
a "major role in the administration of agreements" resulting from
collective bargaining negotiations. 53 PERC held in Seminole Edu-
cation Association that "[a]n employee plays a major role in con-
tract administration if he or she is vested with the authority to
146. FLA. STAT. § 447.203(4)(a) (1977).
147. Id. Seminole Educ. Ass'n, No. 8H-RA-754-1001, slip op. at 3.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 5.
151. FLA. STAT. § 447.203(4)(a)(2) (1977).
152. Seminole Educ. Ass'n, No. 8H-RA-754-1001, slip op. at 5.
153. FLA. STAT. § 447.203(4) (1977). The managerial exclusionary provision in the original
PERA used the word "major" in the administration of agreements phrase. Act of May 30,
1974, ch. 74-100, § 3, 1974 Fla. Laws 134 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 447.203(4)(a)(3)
(1977)). The word "major" was apparently dropped from the conference committee bill
passed by both houses when the bill was printed for statutory distribution. See Act of June
22, 1976, ch. 76-214, § 1, 1976 Fla. Laws 390 (amending FLA. STAT. § 447.203(4)(a)(3)(1975)).
This apparent error was compounded in the 1977 conference committee bill which passed.
Fla. SB 1449 (1977). Thus, "major" is omitted from the 1977 amendments. Act of June 24,
1977, ch. 77-343, § 6, 1977 Fla. Laws 1476.
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modify policies and procedures that have a significant impact on
labor relations."' 54 Merely having authority to enforce observances
of contract terms does not establish managerial status even though
the individual participates in the first step of the grievance machi-
nery. 155 PERC found that school principals do not exercise indepen-
dent judgment in resolving initial grievances and held that princi-
pals are engaged in ministerial activities which do not constitute a
major role in contract administration.' Thus, principals do not fall
within the managerial exclusionary provision of section
447.203(4) (a) (3) of the Florida Statutes.'57
In Marion Education Association,'5 8 PERC again dealt with the
issue of whether school principals were a part of management. The
commission followed basically the same approach it had used in
Seminole and held that principals were at best supervisory. 15'
"There is no evidence," the commission observed,
that any of the employees have directly participated in collective
bargaining or that such employees may ever be required to assist
the employer in negotiations with a certified organization. Further-
more, the evidence discloses that the supervisory function of many
of the employees in the managerial application is at best minimal.
The job descriptions provided by the employer disclose that the
employees sought to be exempted, just .as other certified teachers,
are engaged almost exclusively in the process of educating students
within the school district."10
To the extent that the commission held in Seminole and Marion
that school principals are not managerial employees, both cases
were overruled by the 1976 amendment to section 447.203(4)."' The
1976 amendment specifically excluded school principals as manage-
ment. Nevertheless, the two cases may still be significant in that
they reflected a narrow construction of PERA's managerial exclu-
sionary provisions.
The extent to which Seminole and Marion still reflect PERC's
position on managerial exclusion is not clear. Both cases proceeded
from an important premise: since article I, section 6 of the Florida
154. Seminole Educ. Ass'n, No. 8H-RA-754-1001, slip op. at 6.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. (1977).
158. 1 F.P.E.R. 28 (PERC 1975).
159. Id. at 29.
160. Id.
161. Act of June 22, 1976, ch. 76-214, § 1, 1976 Fla. Laws 390 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
447.203(4)(a)(6) (1977)).
19781
294 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:263
Constitution assures all public employees the right to engage in
collective bargaining, a provision of PERA which seeks to divest
such right should be narrowly construed. Therefore, "anyone assert-
ing a claim of managerial status will have the burden of offering
clear and convincing evidence that the standard criteria have been
satisfied."'
The narrow construction of managerial exclusions applied by
PERC in Seminole and Marion is not yet settled law. A recent
decision by the First District Court of Appeal cast some doubt on
the commission's construction. In Miami-Dade Community Col-
lege District Board of Trustees, the court held that department
chairpersons and program coordinators in a community college are
managerial employees as defined in PERA.'13 In a brief opinion, the
court noted that chairpersons make recommendations on the hiring
of new faculty members, prepare recommendations for promotions
and salary raises for all departmental faculty members, determine
the use of department travel funds, and have some responsibility for
hiring support personnel.' 4 The court concluded that the chairper-
sons fell within the management exclusion definitions of PERA be-
cause they clearly played a role in employee relations' 5 and because
the responsibilities of the chairpersons were neither routine nor min-
isterial. 66 Thus the court held that chairpersons should not be in-
cluded within the employee bargaining unit of the community col-
lege.
Miami-Dade is significant because it invoked a broad interpreta-
tion of the management exclusion provision by excluding supervi-
162. 1 F.P.E.R. at 29.
163. 341 So. 2d 1054, 1056 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977); cf. United Faculty Ass'n of St.
Petersburg Junior College, FTP/NEA, 3 F.P.E.R. 80 (PERC 1977) (holding that directors of
academic divisions are managerial employees who should be excluded from the employee
bargaining unit).
164. 341 So. 2d at 1055-56.
165. Id. at 1056; FLA. STAT. § 447.203(4)(a)(5) (1977).
166. 341 So. 2d at 1055; FLA. STAT. § 447.203(4)(a)(5) (1977). The Miami-Dade decision
suggests that Florida courts may pass quite readily on PERC's findings concerning unit
definitions in the future. Normally, there is a general reluctance on the part of courts to
second-guess unit determinations made by labor relations boards. See Universal Camera
Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951); Sullivan v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 364 N.E.2d 1099
(Mass. App. 1977). See also Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473 (1964). However, it
appears settled that, while a PERC order decreeing a representation election and specifying
the unit is not a final order for purposes of securing judicial review, the actual certification
of the unit following the election does constitute final agency action from which an appeal
can be taken to the appropriate district court of appeal. Panama City v. PERC, 333 So. 2d
470 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976); School Board v. PERC, 333 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1976) (Sarasota County). Thus, an unfair labor practice case is not an appropriate
proceeding for a public employer to attack the appropriateness of the certified bargaining
unit. Pinellas County School Bd., 3 F.P.E.R. 158 (PERC 1977).
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sory positions from an employee bargaining unit. The court clearly
characterized high-level supervisory positions as management and
pointed in explanation to their supervisory functions. Also notewor-
thy is the court's silence on the constitutional argument relied on
by PERC in Seminole and Marion. In fact, the Miami-Dade court
did not even cite these relevant PERC decisions.
In summary, resolution of disputes over managerial exclusions of
supervisors will depend on the extent of supervisory responsibility
in each particular case and the type of public employee group in-
volved. The higher the level of supervisory responsibility and policy
involvement, the greater the likelihood that PERC will designate
the supervisory position as management. In unit cases where lower
level supervisory positions cannot be excluded from the unit, PERC
might nevertheless characterize the supervisory positions as man-
agement on the theory that to do otherwise would create a conflict
of interest with most of the employees in the proposed unit. Such a
decision would leave those supervisors free to claim their bargaining
rights under PERA as a separate unit. '
In practice, the matter of managerial exclusion is usually worked
out on an ad hoc basis. This results in exclusion of supervisory titles
as managerial in some cases but not in others. Sometimes no reason
is given for excluding the supervisory positions from the employee
unit. Typically this happens when the parties leave the issue to be
decided at some future date following a consent election.
Florida's problems with managerial exclusions and supervisory
unionism are understandable in view of the Florida statute. Those
contemplating legislation in the field would do well to clarify such
issues as: whether or not supervisory employees may bargain collec-
tively; whether supervisory employees should be prohibited from
inclusion in the same unit with those they supervise; whether super-
visory employees may be represented by or affiliated with the same
union which represents the employees they supervise; whether there
should be a more precise statutory definition of managerial exclu-
sions by specification of certain job titles or classifications; whether
a more systematic scheme for such specification should be left to the
167. FLA. STAT. § 447.307(4)(h) (1977) requires PERC in unit determination cases to
consider "[sluch other factors and policies as the commission [PERC1 may deem appropri-
ate." FLA. DEP'T. CoM. PERC R. § 8H-3.31 provides that PERC must consider "the presence
of possible conflict of interest of employees in the proposed unit." There does not seem to be
any serious question as to whether supervisory public employees may bargain collectively in
Florida, although the issue has not ben raised in a court of competent jurisdiction. See also
United Faculty Ass'n of St. Petersburg Junior College, FTP/NEA, 3 F.P.E.R. 80 (PERC
1977), in which PERC excluded certain employees from the unit as supervisors rather than
under the managerial/confidential designation.
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labor board; whether the scope of negotiable subjects should be
statutorily narrowed where supervisory employees negotiate with
management in order to minimize conflict between the two. Rather
than address such issues, lawmakers may choose to draw a rather
broadly defined managerial exclusion provision which permits, on
an ad hoc basis, exclusion of middle- and high-level supervisory
employees from statutory coverage. This is the approach which has
been followed in Florida.
4. Statutory Criteria for Defining Bargaining Units
As previously noted, the weight of authority in public sector labor
relations is to define the largest feasible bargaining unit comensur-
ate with reasonable employee community of interest and practical
workability. The statutory criteria for unit definition in Florida's
PERA reflect this bias toward large units:
(a) The principles of efficient administration of government.
(b) The number of employee organizations with which the em-
ployer might have to negotiate.
(c) The compatibility of the unit with the joint responsibilities
of the public employer and public employees to represent the pub-
lic.
(d) The power of government officials at the unit level to agree
or make effective recommendations to another administrative au-
thority or legislative body with respect to matters of employment
upon which the employee desires to negotiate.
(e) The organizational structure of the public employer.
(f) Community of interest among the employees.
(g) The statutory authority of the public employer to administer
a classification and pay plan.
(h) Such other factors and policies as the commission may deem
appropriate. However, no unit shall be established or approved for
purposes of collective bargaining which includes both professional
and nonprofessional employees unless a majority of each group votes
for inclusion in such a unit.6 8
Items (c), (d), and (f) above are identical to New York's statutory
criteria.' The interpretation and application of these criteria by the
New York Public Employee Relations Board (PERB) and courts
establish beyond question a pattern of favoring large and compre-
hensive units. 70
168. FLA. STAT. § 447.307(4) (1977); see Mack, supra note 89.
169. N.Y. Civ. SEav. LAW § 207 (McKinney Supp. 1969).
170. See Rock, supra note 96, at 1001-16. See also State of N.Y., 2 P.E.R.B. 4183 (N.Y.
PERB 1969); New York State Thruway, 1 P.E.R.B. 4062 (N.Y. PERB 1968); State of N.Y.,
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Under the single criterion of "community of interest," PERA
identifies five key factors: the manner in which wages and other
terms of employment are determined; the method by which jobs and
salary classifications are determined; interdependence of jobs and
interchange of employees; desires of the employees; and the history
of employee relations within the organization of the public employer
concerning organization and negotiation.'
5. Defining State Worker Units
a. The State University System
State worker bargaining units have been defined two ways in
Florida: by PERC decision in the case of the university system and,
more recently, by PERC rules with respect to other state workers.
The experience in the university system reveals the complexities
of defining comprehensive public-sector bargaining units. The uni-
versity system was the first state employer for which there was a
unit determination proceeding in Florida. And the determination
occurred at an early stage of PERA's development.
As previously noted,7 2 defining a bargaining unit in government
raises substantial policy issues. These issues include the size of the
employee group to be represented, the impact on the existing pay
plan, the authority of specified public officials to administer the
agency, and the scope of the negotiation. In the private sector, unit
definition does not have quite such a pervasive impact on institu-
tional policy as it has in the public sector. For example, employer
authority is more defined and the functional diversity of the enter-
prise is less pronounced in the private sector, and greater numbers
of jobs may be combined more readily to form a unit. Furthermore,
there is no need to conform private units to civil service job classifi-
cation and pay plans and other existing statutory schemes relating
to terms and conditions of employment. Moreover, state worker
units generally deal with more employees than do those routinely
encountered in private business."'
1 P.E.R.B. 3226 (N.Y. PERB 1968); Malone Cent. School Dist., 1 P.E.R.B. 3150 (N.Y.
PERB 1968).
171. FLA. STAT. § 447.307(4)(f) (1977); cf. National Labor Relations Act § 9(b), 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(b) (1970) (criteria for unit determination by the NLRB); See also Olinkraft, Inc., 179
N.L.R.B. 61 (1969); Kennecott Copper Corp., 176 N.L.R.B. 96 (1969); Kalamazoo Paper Box
Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 134 (1962); FLA. STAT. § 447.307(1)(b) (1977) (PERC shall approve unit
as appropriate absent inclusion of prohibited category of employees when unit has been
recognized by the public employer).
172. See Rock, supra note 96.
173. Id. See also McHugh, supra note 65, at 58-61.
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What happened in Florida's university system illustrates these
differences. Under state law, the Florida State University System
(FSUS) includes nine universities on as many campuses and is gov-
erned by a Board of Regents (BOR) appointed by the Governor.",
A statewide executive staff is headed by the chancellor of the sys-
tem, who is appointed by the BOR. 1 5 College and university presi-
dents administer the individual universities.'76
The United Faculty of Florida (UFF) filed a Petition for Certifica-
tion on December 16, 1974, seeking to represent a unit composed of
all faculty and professional employees of the state university sys-
tem. "'77 On December 19, 1974, the Florida Chapter of the American
Association of University Professors (AAUP) filed a Motion to Inter-
vene but did not describe what it deemed to be an appropriate
unit.7 8 The two law schools within the system-at Florida State
University and the University of Florida-sought a separate com-
prehensive statewide unit of law professors through the FSUS Law
Faculty Association (LFA).175 Similarly, the Florida Engineering
Faculty Association (FEFA) sought a unit of all engineering faculty
in the university system.18'
In addition, a representation petition was filed by the University
of Florida Health Center Faculty Association (HCFA).15 ' HCFA
sought to represent certain employees associated with the J. Hillis
Miller Health Center at the University of Florida campus in Gaines-
ville. Finally, a petition seeking to represent extension agent em-
ployees of the Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences (IFAS) at
the University of Florida campus was filed by the IFAS Faculty
Association (IFAS-FA).52 All these petitions were consolidated for
a hearing by PERC.5 3
174. FLA. STAT. § 240.001 (1977).
175. Id. § 240.0042(2)(c).
176. Id. § 240.042(2)(d).
177. United Faculty of Fla., No. 8H-RC-745-0002 (Fla. PERC, filed Dec. 16, 1974).
178. Id. (motion filed pursuant to FLA. AD. CODE R. 8H-3.05).
179. University of Fla. Law Faculty Ass'n, No. 8H-RC-754-0032 (Fla. PERC, filed Jan.
3, 1976); Florida State Univ. Law School Ass'n, No. 8H-RC-755-0003 (Fla. PERC, filed Jan.
28, 1975).
180. University of Fla. Eng'r Faculty Ass'n, No. 8H-RC-755-0006 (Fla. PERC, filed Jan.
29, 1975).
181. University of Fla. Health Center Faculty Ass'n, No. 8H-RC-755-0008 (Fla. PERC,
filed Jan. 28, 1975).
182. IFAS Faculty Ass'n, No. 8H-RC-755-0004 (Fla. PERC, filed Jan. 29, 1975).
183. PERC held representation hearings in March, April, and May (a total of about 17
days) to take evidence on the unit issues. On November 21, 1975, the hearing officer issued
his report recommending an appropriate unit for the FSUS. State Univ. Sys. Bd. of Regents
3 F.P.E.R. 39 (PERC 1977).
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After receiving briefs and hearing all testimony,"' PERC defined
four bargaining units for the Florida State University System:
184. The petitions cited in notes 177-82 supra were consolidated in State Univ. Sys. Bd.
of Regents, 3 F.P.E.R. 39 (PERC 1977). At the hearings, considerable testimony was pre-
sented to show why these particular bargaining units were appropriate. That testimony is
summarized here as an indication of evidence which PERC found persuasive.
The LFA presented testimony that emphasized the following factors to show that the law
schools' faculty did not share a community of interest with other faculty: law students must
be enrolled as full-time students, while students in other programs may attend school part-
time; the average law school class is approximately 45-50 students, whereas in other graduate
departments in the university, the average class is 10-12 students; the law schools are not
located on the central campus but rather are housed in separate buildings away from the main
campus; both law schools have their own administrative offices and libraries (students' re-
cords and transcripts are maintained at the law schools); unlike other departments, the law
schools establish their own admission standards; both law schools publish their own law
review journal; the law schools conduct clinical programs. The LFA emphasized that the
Florida Supreme Court has indirect control over internal operations of the law schools due
to its inherent power to govern the practice of law in Florida. Thus an individual must be a
graduate from an accredited law school for admission to The Florida Bar. The LFA argued
that because the law schools are subjected to accreditation standards established by the
American Bar Association and the American Association of Law Schools, the law schools
must maintain a certain amount of autonomy from the regular university system which might
be compromised by inclusion in an overwhelming employee unit. Thus, external accrediting
agencies require that law faculty salaries be maintained above a specified level. And finally,
the LFA emphasized that the average faculty salary at the law schools is two to four thousand
dollars higher than the average university faculty salary. Id. at 40.
IFAS-FA emphasized the following factors in seeking a separate unit for the extension
agents faculty. IFAS faculty employees are located primarily in Gainesville; other employees
operate out of either the research extension centers or the county extension center. Approxi-
mately 95% of the extension faculty derive more than 50% of their salary from extension
sources and are considered federal appointments; because the extension service and experi-
mental agricultural stations operated by WAS cooperate closely with the U.S. Department
of Agriculture and make use of federal monies specifically earmarked for the agricultural
experiment stations, some WAS county agents and extension employees derive their salaries
solely from federal appropriations. Each county in Florida has an extension program in which
the results of research are extended to the people of Florida, and the employees in these
extension centers are funded cooperatively by the state and county (though they are consid-
ered employees of the University of Florida Campus (UF). See FLA. STAT. § 241.193(3) (1977).
UF has the ultimate responsibility for appointing all WAS faculty. But local county commis-
sioners have the right to approve or reject the employment of county extension workers in
their respective counties, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture must approve the appoint-
ment of the IFAS deans. 3 F.P.E.R. at 41; FLA. STAT. § 241.193(3)-(4) (1977). UF can termi-
nate IFAS county agents, but the county can only recommend termination; however, a county
can effectively compel the transfer of an IFAS county agent by withholding funds to pay the
county-committed portion of the salary. FLA. STAT. § 241.193(2) (1977). Of the approximately
800 IFAS faculty positions, only approximately 60 are full-time classroom teachers, and 160-
200 UF faculty members fill IFAS faculty positions through joint appointments with other
UF departments and joint relationships among teaching, research, and extension functions.
County faculty members are not in tenure-accruing positions but are accorded tenure within
the extension service program, the promotion requirements being determined by UF. Accord-
ingly, IFAS-FA argued that it had a separate community of interest from the other faculty
in the university system. 3 F.P.E.R. at 41.
Both the Board of Regents and the AAUP were in near agreement with UFF's proposed
statewide unit. Id. However, the AAUP originally proposed a "pure" teaching unit and sought
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1. A systemwide unit composed essentially of all faculty from the
nine campuses, including nonacademic professionals performing
professional support functions such as research associates, certain
directors, librarians, and counselors, and including part-time em-
ployees who work half-time or more, as well as certain stipulated
chairpersons. Deans, vice-presidents, provosts, presidents, chan-
cellors, vice-chancellors and certain employees in other managerial
and confidential positions were excluded from this "large unit."
2. A single, separate systemwide bargaining unit composed of the
two State University System Colleges of Law, located at the
Gainesville (University of Florida) and Tallahassee (Florida State
University) campuses. The deans of these colleges were also ex-
cluded.
3. Faculty members employed at the J. Hillis Miller Health Cen-
ter at the University of Florida in Gainesville (colleges of Medicine,
Nursing, Pharmacy, and Veterinary Medicine).
4. Faculty members employed at the Institute of Food and Agri-
cultural Sciences (IFAS) of the University of Florida in Gaines-
ville.'"
PERC rejected a separate bargaining unit for engineering faculty,
saying that the evidence to justify such a unit was insufficient. In
addition, PERC refused to include graduate and teaching assistants
in the large unit.'58 As of the end of January, 1978, there had been
no petitions filed for election in the IFAS, Health Center, or law
school units. In contrast, the large unit held an election in 1976, in
which UFF earned the right to negotiate a contract with FSUS for
this unit. 17 A contract dated October 1, 1976, was negotiated. That
the inclusion of all chairpersons and the exclusion of all teaching graduate students. It also
sought to exclude a majority of positions on the administrative and professional pay schedule
(i.e., nonteaching professional staff). The UFF, on the other hand, had initially sought a
single, comprehensive unit of faculty and certain nonteaching professionals, together with
teaching and research assistants and department chairmen and directors whose primary
responsibility was teaching. The UFF sought to exclude all administrative officers, including
but not limited to those with titles such as dean; assistant dean; associate dean: provost; vice-
president; president; director; chairpersons or division heads whose duties are not primarily
teaching, research, or comparable professional work; registrar; and head coach.
The Board of Regents recommended the exclusion of graduate student teaching positions.
BOR also sought a single unit including all instructional and research faculty and administra-
tive and professional employees of the state university system except managerial or confiden-
tial employees as defined in the Act.
During the course of the hearing and afterwards, the BOR, AAUP, and UFF stipulated that
there are approximately 6,000 to 9,000 employees in the appropriate bargaining unit.
185. 3 F.P.E.R. at 39-40.
186. Id. at 42.
187. The results of this election were as follows:
19781 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
contract provided for a renewal of salary negotiations in October,
1976. These negotiations resulted in agreement after an impasse in
April, 1977.88 The contract expires in June, 1978.
The issue of whether or not university system graduate teaching
and research students were covered under PERA and therefore enti-
tled to bargain collectively was not resolved until late in 1977.
PERC ruled then that graduate teaching and research students con-
stitute an appropriate statewide bargaining unit. As of January,
1978, a petition for election had not been filed.'18
In Favor Of Number Percent
UFF 2,344 46
No agent 1,304 26
AAUP/NEA 701 14
Challenged and void 226 4
Valid and challenged ballots 4,570 90
Total Eligible 5,100 100
United Faculty of Fla., 2 F.P.E.R. 50, 51 (PERC 1976).
188. UFF's final proposal was placed on the bargaining table on January 31, 1977, and
an impasse was declared shortly thereafter. As provided by FLA. STAT. § 447.403(2) (1977),
PERC appointed former Governor LeRoy Collins as special master. Governor Collins con-
ducted hearings on February 17 and 18, and his report was issued on March 9, 1977. Negotia-
tions between UFF and BOR resumed on March 22. After an all-night bargaining session,
both parties accepted the special master's recommendations virtually intact, and agreement
was announced on April 20, 1977. See Summary of the Board of Regents/United Faculty of
Florida Reopener Negotiations (April 1977) (on file with Florida Board of Regents).
After an agreement had finally been reached by UFF and BOR, the Florida Legislature
refused to pay the agreed-upon salary increases. The legislature provided sufficient funds for
a 5.87% increase, which was elevated to 7.17% through cutbacks in other areas. This was 1.5%
less than the amount agreed on by UFF and BOR, and substantially below the amount
recommended to the legislature by Governor Reubin Askew. See Letter from E.T. York
(Chancellor of the Board of Regents) to Donald L. Tucker (Speaker of the House) (June 20,
1977) (on file at Florida Board of Regents).
On July 15, 1977, UFF filed an unfair labor practice charge against BOR, pursuant to FLA.
STAT. § 447.501(1)(a), (c) (1977). UFF charged BOR with having failed to represent the views
of the legislative body of the public employer during the negotiations, as required by FLA.
STAT. § 447.309(1) (1977). United Faculty of Fla., No. CA77-083 (Fla. PERC, filed July 15,
1977). The case was closed on October 6, 1977, when PERC issued order no. 77-445, granting
BOR's motion to dismiss.
That same day, UFF filed a petition for an administrative hearing before BOR, so that BOR
could explain its failure to provide enough money for the salary increases. The petition was
filed pursuant to the Florida Administrative Procedure Act, FLA. STAT. § 120.57 (1977). BOR
denied UFF's petition for a hearing, and UFF promptly filed another unfair labor practice
charge under § 447.501. United Faculty of Fla., No. CA77-087 (Fla. PERC, filed July 22,
1977). The case was closed on January 12, 1978, when PERC issued order no. 78U-014,
granting a motion to dismiss.
For complete details, inquiries should be directed to the Commission Clerk, PERC, 2003
Apalachee Pkwy., Tallahassee, Fla.
See text accompanying notes 43-58 for an in-depth examination of the statutory impasse
procedures.
189. See United Faculty of Fla., FEA/United, AFT, Local #1880, 3 F.P.E.R. 304, 305
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b. Other State Worker Units
In June, 1975, the Florida Nurses Association (FNA) filed a peti-
tion for certification seeking a bargaining unit of state nurses.110 The
state sought a larger unit of all positions related to health care
functions, including nurses. After extensive hearings, PERC defined
by rule a Professional Health Care Unit composed of nurses, thera-
pists, nutritionists, some physicians, psychiatrists, and other
health-related professional positions, including supervisory
nurses."1 PERC then approved a consent election agreement be-
tween the state and FNA. 192 FNA received 1,146 of 1,572 valid and
challenged ballots tallied. Consequently, PERC certified FNA as
the exclusive bargaining representative for professional health care
workers on March 9, 1977.114 By the first week of May, 1977, the state
and FNA had agreed to a contract.
On March 20, 1975, the Florida Police Benevolent Association
(PBA) filed a petition for certification seeking a Law Enforcement
Unit composed primarily of highway patrolmen-but including cor-
porals, pilots, and certain marine officers." 5 In the ensuing election,
PBA received 981 of 1226 votes cast from a total of 1557 eligible
voters. The parties negotiated a contract effective July 1, 1976,
with a wage and fringe benefits reopener for fiscal year 1977-1978.
Negotiations under the reopener reached an impasse. A special
master issued a factfinding report, and the legislature held public
hearings on the report in May, 1977. This was the first time the
(PERC 1977), in which PERC noted that "[a] more classic example of an employer-
employee relationship can hardly be imagined."
190. Florida Nurses Ass'n, 2 F.P.E.R. 45 (PERC 1976).
191. State of Fla., 2 F.P.E.R. 166, 167 (PERC 1976). The commission specifically
amended the hearing officer's recommendation to include health care supervisors in the same
unit with other health care professionals, finding that their duties were similar and that the
inclusion would not cause enough conflict to merit exclusion.
192. Consent elections are provided for in FA. DEW'T COM. PERC R. § 8H-3.16. Briefly,
if the parties agree on an appropriate unit which has been approved by PERC, they may
waive pre-election hearings and hold an election to resolve the issue of majority status.
193. Florida Nurses Ass'n, No. 8H-RC-741-0035 (Fla. PERC Mar. 9, 1977) (Order No.
77E-112).
Votes Number Percent
In favor of FNA 1,146 44
Against FNA 196 7
Challenged and void votes 236 9
Valid and challenged counted 1,572 60
Total Eligible 2,635 100
194. Id.
195. Florida Police Benevolent Ass'n, No. 8H-RC-756-2085 (Fla. PERC Dec. 15, 1975).
196. Id. (Order No. 75E-661).
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legislature had held such hearings. The legislature lacked a formal
procedure for handling the matter. Nevertheless, the lawmakers
sought unsuccessfully to resolve the matter through the appropria-
tion act. The intent of the appropriation act and the effect of the
legislature's action will be determined in an administrative hear-
ing.' 97
The American Federation of State, County and Municipal Em-
ployees (AFSCME) petitioned in August, 1975, to represent em-
ployees of state hospitals and rehabilitative and correctional institu-
tions. 9 In response to this petition, PERC defined a human services
unit composed of correctional officers, technicians, certain nonpro-
fessional health services workers, and facility services workers. A
consent election agreement was approved by PERC on March 16,
1976. PERC later incorporated this unit by rule with the other state
worker units. In a 1976 election, AFSCME received 7,754 of 9,591
votes cast. There were 774 votes against representation. There were
14,662 eligible voters.'19 Subsequent contract negotiations produced
a written agreement for the period July, 1977 through June, 1978,
covering certain conditions of employment and allowing new nego-
tiations over "all unresolved issues ... including all economic issues
''200
Votes Number Percent
For PBA 981 63
Against PBA 164 11
Challenged and void votes 85 5
Valid and challenged counted 1,226 79
Total Eligible 1,557 100
197. PBA, as the bargaining agent for the law enforcement bargaining unit, contends that
the state has not complied with the intent of the appropriations act regarding salary increases
for unit members and has requested a hearing on the matter pursuant to the Administrative
Procedure Act, FLA. STAT. § 120.57 (1977). Letter from Mallory E. Home, Counsel for Police
Benevolent Association, to Conley M. Kennison, Director of the Division of Personnel, Florida
Department of Administration (Oct. 26, 1977).
198. American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees, No. 8H-RC-751-0202 (Fla.
PERC Dec. 21, 1976).
199. Id. (Order No. 76E-1405).
Votes Number Percent
For AFSCME 7,754 53
Against AFSCME 774 5
Challenged and void votes 1,082 7
Valid and challenged counted 9,591 65
Total Eligible 14,662 100
200. Some of the matters covered were: recognition; dues check-off; a nondiscrimination
policy; disciplinary action for employees with and without permanent status; economic mat-
ters, including pay adjustments and merit increases; and a no-strike agreement. Agreement
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In March, 1976, the State Department of Administration filed a
petition, pursuant to sections 120.54(b)(4) and 447.201(1) of the
Florida Statutes,0 1 to adopt a rule establishing bargaining units for
state employees. In its petition, the department proposed that four
statewide occupational units be established by rule in addition to
the law enforcement and human services units previously approved
by consent elections.202
At a public hearing on April 8, 1976, PERC determined that it
had authority to define state worker bargaining units by rule.0 3
PERC reasoned that a rule would expedite the exercise of the consti-
tutional and statutory right to bargain by state employees and also
would enhance administration of the collective bargaining pro-
cess.0 ' At the conclusion of the hearing, PERC directed its staff to
initiate proceedings on the adoption of a rule to establish units for
all state employees. 05 On June 18, 1976, PERC fulfilled the notice
requirements for compliance with the rulemaking procedures of the
Florida Administrative Procedure Act.20 6
The Career Service Employees Federation, Local No. 3186
(CSEF), requested a hearing on the proposed rule. Hearings were
held by PERC on July 1, 2, and 21, 1976. CSEF unsuccessfully
sought a separate unit for career service employees in the university
system.207 On August 12, 1976, the hearing officer issued a report
setting forth the factual matters underlying PERC's unit determi-
nation by rule and isolating the major points of contention.20 1 PERC
convened on August 16, 1976, to consider the state's petition, as
employer, to establish bargaining units for state workers by rule. 29
After hearing arguments, PERC adopted the hearing officer's report
subject to minor modifications, incorporating it into the commission
decision.
PERC's decision and rule defined seven units. These units in-
clude the Law Enforcement and Human Services Units.210 PERC
between State of Florida and Florida State Employers Council No. 79, American Federation
of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, Human Services Unit, at 32 (July 1,
1977).
201. (1977).
202. State of Fla., 2 F.P.E.R. 111 (PERC 1976). The hearing officer's report may be found
at State of Fla., 2 F.P.E.R. 120 (PERC 1976).
203. 2 F.P.E.R. 111. PERC found its authority in the Florida Administrative Procedure
Act, FLA. STAT. ch. 120 (1977), and PERA, id. ch. 447.
204. 2 F.P.E.R. 111.
205. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 120.54 (1977).
206. State of Fla., 2 F.P.E.R. 166, 167 (PERC 1976).
207. See State of Fla., 2 F.P.E.R. 120, 125 (PERC 1976).
208. 2 F.P.E.R. 120.
209. See FtA. STAT. § 120.54(2)-(3) (1977).
210. State of Fla., 2 F.P.E.R. 166; State of Fla., 2 F.P.E.R. 120.
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also clarified the Professional Health Care unit by including health
care supervisory nurses."' By a second amended order, PERC in-
cluded state attorney investigators and special agents within the
Law Enforcement Bargaining Unit. 2
On December 28, 1977, the results of an election in the skilled
professional unit of state employees were announced. By a 4-1 mar-
gin, the 9,200 skilled workers voted to authorize AFSCME to repre-
sent them in bargaining talks with the state."']
The PERC rule describing state worker units in Florida may be
summarized as follows: with respect to state employees, no petition
will be entertained, except under extraordinary circumstances,
when the petition seeks certification of a bargaining unit not in
substantial accord with the provisions of the PERC rule on state
worker units. Bargaining units will be established on a statewide
basis, with one unit for each of the following occupational groups,
excluding in each case all managerial and confidential employees:
NON-PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES:
Unit 1: Administrative and Clerical, including all non-
professional employees whose work involves the keeping or exami-
nation of records and accounts, or general office work;
Unit 2: Operational Services, including laborers and artisans, as
well as technicians, mechanics, operators, and service workers
[election won by AFSCME on June 16, 1978];
Unit 3: Human or Institutional Services [AFSCME represents
this unit under a 1977-78 contract];
PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES:
Unit 4: Health Care, including all supervisory employees of
health care professionals [FNA represents this unit under a 1977-
79 contract];
Unit 5: All other professionals [AFSCME represents this unit
under a contract which runs until June, 1978];
211. 2 F.P.E.R. at 167.
212. See Florida Police Benevolent Ass'n, Inc., 3 F.P.E.R. 93 (PERC 1977).
212.1 American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees, AFL-CIO, No. 8H-RC-763-
0045 (Fla. PERC Jan. 9, 1978) (unnumbered order). Results of this election were as follows:
For AFSCME 3,522
Against AFSCME 853
Challenged ballots 129
Void ballots 73
Total eligible 8,772
Total valid votes 4,375
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LAW ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYEES:
Unit 6: All sworn law enforcement officers [PBA represents this
unit under a contract due to expire in June, 1978];
SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES:
Unit 7: All supervisory employees who have authority, in the
interest of the State of Florida and its departments, divisions,
bureaus, sections, and sub-sections as the Public Employer to hire,
transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, promote, discharge, assign, re-
ward, or discipline other employees, or responsibility to direct
them, or to adjust grievances, or effectively to recommend such
action, provided such exercise of authority is not a routine or cleri-
cal nature. Supervisory employees of the professional employees
included in Unit 4 are expressly excluded from this unit. All profes-
sional supervisory employees shall be given the opportunity to vote
for inclusion in this unit as set forth in section 447.309(4)(h) of the
Act. If such employees vote for non-inclusion in this unit, a sepa-
rate unit shall be established for professional supervisory employ-
ees.
213
PERC may hold additional hearings concerning the specific job
classifications of the above units or approve consent agreements
between the state as public employer and employee organizations,
provided these agreements are consistent with the unit structure
defined in the rule and the requirements for consent agreements
prescribed in section 447.307 of the Florida Statutes214 and PERC's
rules and regulations.215
c. Local Government and the Problem of Excessive Fragmentation
At the local government level, PERC has sought to avoid
"excessive fragmentation" of employee bargaining units.21 Under-
standably, firefighters and police have their own separate units
apart from other local government employees.2 1
7
213. 2 F.P.E.R. at 167; see FLA. STAT. § 447.203(4)-(5) (1977).
214. (1977).
215. FLA. DEP'T COM. PERC R., §§ 8H-2.01 to .09, -3.15.
216. This is not to say that there should be no fragmentation but only that fragmentation
should not be excessive. See Florida Nurses Ass'n, 2 F.P.E.R. 112 (PERC 1976); U.B.C. Pub.
Employees Local #2113, 2 F.P.E.R. 91 (PERC 1976). See generally FLA. DEP'T COM. PERC
R. § 8H-3.31, under which PERC is authorized to consider "avoiding excessive fragmentation
of bargaining units," among other factors, in determining the appropriateness of bargaining
units.
217. Application of the "community of interest" criterion under § 447.307(4)(f), Florida
Statutes (1977), has resulted in segregation of various police or security employees. In Florida
State Lodge Fraternal Order of Police, 1 F.P.E.R. 8 (PERC 1975), PERC approved a unit for
police officers but excluded the administrative secretary to the police chief, animal control
officers, communications operators, bailiffs, court clerks, clerks, typists, and custodial work-
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In local school districts, teachers are usually defined in a separate
bargaining unit which may include professional support staff. As
noted earlier, supervisory unionism insofar as school principals are
concerned presents no problem because principals are specifically
excluded from employee units by PERA. 18The continuing challenge
has been to avoid excessive fragmentation with respect to other local
government employees, typically municipal workers. 19
There are no comprehensive studies of local governmental unit
determinations in Florida. Generally speaking, at the local govern-
ment level one might expect that a medium-sized school district of
about 1,000 teachers and an equal number of other school district
employees2 would have three units: (1) a professional unit com-
posed primarily of certified school teachers, but also including
coaches, counselors, speech therapists, and similar support staff; (2)
a nonprofessional blue-collar unit of bus drivers, food service, cus-
todial and maintenance, and other blue-collar employees; and (3) a
clerical and administrative unit of secretaries, bookkeepers, com-
puter or keypunch operators, clerks, and nonsupervisory adminis-
trative personnel.2'
In contrast, medium-sized municipal ehployers, in addition to
separate units for firefighters and police, might have: (1) a blue-
collar unit; (2) a clerical and administrative, or white-collar, unit;
and in some cases (3) a professional unit.2 2 There is some authority
to suggest that small- to medium-sized local governments could
have a single comprehensive employee bargaining unit.223 In larger
ers as not having a community of interest because the latter did not serve as sworn police
officers.
218. FLA. STAT. § 447.203(4)(a)(6) (1977).
219. The effort is to avoid carving a small group of employees out of a large, comprehen-
sive unit. Laborers' Local Union 1306, 1 F.P.E.R. 18 (PERC 1975). See also note 221 infra.
220. For example, Marion County had an estimated population of 98,362 in 1976. Bureau
of Economic & Business Research, University of Florida, Florida Estimates of Population,
July 1, 1977, State, Counties and Municipalities 35 (Feb. 1978). The county employed 1,046
full-time instructional personnel and 1,099 support personnel. DIvIS1ON OF PUBLc SCHOOLS,
FLORIDA DEP'T OF EDUCATION, PROFILE VI, PROFILES OF FLORIDA SCHOOL DIsTRcTs 1975-76, at
166 (1976). Florida's most populous county, according to the 1976 estimates, was Dade, with
1,449,300 people; the least populous was Lafayette, with 3,277. See Bureau of Economic &
Business Research, supra at 34.
221. PERC rejected a unit of full-time bus drivers employed by the Clay County School
Board, citing the "principles of efficient administration" criterion set forth in FLA. STAT. §
447.307(4)(a) (1977). Clay County Bus Drivers Ass'n, 1 F.P.E.R. 15 (PERC 1975).
222. See FLA. STAT. § 447.307(4)(h) (1977). This section prohibits the inclusion of profes-
sionals and nonprofessionals in the same bargaining unit unless a majority of both units votes
for inclusion. PERC's decisions also disclose a trend in favor of separate blue- and white-collar
units. See, e.g., Communications Workers of America, 2 F.P.E.R. 158 (PERC 1976).
223. In Laborers' Local Union #1101, 2 F.P.E.R. 161, 161-62 (PERC 1976), PERC rejected
a petition for a unit of select groups of county employees in favor of a countywide unit and
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cities, the greater numbers of public employees may well result in
more fragmented units.
It is fair to say that PERC will favor larger units. However, cir-
cumstances may permit some fragmentation if a strong community
of interest seems to require it.24
D. The Negotiation Process
1. Procedures for Negotiation
After an employee union has been certified by PERC as the exclu-
sive bargaining agent for a unit, both the union and the public
employer, through its chief executive officer or his representative,
said, "[wihen seeking to define an appropriate bargaining unit, this Commission must be
mindful of the problems which confront an employer that is required to negotiate with
numerous bargaining agents. Consequently, we have consistently prohibited fragmentation
and have encouraged the formation of broad units."
When dealing with smaller employers with small numbers of employees, an effort may be
made to avoid excessive fragmentation by grouping residual employees into the larger unit,
even though whether they share a community of interest may be somewhat questionable.
Thus, in Florida Nurses Ass'n, 2 FP.E.R. 112 (PERC 1976), in which nurses petitioned for a
single unit of full- and part-time registered nurses, and the employer sought a comprehensive
professional unit, PERC held for a larger unit-because to have granted the nurses a separate
unit would have left forty professional employees without a bargaining unit.
See Laborers' Local Union No. 1306, 2 F.P.E.R. 1, 1 (PERC 1975), in which PERC defined
a single unit of all city employees and rejected a petition for a separate unit composed of the
members of a single department. PERC held that the employees in the proposed departmen-
tal unit did not have "a distinct community of interest." Id. PERC also noted that the
"Commission is looking for broad units, especially if the employer also seeks such a unit."
Id.
Until recently, the City of Miami had contracts with five bargaining units: (1) police
officers; (2) firefighters; (3) blue-collar workers; (4) white-collar workers; and (5) sanitation
workers. Of these, the last three contracts have expired and are presently being renegotiated.
The City of Miami is continuing to honor the expired contracts on a day-to-day basis. Copies
of all five contracts are on file with the Director of Employer Relations for the City of Miami.
224. For example, in Orange County Police Benevolent Ass'n, 1 F.P.E.R. 43 (PERC 1975),
the commission held that security guards did not share a sufficient community of interest
with other airport employees to be included in one overall bargaining unit. But see Town of
Palm Beach Firefighters Local #1866, 2 F.P.E.R. 4 (PERC 1975), in which PERC included
paramedics in a unit with firefighters because of significant job interchangeability. The
author feels that in the latter case excessive fragmentation was the overriding concern, with
the interchangeability rationale being merely a justification for inclusion.
A 1977 amendment to PERA states that "[whenever a public employer recognizes an
employee organization on the basis of majority status and on the basis of appropriateness in
accordance with subsection (4)(f05. of this section, the commission shall . . . certify the
proposed unit." Act of June 24, 1977, ch. 77-343, § 12, 1977 Fla. Laws 1476 (codified at FLA.
STAT. § 447.307(1)(b) (1977)). Prior to this amendment, there was some suggestion that
historical relationships were not persuasive in justifying separate units. See Miami Beach
Prof'l Lifeguard Ass'n, 2 F.P.E.R. 149 (PERC 1976) (refusal to define lifeguards as a separate
appropriate bargaining unit); Florida Nurses Ass'n, 2 F.P.E.R. 112 (PERC 1976) (refusal to
define a unit of nurses separate from other professional health care employees).
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have the duty to engage in good faith collective bargaining." 5 The
chief executive of the public employer is required to consult with,
and to represent the views of, the public employer's legislative body
during collective bargaining sessions."' Any collective bargaining
agreement reached must be reduced to writing and signed by the
chief executive officer and the bargaining agent.
The agreement is not effective until ratified by employees who are
members of the bargaining unit (rather than only by union mem-
bers) and by the public employer.12 7 If either of the parties fails to
ratify the agreement, it is returned for further negotiations.22 1 When
agreement is reached and ratified, PERA requires the chief execu-
tive officer to ask the legislative body to finance the provisions of
the agreement. If less than the requested amount is appropriated by
the legislative body, the agreement must be administered by the
chief executive officer on the basis of the amount appropriated. 29
The Florida statute expressly provides that failure to appropriate
an amount sufficient to fund the collective bargaining agreement
shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice.2 30 If
there are contractual provisions in conflict with the law, the chief
executive officer must seek an amendment of the conflicting law or
regulation from the appropriate governmental body having amenda-
tory power. Until this is done, the conflicting contractual provision
is not effective.231
2. Scope of Negotiation
PERA typically requires negotiation of wages, hours, and terms
and conditions of employment. 2 But no PERC decision definitively
225. FLA. STAT. § 447.309(1) (1977); cf. id. § 447.501(1)(c),(2)(c) (refusing to bargain
collectively or failing to bargain in good faith).
226. FLA. STAT. § 447.309(1) (1977). See note 80 supra for an example of the difficulties
which can arise when a union feels that the management negotiator has failed in his duty
under this provision.
227. FLA. STAT. § 447.309(1) (1977).
228. Id. § 447.309(1), (4).
229. Id. § 447.309(2).
230. Id. See generally note 188 supra.
231. FLA. STAT. § 447.309(3) (1977).
232. Numerous sections of PERA refer to wages, hours, and terms and conditions of
employment. Basically, the parties are required to negotiate on all the terms and conditions
of employment. FLA. STAT. § 447.203(14) (1977). See also id. §§ 447.301(2), .309(1), .403(1).
The following sections of PERA also directly impact on the bargaining of terms and con-
ditions of employment: id. §§ 447.301(2) (retirement not negotiable), .303 (cost of dues
deduction is negotiated), .309(5) (duration of contract), .401 (grievance procedures), .405
(criteria which must be considered by special master), .601 (act does not repeal or prohibit
merit systems for public employees).
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states which subjects are negotiable.1 3 Florida has not yet embraced
the mandatory and permissive dichotomy of negotiable subjects
used in the private sector 3 and in some other public jurisdictions. 35
PERA does, however, regulate certain matters typically included in
collective bargaining agreements. For example, all agreements are
limited to three-year terms and must contain all the terms and
conditions of employment. 3  A 1977 amendment excludes retire-
ment benefits from negotiations. 37
PERA also requires that every collective bargaining agreement
contain a grievance procedure, and the last step of this grievance
procedure must end in binding arbitration by a neutral person se-
lected by the parties.238 The statute also provides that all public
employees must have the right to a fair and equitable grievance
procedure administered without regard to union membership. How-
ever, a 1977 amendment provides that certified employee organiza-
tions are not required to process grievances for employees who are
not members of that organization. 39
Under a 1977 amendment, dues check-offs are given as a matter
of right to a duly certified union but the reasonable cost thereof to
233. However, in Escambia Educ. Ass'n, 2 F.P.E.R. 93, 98 (PERC 1976), PERC found
that promotions, layoffs, transfers of employees, and wage rates are "at the core of collective
bargaining," and thus the employer could not seriously contend that such subjects are not
negotiable. In Duval Teachers United, FEA-AFT, AFL-CIO, 3 F.P.E.R. 96,'100 (PERC 1977),
PERC noted that "[iut is beyond discussion that the discipline or discharge of an employee
is a fundamental condition of employment." Thus, through PERC decisions, a definition of
"terms and conditions of employment" is slowly emerging.
234. See generally, e.g., Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964);
NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
235. See Board of Educ. v. Associated Teachers of Huntington, Inc., 282 N.E.2d 109 (N.Y.
1972); Westwood Community Schools, No. C70 1-152 (Mich. MERC Mar. 24, 1972).
236. FLA. STAT. § 447.309(5) (1977).
237. Act of June 24, 1977, ch. 77-343, § 13, 1977 Fla. Laws 1476 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
447.309(5) (1977)).
238. FiA. STAT. § 447.401 (1977).
239. Act of June 24, 1977, ch. 77-343, § 14, 1977 Fla. Laws 1476 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
447.401 (1977)). The impact of this provision on the doctrine of exclusivity must be ques-
tioned. A situation might arise in which a minority union could represent an employee under
this section. Since the employee may be deprived of the right to be represented by the
bargaining agent at the bargaining agent's option, it would seem that the employee should
then be permitted representation by another organization. A better position is that §
447.301(4), Florida Statutes (1977), which permits employees to be represented by counsel
during the prosecution of their grievances, is sufficient to protect the employee where the
exclusive representative refuses to represent the employee in a contract grievance. Thus,
minority representation could be denied on the basis that it would be bad policy to encourage
minority union representation in grievance administration, thereby undermining the majority
status of the incumbent union. The amendment was backed by union lobbyists and seems
to be intended to encourage employees to join the union on pain of having to pursue their
individual contract grievances at their own expense.
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the employer is a proper subject for negotiation. 40
There is some indication of legislative intent in the statutory
criteria for impasse factfinding that the following subjects should be
negotiable: hazards of employment; physical, educational, and in-
tellectual job qualifications; retirement plans; sick leave; and job
security. 24' One could argue that if a special master is legislatively
mandated to consider such matters in impasse proceedings, it is fair
to conclude that the legislature intended such matters to be negoti-
ated. Presumably, the statutory language mandating bargaining on
wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment should be
read in conjunction with the management rights section of the stat-
ute. 4 ' PERC has held that there may be some overlap between
management rights and working conditions, and that the employer
"must negotiate the areas of overlap. ' ' 24 .2
A provision in the 1977 amendments provides for expedited proce-
dures before PERC to ascertain questions of negotiability.
2 2
3. Statutory Procedures for Impasse Resolution
When a dispute exists and agreement cannot be reached between
negotiating parties, impasse may be created when one of the parties
so declares in writing to the other.4 3 Permissive mediation at the
request of either or both of the parties is authorized by PERA.
Thereafter, if the impasse still exists, PERC must appoint a special
master to conduct a factfinding proceeding to define the areas of
dispute and render a decision with recommendations for resolving
all contractual issues.2 4
The special master, who is authorized to issue subpoenas and
administer oaths, must transmit his recommended decision to
240. Act of June 24, 1977, ch. 77-343, § 10, 1977 Fla. Laws 1476 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
447.303 (1977)).
241. See FLA. STAT. § 447.405 (1977) (defining the statutory standards a special master
must apply at impasse). It should be noted that the inclusion of retirement plans as a factor
to be considered by the special master, id. § 447.405(4)(f), would appear to conflict directly
with id. § 447.309(5), which expressly removes the subject of retirement from bargaining.
241.1. Id. § 447.209.
241.2. Duval Teachers United, FEA-AFT, AFL-CIO, 3 F.P.E.R. 96, 100 (PERC 1977).
242. Act of June 24, 1977, ch. 77-343, § 8, 1977 Fla. Laws 1476 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
447.207(7) (1977)). PERC is in the process of promulgating rules pursuant to that statute.
243. FiA. STAT. § 447.403(1) (1977).
244. Id. § 447.403(2)-(3). The law also requires the special master to consider the following
factors in making his report: local income comparison of similar governmental and private
jobs; the interest and welfare of the public; comparison of peculiarities of employment as to
hazards, physical, educational, or intellectual job qualifications, training and skills, retire-
ment plans, sick leave, job security, and availability of funds. Id. § 447.405.
Compensation for the special master and stenographic and other expenses of the factfinding
proceedings are borne equally by the parties. Id. § 447.407.
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PERC within fifteen days after the final hearings. 45 PERC must
then transmit the decision to the parties within five days.4 The
decision must then be "discussed" by the parties and is deemed to
be approved by both parties unless either rejects it within fifteen
days of receipt.247 If a party chooses to reject the report, it must so
indicate in writing to the other party and state reasons for the rejec-
tion.248 If either of the parties rejects the special master's recom-
mended decision, the chief executive officer must submit it to the
legislative body together with his recommendations concerning the
dispute. 249 The employee organization must also submit its recom-
mendations to the legislative body. 20 Where faculty members
within the university system are concerned, the Board of Regents is
the public employer. But the Governor may also submit his recom-
mendations .51
The legislative body then must conduct "forthwith" a public
hearing at which both parties explain their positions with respect
to the factfinding report and the recommendations. Thereafter, the
legislative body must take "such action as it deems to be in the
public interest, including the interest of the public employees in-
volved. ' 252 Thus, the ultimate power to resolve impasse disputes
involving public workers rests in the legislative body. The parties
may not resort to the extremes which are available in private dis-
putes. Strikes by public employees are unconstitutional in Flor-
ida. 253
Presently, there seem to be few alternatives to factfinding. Since
public strikes are unconstitutional in Florida, the use of economic
weaponry to "encourage" good faith compromise at the bargaining
table is not authorized. Binding arbitration for impasse disputes
does not appear to be a politically acceptable alternative. 254 The
legislature has rejected this approach. Management seems uni-
245. Id. § 447.403(3).
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. § 447.403(4)(a).
250. Id. § 447.403(4)(b).
251. Id. § 447.403(4)(a).
252. Id. § 447.403(4)(d); see note 188 supra.
253. FLA. CoNST. art. I, § 6; FLA. STAT. §§ 447.501(2)(e), .505 (1977).
254. Tallahassee Democrat, Apr. 12, 1977, § A, at 3, col. 2. See also Tampa Tribune, Dec.
12, 1977, § A, at 14, col. 1, relating to the Constitution Revision Commission's approval of a
proposal which would prohibit binding interest arbitration of public employees. The following
proposal will now be part of the proposed constitution to be submitted to the people in
November, 1978: "Binding arbitration is prohibited to resolve impasse in collective bargain-
ing negotiations concerning wages, hours and terms and conditions of employment between
public employees and a public employer."
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formly opposed to binding arbitration, and the public unions do not
unanimously support it.
Pressure to adopt binding impasse arbitration for firefighters met
with little success in the 1977 session of the legislature. 55 If binding
arbitration were to be adopted in Florida, which now seems un-
likely, it would probably be limited to firefighters and perhaps po-
lice.256 Apparently factfinding will be used in Florida for some time
to come.
The theory behind factfinding is that it will encourage public and
political pressure by illuminating the issues; this in turn is thought
to facilitate settlement. The intervention of a third party neutral is
assumed to encourage the spokesmen for both management and
labor to rethink their positions and perhaps make concessions. Fact-
finding requires gathering information and data in support of one's
position on impasse issues. Extreme or unsubstantiated positions
lose force and status in the factfinding forum.
A factfinder's report is advisory; it usually identifies the issues in
dispute; and it contains recommendations for dispute resolution.
Thus, the factfinding process is intended to crystallize thoughtful
public opinion and stimulate commentary, by the news media. Fi-
nally, factfinding fulfills the public's right to know-the right to be
informed on the issues and the merits of the bargaining dispute.
This in turn is likely to bring political awareness to the legislative
body which makes the final and binding determination resolving the
dispute. 5 ' Often, too, labor and management are able to make polit-
ically unpalatable concessions (i.e., to their respective constituen-
cies)-since such concessions are identified with the factfinder's
report. All in all, the success of factfinding depends on the negotiat-
ing skill and civility of the parties, on informed persuasion, and on
a capable factfinder. Indeed, an effective factfinder will often me-
diate the parties to settlement and issue no report at all.
Factfinding in Florida is not without its problems. Unfortunately,
there are no completed evaluative field studies on the subject. The
following outline of the difficulties attendant to factfinding in Flor-
ida is based on the experience and observation of the author.25
255. Tallahassee Democrat, Apr. 12, 1977, § A, at 3, col. 1.
256. By August, 1972, four states provided for compulsory arbitration for both firemen
and policemen: Pennsylvania, Michigan, Rhode Island, and South Dakota. Vermont and
Wyoming provide for binding arbitration for firemen alone. Nevertheless, binding arbitration
provisions for public employees who provide "essential services" appear to be the wave of the
future. See Shaw, The Development of State and Federal Laws, in PUBLIC WORKERS AND
PUBLIC UNIONS 32 (S. Zagoria ed. 1972).
257. See GovERNOR'S COMMITrEE ON Pusuc EMPLOYEE RELATIONS, STATE OF NEW YORK,
FiNAL REPORT 37 (1966) (resolution of deadlocks in collective negotiations).
258. The author is conducting a field study to evaluate the effectiveness of Florida's
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The problems Florida has encountered in impasse factfinding
may be attributed to five general factors. First, and wholly apart
from Florida's peculiarities, there are inherent problems with fact-
finding even at its best. When overused, factfinding tends to dis-
courage good faith bargaining during the table negotiations, and
thus the responsibility of negotiating and its problem-solving vir-
tues are lost. There is a tendency for the parties to resist compro-
mises and to engage in political gamesmanship if one or both view
factfinding as part of the negotiation process. 219 If a party thinks
that the factfinder will make recommendations in its favor, there is
little incentive to reach a compromise before factfinding takes
place. So, too, if a party feels it has the political clout to persuade
the legislative body to adopt its position at the hearing on the fact-
finding report, there will be little incentive to bargain at the table.
Table negotiations then become a mere preamble to the political
maneuvering and negotiations during and after factfinding. 210
When factfinding is automatic, collective bargaining at the table
is discouraged. Involuntary factfinding does not easily accommo-
date the situation where positions have polarized and negotiations
have degenerated into a pure power struggle. In this situation, fact-
finding and the hearing on the report are seen exclusively as the
means for inflicting injury on the adversary. Given an out-and-out
power struggle, factfinding as an exclusive system for dispute settle-
ment is ineffective in proportion to its being involuntarily imposed
on the parties by law. Thus, in a total breakdown situation, it
merely becomes an automatic part of the dispute. The author's
experience as a practitioner convinces him that for factfinding to
work, there must be a considerable degree of civility and negotiating
skill. In the hands of the inexperienced negotiator, who views it as
a cure-all, or the sophisticated obstructionist, factfinding tends to
be ineffective. 26'
A second factor hindering the impasse machinery in Florida is the
resistance by some public employers to the whole idea of bilateral
determination of terms and conditions of employment. The bilater-
impasse procedures. This study should be completed in the summer of 1978. The generaliza-
tions in this article are predicated in part on some emerging trends and are based in part on
information gathered to date and on conversations with practitioners. For a similar study of
the factfinding experience conducted in New York, see B. YAFFE & H. GOLDBLATr, FACTFINDING
IN Puauc EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES IN NEW YORK STATE: MORE PROMISE THAN ILLUSION (1971).
259. See H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, supra note 82, at 178-80. See also B. YAFFE & H.
GOLDBLATT, supra note 258, at 57.
260. Gotbaum, Collective Bargaining and the Union Leader, in PuBuc WORKERS AND
PUBuC UNIONS 83 (S. Zagoria ed. 1972).
261. Id: , "
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alism implicit in the collective bargaining process is viewed as in-
consistent with traditional concepts of sovereignty.6 2 For example,
a public employer might refuse to negotiate on a number of issues.
This refusal to bargain may needlessly polarize the parties and trig-
ger an impasse. Such disputes over negotiability often emerge from
a belief that negotiating the disputed issues into a contract would
result in an illegal delegation of employer authority or a total loss
of employer control over a significant aspect of the governmental
enterprise.
Part of the concern stems from the fact that Florida law requires
that grievance procedures end in binding third party arbitration as
to the interpretation and application of the agreement. Thus, once
an issue is negotiated into the contract, employer authority exer-
cised during contract administration is subject to challenge by the
determination of a third party not accountable to the people.2 3 A
variation on this theme is that since existing state law, outside of
PERA, places responsibility over a particular negotiation issue with
the employer, the employer accordingly has no authority to negoti-
ate on that issue; the issue, therefore, is "non-negotiable. '264 Still
another argument is that the management rights provision in PERA
reserves to the public employer unilateral control over standards of
services, unilateral control over its organization, and the right to
take disciplinary action for cause.2 5 The advocates of this position
pay little heed to the provision's qualifying sentence subjecting
management's rights to the union's right to raise grievances when
such management rights "have the practical consequence of violat-
ing the terms and conditions of any collective bargaining agree-
ment. 12 6 As a result, impasses over negotiability may well result in
an unfair labor practice charge by the union against the public
employer for failure to negotiate in good faith.
262. On March 21, 1944, the Florida attorney general issued an opinion stating in part
that "no organization, regardless of its affiliations, union or nonunion, can tell a political
subdivision possessing the attributes of sovereignty, whom it can employ, how much it shall
pay them, or any other matter or thing relating to its employees." 1944 FLA. Op. ATT'v GEN.
044-88. See also Mugford v. Mayor of Baltimore, 44 A.2d 745 (Md. 1946).
263. See Impasse Between Duval County School Bd. & Duval Teachers United AFT',
AFL-CIO, No. 8H-SM-76-39, slip op. at 4 (Fla. PERC Aug. 31, 1976). On appeal, the First
District Court of Appeal refused to rule on the constitutionality of PERA's statutory require-
ment of binding grievance arbitration and sustained PERC's finding that the school board
refused to bargain in good faith. Duval County School Bd. v. Florida Pub. Employees Rela-
tions Comm'n, 353 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
264. Cf. West Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. Decourcy, 295 A.2d 526 (Conn. 1972); West Ironde-
quoit Bd. of Educ., 4 P.E.R.B. 3070 (N.Y. PERB 1971).
265. FLA. STAT. § 447.209 (1977).
266. Id.
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At the core of these disagreements is the notion that sovereign
authority ultimately reposes in the people and their duly elected
officials. To the extent that collective bargaining involves bilateral
determination of employment conditions, it is seen by some employ-
ers as creating unavoidable and unlawful interference with the sov-
ereign authority of public officials. 267 Thus, such labor-oriented de-
vices as exclusive recognition and "check-off" are often seen as
inviting organized interference with the conduct of public business
and as giving improper preference to union status.2 1 Moreover, use
of grievance arbitrators to resolve contract disputes or use of third-
party factfinders to make pronouncements concerning the merits of
contract disputes are seen as improper abandonment by the sover-
eign of its authority and public responsibility. The strike as a means
for concerted coercion of the employer is viewed as simple insurrec-
tion, if not actual revolution.2 19
In essence, the sovereignty argument is that governments have
the unilateral power and responsibility to fix conditions of employ-
ment. This unique power cannot be given, taken away, or shared.
Organized efforts to interfere by means of collective bargaining are
thus viewed as irreconcilable with the concept of sovereignty and
sovereign authority. 0 In extremis, the argument is a total rejection
of the collective bargaining process.
The extent to which this perception is held by the public em-
ployer bears directly on the chances for compromise at the bargain-
ing table and for acceptance of a factfinding report. It stands to
reason that no impasse procedure will be effective which relies on
advisory factfinding and vests final authority in a group of uncom-
promising public officials who reject collective bargaining. In Duval
County School Board v. Florida Public Employees Relations
Commission, the court, in sustaining a finding that the school board
had failed to bargain in good faith, summed up its frustration to-
ward this attitude:
The Public Employees Relations Act is the law of our State.
Whether we agree with it or not, we must comply with it. If
267. See, e.g., State College Educ. Ass'n v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd., 306 A.2d
404 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973), rev'd, 337 A.2d 262 (Pa. 1975). See also H. WELLINGTON & R.
WINTER, supra note 82.
268. "Check-off" is a commonly used term which refers to the process of dues deduction
by the employer and subsequent remittance to the employee organization. Mugford v. Mayor
of Baltimore, 44 A.2d 745 (Md. 1946); FLA. STAT. § 447.303 (1977).
269. See Shaw, The Development of State and Federal Laws, in PuBuc WORKERS AND
PUBLIC UNIONS 22 (S. Zagoria ed. 1972).
270. K; H NSLOWE, THE EMERGING LAW OF LABOR RELATIONS IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 11-20
(1967).
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changes are desired, they must be made by the Legislature.
Every public employer, public employee and union must exert
every effort to cooperate with each other and to build respect for
each other. Collective bargaining is not and should not be a game.
Representatives of the public employer and the union should and
must be able to sit down together and negotiate an agreement
which will be beneficial and fair to all parties. There is too much
at stake to play games. Idealistic? Perhaps. Too much to ask? We
think not.2'
A third factor contributing to Florida's factfinding difficulties
might be labeled, very simply, inexperience. PERA's statutory
scheme of dependence upon factfinding to resolve negotiation im-
passes requires two critical elements. First, there must be a strong
and vigorous administration of the impasse machinery by PERC.
Indeed, PERA makes PERC responsible for maintaining lists of
qualified factfinders (called "special masters" in Florida) and as-
signing them to disputes. 2 This entails identifying and training
qualified special masters, coupled with selective monitoring of im-
passes around the state. The monitoring function should certainly
include keeping records of impasse issues and other pertinent fac-
tual information, and performing postproceeding evaluation of the
special masters. In unusual and particularly critical impasses,
PERC should be available during the proceedings to assist the spe-
cial master and parties. At the time the law first became operative,
PERC's administrative instability7 3 proved unequal to these res-
ponsibilities. The situation was further aggravated by a dearth of
experienced special masters.
Secondly, successful factfinding requires experienced negotiators.
There were relatively few seasoned negotiators on either side-this
was especially true of the employers-during the initial rounds of
negotiation under the new law. Experienced negotiators are critical
because they are the key to preparation of the advocates' cases
before the special master. Moreover, it is not uncommon for negotia-
tions, or even mediation,7 to take place during the formal factfind-
ing proceedings. Negotiations may resume after the factfinder's re-
port has been issued. Consequently, the negotiating skill and the
271. 353 So. 2d 1244, 1249 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978). See generally Wollett, supra note
82.
272. FLA. STAT. § 447.207(5) (1977).
273. See note 28 and accompanying text supra. PERC simply did not have continuity of
leadership to give it direction in the important area of impasse resolution.
274. See J. SIMKIN, FACT-FINDING: ITS VALUES AND LIMITATIONS IN ARBITRATION AND THE
EXPANDING ROLE OF NxuTRALs 165-72 (1970).
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experience of both parties are critical to the success of factfinding.
In many instances, public employers in Florida were ill-prepared
for collective bargaining. Many employers gave little thought to
training or hiring high-level administrators in anticipation of bar-
gaining until unions had been certified and sought negotiation
dates. Inexperience on both sides caused common mistakes. For
example, in some cases a school superintendent or, worse, a school
board chairman, decided to be the negotiator. Or perhaps a staff
member of a public employer began to negotiate and then, in mid-
stream, the chief executive officer or legislative body wanted to
replace him and start over again." 5
In some cases negotiators were experienced in only the private
sector and knew little of local government politics, public finance,
or education. Newly elected and inexperienced union leaders, with
the defeated minority union watching from the fence, were pres-
sured into extravagant demands. Thus, heated and extended de-
bates over what is negotiable, blatant gamesmanship, or plain in-
eptness managed to divert everyone's attention from the serious
business of collective bargaining.
Inexperienced negotiators can easily warp the factfinding process.
A good illustration is the situation in which table negotiations have
been so badly handled that the parties reach impasse on almost all
the contract issues-practically speaking, no negotiations have
taken place. The special master, then, is presented with the practi-
cal necessity- of developing a factfinding report which in effect re-
sults in a recommended contract. 2 1 It is nothing short of ludicrous
to expect acceptability from such a proceeding.
A fourth factor contributing to Florida's factfinding problems,
primarily of concern in the school districts, has been the role of the
legislative body.277 Under Florida's factfinding scheme, the legisla-
275. These are common errors which have come to the author's attention in conversations
with persons involved in public labor negotiations in Florida. Unfortunately, little documen-
tation exists. Note, however, City of Homestead v. International Ass'n of Firefighters Local
2010, 291 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (pre-PERA).
276. For an example of a multiple-isssue impasse, see Impasse Between Duval County
School Bd. & Duval Teachers United AFT, AFL-CIO, No. 8H-SM-76-39 (Fla. PERC Aug.
31, 1976). See also Madison County Educ. Ass'n, 4 F.P.E.R. 4006 (PERC 1977).
Sometimes during negotiations distrust was provoked by having the opposing party bring
in an outsider or "hired gun" as negotiator. See, e.g., Duval County School Bd. v. Florida
Pub. Employees Relations Comm'n, 353 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (union
outside negotiator); School Bd. v. Public Employees Relations Comm'n, 350 So. 2d 819 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (Escambia County) (employer outside negotiator).
277. The statutory definition of the "legislative body" may be found in FLA. STAT. §
447.203(10) (1977). See id. § 447.403(4)(a) (legislative body involvement in impasse resolu-
tion); see, e.'g, United Faculty v. Palm Beach Junior College Bd. of Trustees, No. 76-2594
(Fla. 2d Cir. Ct., filed Nov. 30, 1976) (voluntarily dismissed June 27, 1977, because moot when
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tive body serves as impartial arbiter between the union and the
public employer. 78 Impartiality is nearly impossible when the
school board is both the public employer (with responsibility for
negotiating the contract) and the legislative body (with ultimate
authority for resolving contract disputes). Nothing undermines the
validity of factfinding in the school districts more than the fact that
the school boards wear two hats.
This dual role is especially provocative where the parties have
polarized in an acrimonious impasse and the school board is anti-
union. On such occasions, the hearing on the factfinder's report
before the school board assumes an air of charade. Accordingly, the
factfinding report proves unpersuasive and is rejected out of hand.
The entire impasse procedure for factfinding becomes counterprod-
uctive when the school board shows little disposition to retreat from
its initial negotiating stance and refuses to provide the teachers'
union with a face-saving position. No agreement is reached, and the
union is faced with two options: to strike illegally or to beat a humil-
iating retreat. The latter usually results in some form of guerrilla
warfare: underground papers with unflattering cartoons of school
administrators, political efforts to run candidates against school
officials who are perceived as anti-union, and confrontation over
policy and other political decisions in the newspapers. And all of
this leads to a year or more of petty employer/employee conflict.
True enough, labor disputes will sometimes degenerate regardless of
procedures and legal definitions, but the wearing of two hats by one
party exacerbates the potential for conflict.
A fifth factor is the employees' equivalent to the public em-
ployer's sovereignty argument: that is, everything is negotiable. A
"great expectations" syndrome tends to develop, typically as a re-
sult of a close election campaign. Once the election is over, expecta-
tions raised among the workers by campaign promises must be met
by the winning union. Elated workers were led to expect that the
dead hand of bureaucracy-previously characterized as synony-
mous with archaic salary classifications, wornout or nonexistent
grievance procedures, unduly restrictive work rules, and authoritar-
ian administrative procedures-would be triumphantly eliminated
in one fell swoop in the first round of contract negotiations.
Too often, dramatic inroads are sought by the inexperienced
union through a list of contract demands covering as many as two
or three hundred items. And pressure for dramatic victories is in-
legislature amended PERA to make board of trustees the legislative body).
278. FLA. STAT. § 447.403(4)(c) (1977).
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creased by competition between unions (as, for example, the Ameri-
can Federation of Teachers and the National Education Associa-
tion). Inflated organizational rhetoric in the heat of highly competi-
tive organizing campaigns does not help. From time to time, the
news media aggravate the situation by focusing on the more provoc-
ative statements of public and union officials.27 9
In summary, then, these factors have contributed to difficulties
in resolving contract impasses in Florida: factfinding with its inher-
ent limitations; strongly held views by certain employers about sov-
ereign authority; pervasive inexperience on both sides of bargaining
disputes; unrealistic expectations encouraged by competitive organ-
izational campaigns; and the dual role of the school boards as both
negotiators and legislative decisionmakers.
Two PERC decisions are worth noting in this context. Both focus
primarily on the issue of what constitutes good faith bargaining, and
both illustrate the attitudes which have contributed to Florida's
difficulties. To a lesser degree, the cases address the knotty problem
of sovereign authority and negotiability.
In Escambia Education Association, the union, Escambia Educa-
tion Association (EEA), filed an unfair labor practice charge against
the employer, the School Board of Escambia County.28 The charge
alleged infringement of bargaining rights because union members
were photographed while engaged in orderly and lawful informa-
tional picketing. 28' After studying the record, PERC con-
cluded-contrary to the finding of the hearing officer-that
"photographic surveillance is inherently coercive .... ,, 2 The union
also alleged that the school board had engaged in surface bargaining
and had wrongfully refused to check-off dues. 29 The PERC decision
in Escambia is instructive on the issue of good faith bargaining.
PERC concluded that the school board did not bargain in good
faith on dues deductions.28 Under prior agreements, the employer
had deducted dues on a monthly basis at a cost to EEA of $3,900
279. During negotiations between the Duval Teachers United (DTU) and the Duval
County School Board, the Jacksonville newspaper published a great many articles, some of
which resulted in unfair labor practice charges by the union. During the unfair labor practice
proceeding, PERC found that the employer's release to the media of information which DTU
had repeatedly requested but had been unable to obtain, was one factor leading to a finding
of failure to bargain in good faith. PERC also found that the school board's "repeated practice
of releasing information to the media undermined the bargaining process. Duval
Teachers United, FEA-AFT, AFL-CIO, 3 F.P.E.R. 96, 101 (PERC 1977).
280. Escambia Educ. Ass'n, 2 F.P.E.R. 93 (PERC 1976).
281. Id. at 94; see FLA. STAT. § 447.501(1)(a) (1977).
282. 2 F.P.E.R. at 99.
283. Id: at 94; see FLA. STAT. § 447.501(1)(c) (1977).
284. Id. at 98.
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anually ($325 per month). Each teacher received notice from the
school board that dues would be deducted only on a lump sum
annual basis unless the teachers withdrew their dues deduction au-
thorizations. EEA knew nothing of the proposed lump sum deduc-
tion policy prior to the notice to the teachers, and in fact the em-
ployer did not make the deduction. Several teachers withdrew their
authorizations and resigned from the union. Thereafter, apparently
at the instigation of an outside consultant, the employer demanded
payment of $12,500 annually for the check-off privilege, after an
apparent agreement for a lesser amount had been reached. PERC
concluded that the school board hoped to "secur[e] mass cancella-
tions from employees of their dues authorizations; thereby dissipat-
ing the Association [EEA] majority and undermining its efforts to
represent its constituency. '285
PERC said that in considering whether there has been a breach
of the duty to bargain in good faith, the employer's conduct at the
bargaining table will be judged and considered by the "totality" of
the circumstances. Thus, if an examination of all the facts and
circumstances giving rise to the dispute indicates that no single act
standing alone is clear evidence of a per se refusal to bargain, the
commission will examine the totality of the employer's conduct dur-
ing the bargaining process.56 PERC also said that the employer's
"constant insistence upon 'total package agreement' is inconsistent
with the duty to bargain. 28 6 .1
After considering the full history of the negotiations, PERC found
a general failure to bargain in good faith. The school board repeat-
edly had failed to attend scheduled meetings, arrived late and un-
prepared to discuss issues, refused to discuss issues, and refused
EEA access to information it could easily have provided.287 PERC
came to the "inescapable conclusion that the [employer] conceived
every scheme imaginable to avoid arriving at a collective bargaining
agreement . "...1,288 Accordingly, the commission ordered reinstate-
ment of the check-off at the previously agreed cost of five cents per
card, ordered the employer to stop bargaining in bad faith, and
ordered the employer as well to stop photographing and otherwise
engaging in surveillance of its employees.
2 89
The PERC decision was appealed to the First District Court of
285. Id.
286. Id.
286.1. Id.
287. Id. at 95-97.
288. Id. at 98.
289. Id. at 100.
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Appeal, which affirmed PERC.2 1 .' On appeal the employer argued
that PERC erred as a matter of law in ordering the employer to
implement dues deduction in the absence of a collective bargaining
contract. The court said the issue was moot in view of the 1977
amendments to PERA permitting check-off during the union certifi-
cation period. The court further said, however, that under section
447.503(4)(a), Florida Statutes, PERC may take "such positive ac-
tion . . as will effectuate the policies of this part" to remedy unfair
labor practice violations; therefore, the commission had the author-
ity to issue such an order.2' .1
In Duval Teachers United, FEA-AFT, AFL-CIO, there was an
impasse on a substantial number of issues.9 0 The recommendations
in the factfinding report by the special master were the equivalent
of an entire collective bargaining agreement between the parties.29'
The school board rejected the report in toto."2 The Duval Teachers
United (DTU) filed charges of unfair labor practices against the
Duval County School Board, alleging interference, coercion, and
failure to bargain in good faith. " 3 PERC's complaint alleged that
the school board had engaged in surface bargaining, that it had
"persisted in a fixed and unalterable position that certain manda-
tory subjects of bargaining were not negotiable" and thus had re-
fused to bargain on those issues. The employer had also released to
the press a salary proposal which had never been submitted during
the bargaining sessions.24
PERC noted in its decision that a statement was made a few days
prior to the beginning of the negotiations by the school superintend-
ent, publicly attacking the union negotiator as an "outside agitator
and hired gun" and accusing DTU of "coming to the table to pick
the pockets of the taxpayers."2 5 The record indicated that DTU
attempted to negotiate issues concerning discipline and discharge,
personal rights, academic freedom, and teacher transfer, but it was
informed by the employer's negotiator that these subjects were
"inherent management rights" and therefore non-negotiable." The
289.1. School Bd. v. Public Employees Relations Comm'n, 350 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1977) (Escambia County).
289.2. Id. at 823.
290. 3 F.P.E.R. 96 (PERC 1977).
291. See Impasse Between Duval County School Bd. & Duval Teachers United AFT,
AFL-CIO, No. 8H-SM-76-39 (Fla. PERC Aug. 31, 1976).
292. 3 F.P.E.R. at 99.
293. Id. at 96.
294. Id. Apparently, the employer publicly stated that the teachers lost a 6.25% raise
because DTU forced negotiations into an impasse at the time negotiations broke down.
295. Id. at 97.
296. Id.
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employer's counter proposals on other items merely repeated the
language of the previous year's contract. Furthermore, certain
ground rules of negotiation which were agreed to by the parties were
used in bad faith by the employer to frustrate DTU's efforts to
schedule agendas for negotiations and to improvise meeting times.297
In addition, the employer released to the media a list of non-
negotiable issues, which list DTU had repeatedly requested-to no
avail-during the bargaining sessions.28
PERC reaffirmed its position in Escambia, saying that the em-
ployer's "total conduct during the course of negotiations.., in light
of all of the circumstances in the particular case" will determine
whether or not there has been good faith bargaining. 219 On the issue
of what subjects are mandatory items for negotiation, the employer
had relied heavily on the management rights provision in PERA and
had pointed to the Florida Constitution, which provides that the
school board "shall operate, control and supervise all free public
schools . . . ."00 Rejecting the school board's position, PERC said
that school board constitutional responsibility and PERA's manage-
ment rights provision do not stand alone. PERC said that equal
consideration must be given to the constitutional right of public
employees to bargain collectively and to the PERA mandate to
bargain in good faith.310
The commission stated that an employer has a duty to negotiate
in an effort to determine whether a provision is negotiable of right
or is a managerial prerogative. This includes negotiating in good
faith those areas which overlap. 2 Here the school board had failed
to determine where "on the continuum of negotiability" DTU's pro-
posals lay.303 Accordingly, PERC held that the "threshold refusal to
discuss these items with an open mind" was the basis of the failure
to bargain in good faith. By entering negotiations "with a fixed and
pre-conceived determination" as to which issues it would negotiate,
the employer had committed the charged violation.0
The commission recognized that the discussion in negotiation
may reach a point at which the employer need not negotiate. When
that happens, PERC conceded that the employer need not yield if
its position is reasonable. But the employer must "maintain ... an
297. Id. at 101.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 99.
300. Id.; see FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 4(b); FLA. STAT. § 447.209 (1977).
301. 3 F.P.E.R. at 99-100.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
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open mind."30 5 The school board contended during negotiations
that, rather than reject the non-negotiable items, any agreement
with respect to such issues should be appended to the agreement."'
The union refused to agree to this arrangement. Arguably, ap-
pended agreements on the alleged non-negotiable issues would not
be subject to the contract grievance procedure required by PERA
to end in final and binding arbitration. PERC rejected the school
board's approach as contrary to the Act, which requires that any
collective bargaining agreement contain all of the terms and condi-
tions of employment agreed upon by the parties. 07
The school board also argued that the matter was now moot since
the parties had gone through the statutory impaise procedures, in-
cluding factfinding. But PERC rejected this argument and held that
"[a]n employer will not be permitted to engage in a course of
conduct tantamount to a refusal to bargain and subsequently be
allowed to 'cleanse' its illegal activity through the statutory im-
passe procedures."3 8 Accordingly, the commission ordered the
parties to bargain not only for the future, but also for monetary
benefits sought by DTU in past negotiations. 09
Thus Duval reaffirmed the "surrounding circumstances" rule laid
down in Escambia, which said that there was a duty to negotiate
305. Id. at 101.
306. Id.
307. Id. PERC noted:
This contention flies squarely in the face of the statute. Section 447.309(5) of the
Act states:
Any collective bargaining agreement ...shall contain all of the terms and
conditions of employment of the employees in the bargaining unit during such term
except those terms and conditions provided for in applicable merit and civil service
rules and regulations. (Emphasis added).
Respondent's insistence on appending items to the bargaining agreement thereby
making them not subject to the grievance procedure, cannot be permitted in light
of the express language of the Act. See also Section 447.209 of the Act. By agreeing
to certain terms and subsequently refusing to integrate them into the contract,
Respondent violated Section 447.501(1)(a) and (c) of the Act.
Id. In 1977, § 447.309(5) was amended to provide: "except those terms and conditions pro-
vided for in any Florida Statute or appropriate ordinances relating to retirement and in
applicable merit and civil service rules and regulations." Act of June 24, 1977, ch. 77-343, §
13, 1977 Fla. Laws 1476 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 447.309(5) (1977)) (emphasis added). Section
447.301(2), which creates the substantive basis for negotiating terms and conditions of em-
ployment, was also amended in 1977. That section now provides that public employees have
the right to be represented and to negotiate terms and conditions of employment, "excluding
any provisions of the Florida Statutes or appropriate ordinances relating to retirement." Act
of June 24, 1977, ch. 77-343, § 9, 1977 Fla. Laws 1476 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 447.301(2)
(1977)). The legislative intent clearly was to exclude retirement matters from negotiation.
308. 3 F.P.E.R. at 101-02.
309. Id. at 102.
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the issue of negotiability, and rejected attempts to append certain
agreements to the negotiated contract, rather than include them
within the basic document.
The PERC decision was appealed to the First District Court of
Appeal, which affirmed PERC' . ' The court rejected the employer's
contention that the determinative issue was whether or not subjects
labeled non-negotiable by the board were in fact mandatory sub-
jects of negotiation and simply affirmed PERC's finding of bad faith
bargaining. The court noted that whether a party bargains in good
or bad faith is a factual determination dependent on the circum-
stances of the particular case. Since there was competent and sub-
stantial evidence before PERC to support its findings, the court
upheld them.
Although the school board raised the issue, the court declined to
rule on the constitutionality of PERA's requirement that binding
grievance arbitration be included in all collective bargaining agree-
ments.309.2
The court sternly condemned those who view collective bargain-
ing as a game and reminded public employers and unions of their
responsibility to negotiate in good faith to reach fair agreements.3 9-3
In 1977, the legislature added a definitional section on good faith
bargaining to the statute. The new section is basically a codification
of the Escambia and Duval PERC decisions, together with private
sector rules previously developed under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act. The section provides that good faith bargaining requires
the parties "to meet at reasonable times and places," with intent
"to reach a common accord." In deciding whether good faith bar-
gaining has occurred, PERC will "consider the total conduct of the
parties. "310
The 1977 amendment goes on to list incidents which are
"indicative of bad faith . . . ." These include: failure to meet at
reasonable times,3 1' unreasonable restrictions on "prerequisites to
meeting," 3 2 failure to "discuss bargainable issues,"313 refusal to pro-
309.1. Duval County School Bd. v. Florida Pub. Employees Relations Comm'n, 353 So.
2d 1244 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
309.2. Id. at 1249-50.
309.3. Id. at 1249; see note 271 supra and accompanying text.
310. Act of June 24, 1977, ch. 77-343, § 6, 1977 Fla. Laws 1476 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
447.203(17) (1977)).
311. Id. (codified at FiA. STAT. § 447.203(17)(a) (1977)); General Motors Acceptance Corp.
v. NLRB, 476 F.2d 850 (1st Cir. 1973); NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 339 F.2d 829 (5th Cir.
1965); Solvay Process Co. v. NLRB, 117 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1941).
312. Act of June 24, 1977, ch. 77-343, § 6, 1977 Fla. Laws 1476 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
447.203(17)(b) (1977)); see Adrian Daily Telegram, 214 N.L.R.B. 1103 (1974); Utility Workers
Union, 203 N.L.R.B. 230 (1973).
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vide public information,3"' refusal to negotiate because of objection
to a member of the opposing negotiating team, '31 5 negotiating di-
rectly with the employees rather than with their certified agent,36
and refusal to reduce a total agreement to writing. 37
There are no Florida court cases defining what issues are bargain-
able. The two major PERC decisions, Duval and Escambia, are not
particularly helpful, since their primary focus is on the elements of
good faith bargaining. In Duval, PERC put a noticeable dent in the
armor of sovereignty when it observed that equal consideration
should be given to the employees' constitutional rights to bargain
collectively and the school board's constitutional responsibility for
the public schools. 38
PERC intimated in Duval that discipline or discharge of an em-
ployee is a term and condition of employment subject to negotia-
tion. 3 9 In Escambia, PERC held that promotion, layoff, transfer of
employees, and wage rates were negotiable as terms and conditions
of employment.32 Other than these two decisions, no court cases
identify specifically what subjects are considered negotiable terms
of employment.
In both Escambia and Duval, PERC deliberately avoided estab-
lishing guidelines on negotiability. The commission simply held
that there is a duty to negotiate what is negotiable. For example,
there was ample opportunity in both cases to embrace the manda-
tory/permissive dichotomy used in the private sector32' and adopted
in other public sector jurisdictions.3 11. The commission also could
313. Act of June 24, 1977, ch. 77-343, § 6, 1977 Fla. Laws 1476 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
447.203(17)(c) (1977); see Continental Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 495 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1974); Patent
Trader, Inc., 167 N.L.R.B. 842 (1967).
314. Act of June 24, 1977, ch. 77-343, § 6, 1977 Fla. Laws 1476 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
447.203(17)(d) (1977)).
315. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 447.203(17)(e) (1977)); see Fruit & Vegetable Packers &
Warehousemen v. NLRB, 316 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
316. Act of June 24, 1977, ch. 77-343, § 6, 1977 Fla. Laws 1476 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
447.203(17)(f) (1977)); see Siskin Steel & Supply Co., 160 N.L.R.B. 1038 (1966).
317. Act of June 24, 1977, ch. 77-343, § 6, 1977 Fla. Laws 1476 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
447.203(17)(g) (1977)); see NLRB v. Advanced Business Forms Corp., 474 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.
1973); NLRB v. International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, 451 F.2d 1240 (9th
Cir. 1971).
318. 3 F.P.E.R. at 99.
319. Id. at 100. But PERC hedged later in the opinion by suggesting that the impact of
the disciplinary decision falls within terms and conditions of employment.
320. 2 F.P.E.R. at 98.
321. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); NLRB v. Wooster Div.
of Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
321.1. See, e.g., West Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. DeCourcy, 295 A.2d 526 (Conn. 1972);
Westwood Community Schools, No. 313 (Mich. MERC 1972); State College Educ. Ass'n v.
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd., 306 A.2d 404 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973). See also H. WEL-
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have distinguishd with more precision the differences between nego-
tiability and the duty to negotiate the impact of non-negotiable
issues. 22
Highlighting the impasse problem tends to be misleading. Put-
ting things in a larger perspective, it is fair to generalize that collec-
tive bargaining is working rather well throughout the state, based
strictly on the number of contracts which have been negotiated. 22 '-1
LINGTON & R. WINTER, supra note 82; Edwards, The Emerging Duty to Bargain in the Public
Sector, 71 MICH. L. REV. 885 (1973); Wollett, supra note 82.
322. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Associated Teachers of Huntington, Inc., 282 N.E. 2d
109 (N.Y. 1972); West Irondequoit Bd. of Educ., 4 P.E.R.B. 3070, aff'd on rehearing, 4
P.E.R.B. 3089 (N.Y. PERB 1971), aff'd, 346 N.Y.S. 2d 418 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973); City
School Dist. of the City of New Rochelle, 4 P.E.R.B. 3060 (N.Y. PERB 1971).
While PERC has not specifically laid down an impact test in the context of negotiability
guidelines, it has by analogy adopted an impact approach in construing the management
rights section of PERA. The Act reserves to management unilateral control over agency
mission, standards of service, direction and discipline of employees, and layoffs, but permits
grievances with respect thereto should such unilateral action "have the practical consequence
of violating the terms and conditions of any collective bargaining agreement. .... " FLA. STAT.
§ 447.209 (1977). In Osceola Classroom Teachers Ass'n, 4 F.P.E.R. 4066 (PERC 1978),
PERC ruled that an employer may not take unilateral action during negotiations or impasse
procedures except as to management rights reserved under § 447.209. However, PERC held
that even this statutory authorization does not relieve the employer of its obligation "to notify
the union of proposed actions affecting bargaining unit members and to thereby provide the
union an opportunity to bargain over the effect of the action on the unit members." Id. at
147. See also note 319 supra.
The five available Florida state worker contracts manifest a variety of negotiated issues.
The completed contracts are for the Health Care Unit (Florida Nurses Association), the Law
Enforcement Employees (Police Benevolent Association), the Florida State University Sys-
tem (United Faculty of Florida), the Human or Institutional Services Unit (American Federa-
tion of State, County & Municipal Employees), and the Professional Unit (American Federa-
tion of State, County, & Municipal Employees). There are no published studies available
which summarize contract data with respect to cities and municipalities. The author is
currently working on a research project involving contract analysis of Florida schoolteacher,
fire, and police contracts. Preliminary findings indicate that these public employees have, in
fact, negotiated contract provisions on a very large number of items. The completed study
will be available through the Florida State University College of Law in late fall, 1978;
additionally, it will be on file with the 1978 STAR Grant Reports at the Board of Regents,
Collins Building, Tallahassee, Florida.
322.1. In 64 of the 67 school districts in Florida, contracts have been negotiated between
the teachers and the board. Of the eight defined state bargaining units, five are presently
operating under contract. In connection with the author's study of all public employee con-
tracts, see note 322 supra, 40 police and 38 firefighter agreements have been collected and
analyzed. Statistics are less defined in the area of blue- and white-collar municipal and
county employees; these contracts have proved very difficult to collect. Two community
colleges have achieved contracts with their instructional personnel. A number of school dis-
tricts, besides their agreements with certificated faculty, have negotiated contracts with
paraprofessional, clerical, and blue-collar units.
These contracts contain a number of provisions which are, generally, common to all groups.
For example, almost all the contracts reviewed in these somewhat diverse occupational
groups include provisions covering recognition, dues deduction, grievance procedures, nego-
tiations procedures, leave time, holidays, wage rates, insurance coverage, management rights,
no-strike clauses, union/employee rights, and nondiscrimination. In addition to these basic
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These contracts bear witness to good faith bargaining on the part
of both management and labor. It seems there is more promise than
illusion in the implementation of Florida's constitutional grant to
public employees of the right to bargain collectively.
PERC's posture of putting off until another day the designation
of mandatory subjects of bargaining may well be the wisest course.
As experience in the field accumulates and impasse resolution im-
proves, the time may then be ripe for further decisional develop-
ment of guidelines for negotiability disputes.
Since Duval and Escambia, there has been a rash of decisions
involving unfair labor practices in the context of impasses. One case
dealt with unilateral employer action after a contract impasse had
been declared, while the others sought clarification of the dual role
played by some local governments (e.g., school boards and munici-
palities) during impasse as public employer/negotiator on the one
hand, and legislative body/final arbiter on the other.
In Pinellas County Police Benevolent Association v. City of St.
Petersburg,32 .2 after the expiration of certain collective bargaining
agreements the city took unilateral action altering conditions of
employment related to check-off fee, pool time, grievances, clothing
allowance, call back procedure, sick leave, on-duty jury benefits,
and insurance. PERC held that such unilateral action, taken after
prior contracts expired and impasse arose but before the city had
taken final action as the legislative body, constituted an unfair
labor practice and refusal to bargain in good faith.
PERC held that after the expiration of a collective bargaining
agreement there was a duty to bargain before the employer may
unilaterally change conditions of employment. PERC went a step
further: it noted that, unlike the NLRA, which allows unilateral
action after impasse is reached, PERA contemplates that employer
unilateral action may not take place until impasse resolution proce-
dures are concluded by legislative body action.322 -3 PERC reasoned
that, under PERA, a special master (factfinding) proceeding is held
after contract impasse has been declared and, during that time,
continued negotiations between the parties should be encouraged.
items, the teacher contracts reflected concerns with class size and work load, transfers,
student discipline, and academic freedom, while firefighters and police emphasized such
additional items as safety procedures, seniority, call back pay and overtime, moonlighting,
and residency requirements. Detailed studies of the contract provision will be available in
the fall of 1978. See note 322 supra.
322.2. 3 F.P.E.R. 205 (PERC 1977).
322.3. Id. at 208.
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Thus, the employer may not take unilateral action during ongoing
impasse procedings. PERC held that the employer can take unilat-
eral action only when it has acted in its capacity as legislative body
at the conclusion of the impasse resolution procedures detailed in
PERA. 322 .4
It follows that the employer must maintain the status quo as to
terms and conditions of employment during negotiations and also
during the implementation of the impasse procedures. Curiously,
PERC distinguished between continuing benefits which must be
maintained as part of the status quo and mere cyclical benefits
which arise after the prior contract expiration date. Continuing
benefits were thought to be those that were constant (e.g., insur-
ance, dues deduction fee, .grievance procedures, existing salaries);
cyclical benefits, on the contrary, are those which arise periodically
(annual physical examinations, step merit increase on anniversary
dates occurring after contract expiration). PERC further noted that
grievances over cyclical benefits could not be brought in this hiatus
period, even though the grievance procedure itself could not be uni-
laterally suspended.32 2 .
In Madison County Education Association, 322. the teachers' union
and the school board reached a contract impasse resulting in a
factfinding hearing and issuance of a special master's report, effec-
tively outlining a recommended contract. Pursuant to statute , '322. a
hearing on the recommended report was held by the school board.
After incorporating certain recommendations of the school superin-
tendent, the board, sitting as legislative body, approved the con-
tract. Shortly thereafter a dispute arose over whether the salary
provision was to be implemented retroactively. The board refused
to sign the agreement approved at the first meeting and instructed
the school board attorney to draft an addendum clarifying the
board's intent to apply salary increases prospectively. At a subse-
quent meeting the board approved the contract as amended.
The union brought an unfair labor practice charge against the
board for refusing to sign the contract as approved at the first meet-
ing. PERC sustained the union's position.2 .8 PERC held that by
322.4. FLA. STAT. § 447.403 (1977). PERC has ruled that the employer can take unilateral
action as to management rights expressly reserved under section 447.209, Florida Statutes,
but it still has an obligation to notify the bargaining agent of its actions and to provide an
opportunity to bargain over the effect of the action on unit members. Osceola Classroom
Teachers Ass'n, 4 F.P.E.R. 4066 (PERC 1978); see note 322 supra.
322.5. 3 F.P.E.R. at 209.
322.6. 4 F.P.E.R. 4006 (PERC 1977).
322.7. FLA. STAT. §447.403 (1977).
322.8. 4 F.P.E.R. 4006, at 17.
19781
330 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:263
unilaterally replacing the salary provision mandated by the school
board, sitting as the legislative body, and then insisting on the
union's acceptance of this additional language as a condition to
signing the agreement, the school board failed to bargain in good
faith.3 2. PERC observed that while the school board had the right,
as legislative body, to impose contractual provisions it may deem
to be in the public interest, PERA "does not give that employer
license to continually revisit the provisions of that labor contract
under the guise of 'clarifying its intent.' "322.10 PERC went on to state
that subsequent questions of contract interpretation are to be re-
solved by arbitration.
In Boca Raton Fire Fighters, Local 1560, Inc. v. City of Boca
Raton, 322.11 the union filed an unfair labor practice charge, alleging
that the city-sitting in its capacity as legislative body-must be
held to a strict test of fairness, impartiality, and neutrality. In re-
sponse, the city contended that it was not intended to be a neutral,
independent body, but rather, as the public employer, was in an
adversarial position as to a union just like any other employer. 32 2. 2
Impasse had been declared on seven items. A special master was
appointed and made recommendations. After a closed meeting
among the city council, its chief negotiator, and the city attorney,
at which the special master's report was discussed, a compromise
with the union was reached on two of the seven items. Thereafter,
the city as employer submitted a partial rejection of the factfinding
report to PERC.
322.9. Id.
322.10. Id. See also Dade County Employees, Local #1363, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 4
F.P.E.R. 4065 (PERC 1978) (South Miami). There the city conducted a hearing as pre-
scribed by FLA. STAT. § 447.403(4)(d) (1977), on November 4, 1975, to take final action on
the special master's report regarding impasse items. It accepted some of these recommenda-
tions without change and others with slight modifications. Thereafter a proposed contract was
drafted. At a meeting on December 2, 1975, held for the purpose of accepting or rejecting the
entire proposed contract, the city expressed dissatisfaction with the contractual provision to
which it had earlier agreed. The entire contract was rejected, at least in part, because of the
city council's subsequent dissatisfaction with its own binding action of November 4 as to
certain provisions. PERC held that this was a violation of the duty to bargain in good faith
and constituted interference, coercion, and restraint of employee rights under PERA. 4
F.P.E.R. 4065, at 142.
Dade County Employees held that once all or part of a special master's report (or recom-
mended contract provisions) is adopted in a § 447.403(4)(d) proceeding, this is final action
on such issues. Ratification of the legislative body's action, as to these items, is not required
by PERA. The legislative body's action may not later be unilaterally changed, nor may the
entire contract be subsequently rejected where the controversial provisions were previously
approved in a § 447.403(4)(d) hearing. Dade County Employees cited with approval City of
Boca Raton, discussed infra in text accompanying notes 322.11-.16, and Madison County
Educ. Ass'n. 4 F.P.E.R. 4065, at 142.
322.11. 4 F.P.E.R. 4040 (PERC 1978).
322.12. Id. at 86.
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Before the city, sitting as a legislative body pursuant to section
447.403(4)(c)-(d) of the Florida Statutes,3 ' 3 met to take final action
on the items remaining in dispute, a proposed resolution was
drafted which purported to adopt conditions of employment for the
city's firefighters. It included the collective bargaining agreement
agreed to before impasse, those items agreed to during the final
round of negotiations following issuance of the special master's re-
port, and the employer's final position regarding the impasse items
remaining unresolved. On the eve of the public hearing on the dis-
puted issues, the proposed resolution was delivered to city council
members by special courier. Thereafter, the hearing was held, and
the city adopted the resolution as previously submitted, after a
perfunctory opportunity for the firefighters' union to present its
case. The firefighters then brought an unfair labor charge against
the city. PERC overruled the PERC general counsel's dismissal of
the unfair labor practice charge and ordered the general counsel to
issue a complaint alleging that the city violated its duty to conduct
a fair and impartial hearing in its capacity as legislative body.3 2.1'4
PERC said that PERA:
entrusts a legislative body with the right to resolve an impasse
between parties by taking final unilateral action in the public in-
terest. . . Notwithstanding it's [sic] prior involvement as a party
to the negotiations, the public employer/legislative body must now
consider the interest of the involved public employees in discharg-
ing its responsibilities under Section 447.403(4)(d).
[PERA] requires a judicious transition from the posture of pub-
lic employer to the posture of legislative body.32' 5
PERC concluded that the primary measure of the public em-
ployer/legislative body's fulfillment of its duties shall be based on
the parties' receiving a full and fair opportunity to present their
positions and to have those positions fully and fairly considered.
3 2'6
However confusing the switching of hats must be in the rushed
exodus from the burning house of stalemated negotiations, one must
certainly question the propriety of the city's preparing final judg-
ment before the hearing was held.
The very real problems of impasse mixed with the success of
322.13. (1977).
322.14. Id. at 89.
322.15. Id. at 88-89 (emphasis added).
322.16. Id. at 88.
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bargained agreements3 . 7 tends to leave Florida's collective bar-
gaining development in a curiously ambivalent posture at present.
Borrowing from Professor Cox, in one sense collective bargaining
represents a brute contest of economic and political power masked
by the gamesmanship of the bargaining process. But the accumula-
tion of negotiated agreements and experience holds forth the pros-
pect of restraint in these power confrontations. This may result from
a pragmatic, if not Machiavellian, sense of fear and warped self-
interest; but in some cases it is reason, a sense of responsibility,
responsiveness to the public interest, and moral principle which
generate settlements.3 1' 1S
E. Unfair Labor Practices
1. Substantive Provisions
Florida's collective bargaining statute covers unfair labor prac-
tices by both employers and employees. 323 The provisions in PERA
parallel similar terms in section 8 of the National Labor Relations
Act.32
Employers are prohibited by PERA from: interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing public employees in the exercise of their rights
under PERA; encouraging or discouraging membership in any em-
ployee organization by discrimination in regard to hiring, tenure, or
other conditions of employment; refusing to bargain collectively in
good faith, or refusing to sign a final agreement which was agreed
on with the certified bargaining agent for the bargaining unit; dis-
charging or discriminating against a public employee because he
has filed charges or given testimony under PERA; dominating, in-
terfering with, or assisting in the formation, existence, or adminis-
tration of any employee organization, or contributing financial sup-
port to such an organization; and refusing to discuss grievances in
good faith pursuant to the terms of the collective bargaining agree-
ment with either the certified bargaining agent or the employees
involved.32 1
Similarly, a public employee organization or anyone acting in its
behalf, its officers, representatives, or members are prohibited by
PERA from: interfering with, restraining, or coercing public em-
ployees in the exercise of any rights guaranteed under PERA; inter-
322.17. See note 322.1 supra.
322.18. Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HAiv. L. Rxv. 1401, 1409 (1958). See
also NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
323. FLA. STAT. § 447.501(1)-(2) (1977).
324. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970).
325. FLA. STAT. § 447.501(1)(a)-(f) (1977).
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fering with, restraining, or coercing managerial employees because
of their performance of job duties or other activities undertaken in
the interests of the public employer; discriminating against an em-
ployee because of the employee's membership or nonmembership in
an employee organization or attempting to cause the public em-
ployer to engage in unfair labor practices; refusing to bargain collec-
tively in good faith with a public employer; and discriminating
against an employee because he has signed or filed an affidavit,
petition, or complaint or given any information or testimony in any
proceedings under PERA.311 Moreover, it is an unfair labor practice
for an employee organization to participate in a strike against a
public employer by instigating or supporting the strike in any posi-
tive manner. 327 It is unlawful, too, to instigate or advocate support
for an employee organization's activities from high school students,
grade school students, or students in institutions of higher learn-
ing. 38 However, PERA, like the National Labor Relations Act, pre-
serves the right of free speech. Expressions or arguments or opinions
are not unfair labor practices so long as the speech contains no
promise of benefits or threat of reprisal or force. 32
2. Procedures
Whenever an unfair labor practice is charged by an employer, an
employee, or an employee organization, PERC conducts a prelimi-
nary investigation to determine if there is substantial evidence indi-
cating a prima facie violation.3 3 If so, PERC issues a complaint to
the charged party, and provides notice and an opportunity for a
hearing. If not, the charge is dismissed.3
The party may file an answer to the complaint and by right may
appear to "give testimony at the hearing. ' ' 3 2 Other persons may be
allowed to intervene in the proceeding and to present testimony.
Testimony taken in PERC proceedings on unfair labor practices
must be reduced to writing and filed with the commission.m Upon
326. Id. § 447.501(2)(a)-(d).
327. Id. § 447.501(2)(e)-(f). See also Brevard Community College Fed'n of Teachers, 2
F.P.E.R. 87 (PERC 1976), in which PERC held a local union's election and certification valid
even though it was affiliated with a national union which advocated the right to strike by
public employees. The local organization's bylaws and charter did not assert the right to
strike by public employees.
328. FLA. STAT. § 447.501(2)(f) (1977).
329. Id. § 447.501(3); cf. National Labor Relations Act § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970) (unfair
labor practices).
330. FLA. STAT. § 447.503(1) (1977).
331. Id. § 447.503(4)(b).
332. Id. § 447.503(2).
333. Id. § 447.503(4).
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notice, PERC may take further testimony or hear argument.334 But
PERC is not bound by judicial rules of evidence in its hearings. 3 5
Where "substantial and irreparable" injury will result in the ab-
sence of temporary relief, PERC may petition a circuit court for
appropriate injunctive relief pending the final adjudication of the
unfair labor practice by the commission. Thus the court has juris-
diction to grant whatever temporary relief it deems just and pro-
per.336
The remedial section of PERA also parallels the National Labor
Relations Act and is couched in nearly identical language.37 If
PERC finds substantial evidence that an unfair labor practice has
been committed, it must state its findings and issue an order requir-
ing the charged party to stop the unfair labor practice. PERC is also
authorized "to take such positive action, including reinstatement of
employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies
of this part." 33 The order may further require the charged party to
make reports from time to time showing the extent to which he has
complied with the order.
In 1977, the legislature specifically authorized PERC to award
litigation costs, attorney fees, and witness fees.3 Also in 1977, the
legislature added a new section to the statute providing for judicial
review of PERC's final orders.340 PERC's findings with respect to
questions of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence
on the record. 4' However, no order of PERC may require the rein-
334. Id.
335. Id. § 447.503(3)(a).
336. Id. § 447.503(3)(b).
337. Id. § 447.503; cf. National Labor Relations Act § 10, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1970) (remedial
portions of the Act).
338. FLA. STAT. § 447.503(4)(a) (1977). Florida courts have shown a tendency to construe
this section broadly. See text accompanying note 289.2 supra.
339. Act of June 24, 1977, ch. 77-343, § 19, 1977 Fla. Laws 1476 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
447.503(4)(c) (1977)).
340. Act of June 24, 1977, ch. 77-343, § 20, 1977 Fla. Laws 1476 (codified at FLA. STAT.. §
447.504 (1977)). The amendment is essentially the same as the previous § 447.503(5)-(6) but
permits a party, as well as PERC, to apply to the court for enforcement of a PERC order or
for injunctive relief. Such petitions are exempt from the requirements of FLA. STAT. §
120.69(1)(b)(1) (1977), which provides that no such action may be commenced "[prior to
60 days after the petitioner has given notice of the violation of the agency action to the head
of the agency concerned, the attorney general, and any alleged violator of the agency action."
341. FLA. STAT. § 447.504(3) (1977). This language substantially tracks the language of
the National Labor Relations Act § 10 (e)-(f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)-(f) (1970). For the standard
of judicial review of an administrative determination, see Universal Camera v. NLRB, 340
U.S. 474 (1951). See also Pasco County School Bd. v. Florida PERC, 353 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1977), discussed in note 342 infra, which essentially follows Universal Camera
and may be considered the leading Florida authority on the matter with regard to PERA.
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statement of any individual as an employee who has been sus-
pended or discharged for cause." 2
342. FLA. STAT. § 447.503(4)(d) (1977). Several PERC decisions have dealt with discrimi-
nation. In Columbia County Transp. & Maintenance Workers Ass'n, 3 F.P.E.R. 58 (PERC
1977), a refrigeration technician was solicited by other employees to head their newly formed
union; within a short time he was suspended (and then fired) for "incompetence." He was
told by his employer that "the Board is not ready for collective bargaining this year, maybe
next year." Id. at 60.
PERC noted that for a discrimination charge to stand, "an examination of the employer's
motivation underlying the alleged discriminatory conduct must be undertaken. If such exam-
ination reveals that the employer has, in fact, illegally discriminated against an employee, it
must be determined that such discrimination was motivated by anti-union sentiments." Id.
at 61. The commission observed, however, that "it is not logical to always require specific
proof of such prohibited intent. When the natural consequences of the employer actions tend
to encourage or discourage membership in an employee organization, the employer will be
presumed to have intended such consequences which justifiably and foreseeably flow from
its actions." Id.
The creation of this presumption was a significant step toward enforcing basic bargaining
rights of public employees. Among other remedies, PERC ordered the employee reinstated
with back pay and interest from the date of his suspension. See International Bhd. of Electri-
cal Workers, No. 8H-CA-763-0143 (Fla. PERC Oct. 4,1977); Dana E. Pratt & Lloyd A. Perry,
3 F.P.E.R. 186 (PERC 1977); William E. Burrows, 3 F.P.E.R. 179 (PERC 1977); Pasco
Classroom Teachers Ass'n, 3 F.P.E.R. 9 (PERC 1976).
The First District Court of Appeal reviewed and affirmed PERC's decision in Columbia
County Bd. of Pub. Instruction v. PERC, 353 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977),
directing PERC, however, to allow the employer credit for unemployment compensation
benefits received by the mechanic before his reinstatement. The court also held that an
employer commits an unfair labor practice "when its motive for discharging an employee is
to punish for or discourage organizational activity and the employee would be retained but
for his union activity." Id. at 130. The court said where there is proof that an impermissible
motive was one of two or more factors in the employer's decision to terminate, the employer
must then carry the burden of proving that it would have reached the same decision without
considering the protected activity, thus adopting the rationale of Mount Healthy City School
Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). The court noted that the record in Columbia would only
support the conclusion that the school board would have retained the technician but for his
organizational activities. Id.
In Pasco Classroom Teachers Ass'n, 3 F.P.E.R. 9 (PERC 1976), the school board discharged
two teachers and refused tenure to another, allegedly on the basis of their active union
participation. All the teachers had previously received satisfactory or outstanding evalua-
tions, and two of them had been selected as teacher of the year in their respective schools.
PERC pointed out that the language of PERA prohibiting employer discouragement of em-
ployee bargaining activities by discriminating in regard to hiring, tenure, or other conditions
of employment is very similar to that of the National Labor Relations Act, as well as other
states' bargaining acts, and noted that it felt "compelled" to consider precedents adhered to
by the NLRB and the courts in interpreting Florida's PERA. Id. at 13. PERC then went on
to hold that the discharges and denial of tenure in Pasco were motivated by the union
activities of the teachers and thus were violative of the statute. Id. at 14.
On review, in Pasco County School Bd. v. Florida PERC, 353 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1977), the court held that in cases of allegedly discriminatory discharges, it is first up
to the employee to prove his conduct was protected activity and was a motivating factor in
the action taken against him. But the court noted that PERC erroneously stopped its consid-
eration at that point in Pasco; what it should have then done was determine whether the
board could meet its burden of showing "whether the decision affecting the discriminatees
would have been reached despite the presence of a non-permissible reason." Id. at 121.
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3. Other Unlawful Acts
A section of PERA entitled "other unlawful acts" must be read
with the unfair labor practice provisions .3  The unlawful acts sec-
tion provides that employee organizations, or any persons acting on
their behalf, may not solicit public employees during the working
hours of any employee who is involved in the solicitation. In addi-
tion, union workers may not distribute literature during working
hours in areas where the actual work of public employees is per-
formed, such as offices, warehouses, schools, police stations, fire
stations, and any similar public installations. (However, the statute
warns that "this section shall not be construed to prohibit the distri-
bution of literature during the employee's lunch hour, or in such
areas not specifically devoted to the performance of the employee's
official duties.") Finally, union organizers may not instigate or ad-
vocate support for an employee organization's activities from high
school or grade school students during classroom time .34
In addition, the unlawful acts section prohibits employee organi-
zations from paying any fines or penalties assessed against individu-
als pursuant to the provisions of PERA-either directly or indi-
rectly.3 5 The Florida circuit courts are given jurisdiction to enforce
Here, the evidence on the record was not as clear as in Columbia. The court vacated that
portion of PERC's order finding an unfair labor practice with regard to the discriminatee
and remanded the case to the hearing officer for an appropriate determination of the question,
in keeping with the principles of Mount Healthy and the "but for" or "moving cause" tests
espoused in Columbia. Id. at 122.
In a recent case involving the firing of two deputies by the Leon County sheriff, the
Department of Administrative Hearings' officer found that the discharge was "discrimina-
torily motivated and undertaken based on anti-union sentiments," and that the reasons
assigned by the employer were "merely a pretext." Perry Lawrence, No. 77-1082P, slip op.
at 7-8 (Fla. DOAH Oct. 11, 1977). The hearing officer ordered the employer to stop its un-
lawful practices and reinstate the two employees with back pay. A hearing before PERC is
pending on the case. It should be noted that in Murphy v. Mack, No. 51,025 (Fla. March 2,
1978), the Florida Supreme Court held that a deputy sheriff is not a public employee within
the meaning of PERA. See note 71 supra.
The position taken by the First District Court of Appeal in Columbia and Pasco, derived
in large part from the language of the United States Supreme Court in Mount Healthy, may
be a step removed from traditional labor law doctrine, which has held that where an improper
motive for an employee discharge is present, an unfair labor practice has been committed,
entitling the employee to reinstatement and back pay. See also Muskego-Norway Consol.
Schools v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 151 N.W.2d 617 (Wis. 1967), in which the
Wisconsin Supreme Court applied the private labor law principle that "an employee may not
be fired when one of the motivating factors is his union activities, no matter how many other
valid reasons exist for firing him." Id. at 628. See generally Donald E. Leon, 1 P.E.R.B.
800 (N.Y. PERB 1968); R. GORMAN, BAsic TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING 137-44 (1976).
343. FLA. STAT. § 447.509 (1977).
344. Id.
345. Id.
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the provisions of this section by injunction and contempt proceed-
ings. A public employee who is convicted of a violation of any provi-
sion of this section may be discharged or otherwise disciplined by
his public employer, notwithstanding further provisions of law or
the provisions of any collective bargaining agreement. 4
Relatively few court cases have construed PERA's provisions on
unfair labor practices. City of Bartow v. PERC dealt with the ques-
tion of whether investigatory documents in cases involving charges
of unfair labor practices were public records subject to disclosure
under Florida's Public Records Act. 47 The First District Court of
Appeal held that the records, affidavits, papers, and notes in the
custody of PERC or its investigator were "public records" subject
to disclosure under the Act. However, the court also held that it
would be appropriate for PERC and its investigatory agent to post-
pone public disclosure of such documents for a reasonable period
until PERC or its agent had either dismissed the charge or had
found substantial evidence of a prima facie violation. 48
There are two significant court cases reviewing PERC decisions
which have addressed the problem of employment discrimination
for union activity remedied by orders for employee reinstatement
with back pay. The prohibition of such orders in cases involving
dismissal for cause probably would not be applied to overrule PERC
where there was a showing of unlawful discrimination against an
employee for exercising his constitutional right to collective bar-
gaining and where such employee would not have been dismissed
"but for" his union activity. 49
Reinstatement with back pay is essential to preserve the free
exercise of organizational rights where the reason for dismissal was
unlawful discrimination for exercising those rights. This has been
the majority rule in both the private and public sectors. 50 A con-
trary rule would defeat the purpose of PERA. The restrictive lan-
guage dealing with reinstatement for cause should not be read as
restricting the otherwise broad authority of PERC to remedy viola-
tions "and to take such positive action, including reinstatement of
346. Id.
347. 341 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
348. In addition, public disclosure is not required during a nonadversary preliminary
investigation. But it is required once PERC dismisses the charges or finds substantial evi-
dence of a violation. Id. at 1003. See also School Bd. v. PERC, 334 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 1976)
(Marion County).
349. For a discussion of discrimination cases, see note 342 supra.
350. National Labor Relations Act § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970). See also note 342
supra.
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employees . . . as will effectuate the policies" of the Florida stat-
ute.3 51
Few court cases have dealt with the application of either the
PERA section on unfair labor practices or the section on "other
unlawful acts." Those that do focus primarily on the relationship
between those sections and the Public Records Act.32 Predictably,
the PERC decisions in such cases generally cite NLRB and federal
court decisions under section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act,
and PERC generally follows NLRB precedent in rulings on organi-
zational unfair labor practices. For example, PERC decisions which
deal with allegations of campaign misrepresentation constituting
violations of sections 447.501(1) (a) or 447.501(2) (b) somewhat paral-
lel NLRB precedent.35 '
351. FLA. STAT. § 447.503(4)(a) (1977).
352. See City of Bartow v. PERC, 341 So. 2d 1000.
352.1. Laborers Int'l Bhd. of N. America, No. 517, 2 F.P.E.R. 84 (PERC 1976) (holding
under Hollywood Ceramics, 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962), that rule exaggerations and inaccuracies
are not grounds for setting election aside). See also Laborers Int'l Union Local #666, 2
F.P.E.R. 145 (PERC 1976); Public Serv. Employees of Jacksonville, 2 F.P.E.R. 75 (PERC
1976); Town of Palm Beach Firefighters Local No. 1866, 2 F.P.E.R. 41 (PERC 1976) (uphold-
ing 24-hour rule and citing with approval Peerless Plywood Co., 33 L.R.R.M. 1151 (1953), but
refusing to apply rule to facts of case on theory that breach of 24-hour rule did not destroy
laboratory conditions); Teamsters Local 991, 1 F.P.E.R. 34 (PERC 1975) (public employer
failed to meet its burden of showing the union misstatements to be so persuasive as to destroy
laboratory conditions necessary to conduct a fair election) (citing NLRB v. Golden Age
Beverage Co., 415 F.2d 26, 30 (5th Cir. 1969)); General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948).
Hollywood Ceramics has recently been overruled. See Shopping Kart Food Market, Inc.,
228 N.L.R.B. 190 (1977) (holding elections will no longer be set aside solely on the basis of
misleading statements). In practical effect, PERC had been reaching the same result on the
rationale that the charging party had not successfully carried the burden of showing that the
misstatements affected the outcome of the election or had not destroyed the laboratory
conditions. The alleged misrepresentations were simply characterized as campaign puffing.
In Fort Lauderdale City Employees Benevolent Ass'n, Inc., 4 F.P.E.R. $ 4167 (PERC 1978),
the city alleged that the union (AFSCME) made a series of misrepresentations during a
representation election: it stated that AFSCME would establish a separate local bargaining
unit and thus allow a separate contract with the city; it indicated certain civil service benefits
were protected by a gobernatorial executive order, when in fact such protection applied only
to state workers; it asserted that by law no existing civil service benefits could be lost through
collective bargaining, and thus employees would only gain; it declared that AFSCME had
found approximately $13.7 million in the city budget available for salary increases which was
being concealed by the city, notwithstanding the fact that the figure included substantial
federal funds which could not be used for salaries. Id.
PERC decided with this case to limit its regulation of free speech in unfair labor practice
cases, analogizing its approach to federal and Florida regulation of political campaigns. See
18 U.S.C. §§ 594, 597 (1976); FA. STAT. § 104.061 (1977). Essentially, these laws make it a
crime to threaten or promise a benefit to influence a vote in a state or federal election. Section
447.501(1)-(2), as tempered by the free speech proviso in § 447.501(3), is the basis which
PERC will use in the future to evaluate the effects of campaign statements on the validity of
representation elections. PERC seemingly also approved restrictions on campaign statements
by either party within 48 hours of the election. Fort Lauderdale, 4 F.P.E.R. at 322.
PERC noted that employee organizations will be allowed "considerably" more leeway than
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There is a basic difference which might arise between the ap-
proach of the NLRB and that of PERA, section 447.501, concerning
solicitation and distribution rules. 33 Under 447.501-type violations,
the NLRB decisions distinguish between solicitation and distribu-
tion rules applicable to employee organizers as opposed to outside
union organizers. 35 4 A strong argument can be made that under
PERA no such distinction is justified by the "other unlawful acts"
section when read with the unfair labor practice provision, section
447.501. The "other unlawful acts" language applies to "employee
organizations" or "any persons," and it specifies that the section
shall not be construed to prohibit distribution during the lunch hour
or in nonwork areas. Clear in its application to nonemployee organ-
izers as well as employee organizers, it seems, then, that under
PERA outside nonemployee union organizers would be free to enter
the public employer's premises and distribute literature during the
lunch hour in nonwork areas. These sections appear less restrictive
than the NLRB decisions, which are not as hospitable to nonem-
ployee organizers.355
There are no reported court or PERC decisions dealing squarely
with domination of employee organizations.
F. Strike Provisions
Strikes by public employees are prohibited by the Florida Consti-
employers, citing the following cases with approval: NLRB v. Gissell Packing Co., 395 U.S.
595 (1969); Acme Wire Prods. Corp., 224 N.L.R.B. 701 (1976); The Smith Co., 192 N.L.R.B.
1098 (1971). Fort Lauderdale, 4 F.P.E.R. at 322. In abandoning the restrictive approach of
Hollywood Ceramics, 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962), in favor of a fuller implementation of the free
speech proviso of PERA, PERC suggested that determining the effect of an alleged misrepre-
sentation on an election after the fact was too speculative to outweigh the policy reasons
favoring protection of all campaign speech except that which either promised a benefit or, to
the contrary, was threatening or coercive.
For articles which explain the empirical basis and possible rationale for the overselling of
Hollywood Ceramics, see J. Getman & S. Goldberg, The Behavioral Assumptions Underlying
NLRB Regulation of Campaign Misrepresentations: An Empirical Evaluation, 28 STAN. L.
REv. 263 (1976); J. Getman, S. Goldberg, & J. Herman, NLRB Regulation of Campaign
Tactics: The Behavioral Assumptions on Which the Board Regulates, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1465
(1975).
353. FLA. STAT. (1977).
354. Cf. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. 105 (1956) (employer must not interfere
in employees' exercise of their own rights; but no such obligation is owed nonemployee
organizers); Republic Aviation v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945) (upholding NLRB's finding
invalid a company prohibition of union solicitation by employees).
355. In Town of Palm Beach Firefighters Local No. 1866, 2 F.P.E.R. 41 (PERC 1976),
PERC held that distribution of literature and solicitation of memberships among firefighters
before shifts began and during lunch periods did not violate § 447.509. PERC rejected a claim
by the town that firefighters were on call 24 hours a day and therefore on duty 24 hours a
day, and noted that the employer had traditionally recognized lunch and dinner hours as free
time for the firefighters. See also note 354 supra.
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tution, 56 and PERA has antistrike provisions" 7 containing severe
penalties for violations."' The statute provides too that it is an
unfair labor practice to participate in a strike "against the public
356. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 6.
357. FLA. STAT. § 447.505 (1977) provides that "[n]o public employee organization may
participate in a strike against a public employer by instigating or supporting, in any manner,
a strike." The 1977 amendments provide a broad definition of "strike":
"Strike" means the concerted failure [of employees] to report for duty; the con-
certed absence of employees from their positions; the concerted stoppage of work
[by employees]; the concerted submission of resignations [by employees]; the
concerted abstinence in whole or in part by any group of employees from the full
and faithful performance of the duties of employment with a public employer for
the purpose of inducing, influencing, condoning, or coercing a change in the terms
and conditions of employment or the rights, privileges, or obligations of public
employment, or participating in a deliberate and concerted course of conduct which
adversely affects the services of the public employer; the concerted failure [of
employees] to report for work after the expiration of a collective bargaining agree-
ment; and picketing in furtherance of a work stoppage. The term "strike" shall also
mean any overt preparation including but not limited to the establishment of strike
funds with regard to the above listed activities.
Act of June 24, 1977, ch. 77-343, § 6, 1977 Fla. Laws 1476 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 447.203(6)
(1977)).
358. FLA. STAT. § 447.507(2)-(7) (1977). This section provides both severe penalties and
rather flexible procedural relief to enjoin a strike. Thus, either PERC or the public employer
may initiate an injunction in the appropriate circuit court to enjoin a strike or an imminent
strike.
If the strikers do not comply with the injunction, contempt proceedings may follow. A fine
may be imposed against the union as deemed appropriate by the court, but it may not exceed
$5,000. In addition, union officials found in contempt may be fined not less than $50 nor more
than $100 for each calendar day of the strike. A union may also be liable for any damages
suffered by the public employer. A judgment for damages may be enforced against the union's
fees, dues, or check-off. Actions for money damages may not be brought until other proceed-
ings before PERC at the time of the strike have been fully adjudicated. In determining the
amount of damages, the trier of fact may consider in mitigation any action or inaction by
the public employer which provoked or tended to provoke the strike and any damages pre-
viously awarded by PERC.
If PERC, after notice and hearing conducted according to its rules, determines that an
employee has violated the antistrike prohibition, it may order termination of employment.
The employee may only be reemployed for a six-month probationary period, during which
time the employee must serve without tenure. Furthermore, the employee thus reemployed
may not have his salary increased until one year after his reemployment.
If the commission, in accordance with its own rules, finds that an employee organization
has violated the no-strike provision of § 447.505, Florida Statutes (1977), it can suspend or
revoke its certification as a bargaining agent. Additionally, PERC can revoke the employee
organization's right to dues deduction and collection. PERC can also fine the employee
organization up to $20,000 per day for each day of the strike or fine the organization an
amount equal to the approximate cost of the strike (even though in excess of $20,000 per day).
When collected, such fines immediately accrue to the public employer and must be used to
replace those services denied the public as a result of the strike.
When determining the amount of damages to be awarded to the public employer, the
commission must take into consideration any action or inaction by the public employer or
its agents which may have provoked or tended to provoke the strike. Orders issued by PERC
under this section may be reviewed and enforced in the district courts of appeal.
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employer by instigating or supporting, in any positive manner, a
strike."359
Despite the unfair labor practices provisions in PERA, PERC has
no statutory authority to institute an unfair labor practice proceed-
ing. This can be done only by the employer, the employee organiza-
tion, or the aggrieved employee.8 0 However, section 447.505 of the
Florida Statutes contains no similar limitations,", and the commis-
sion or any public employer whose employees are involved or whose
employees may be affected by a strike may file suit in the appropri-
ate circuit court. After a hearing, the circuit court "shall issue a
temporary injunction enjoining the strike.1 3 1
Since the enactment of PERA in 1974, only one strike by public
employees has occurred in Florida, although there have been several
minor disputes involving sick-outs, strike votes, and minor work
stoppages. 3 3 In 1975, teachers in Broward County represented by
the Broward County Classroom Teachers Association went on
strike. PERC obtained an injunction in circuit court pursuant to
section 447.507 of the Florida Statutes,3 'M and the strike ended.3 5
The public employer had not filed a charge against the union. The
union protested the injunction in circuit court, contending that
PERC was powerless to act in the absence of a charge of unfair labor
practice by the employer.
The circuit court disagreed, as did the First District Court of
Appeal. The district court stated on appeal that "[i]f the Commis-
sion could act to enforce the strike prohibition only upon the filing
of a charge by a public employer, a public employer by non-action
or agreement could effectively emasculate the constitutional and
statutory prohibitions against strikes.3166 The court made clear that
section 447.507 grants authority to the commission to initiate pro-
ceedings of its own accord both to enjoin violations of section
447.505 and to impose appropriate sanctions under section
447.507.37
On March 17, 1977, PERC and the teachers' union entered a
settlement stipulation by which the union agreed to end the strike,
359. FLA. STAT. § 447.501(2)(e) (1977).
360. Id. § 447.503(1).
361. (1977). For the text of § 447.505, see note 357 supra.
362. FLA. STAT. § 447.507(2) (1977).
363. These incidents were quickly resolved at the local levels without any involvement by
PERC.
364. For a discussion of strike penalties, see note 358 supra.
365. See Broward County Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. PERC, 331 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 341 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1976).
366. Id. at 344.
367. Id.
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to post notices prohibiting its members from engaging in strike ac-
tivity and informing them that no dues would be accepted during
July and August, 1977, to pay a $40,000 fine (the statutory maxi-
mum for a two-day strike), and to pay the fine before restoration of
its certification.31 8 The union complied with all of the terms. Thus,
the first challenge to PERA's antistrike provisions was met, and
strict penalties were imposed. Whether these stiff penalties will
discourage strikes by public employees in the future remains to be
seen.
G. Public Access to the Collective Bargaining Process
1. Public Records Act
Two Florida appellate cases have explored the relationship be-
tween the Public Records Act " and PERA. In both cases, the courts
sought an accommodation of the two laws.
In School Board v. PERC, the Florida Supreme Court considered
employer access to employee authorization cards.3 10 A union filed a
petition with PERC seeking certification as the bargaining agent for
certain school board employees in Marion County. The petition was
accompanied by dated authorization cards signed by at least thirty
percent of the employees in the proposed unit, as required by section
447.307(2) of PERA.3 7' Ten days later the school board wrote to
PERC, denying that the thirty percent requirement had been met
and requesting access to the authorization cards (then in PERC's
possession). The school board gave no reasons for the denial or the
request. 32 PERC refused access because of the need to protect em-
ployee confidentiality and the need to prevent a possible "chilling
effect" on the exercise of the bargaining right.3 The school board
then petitioned for a writ of mandamus, arguing that the Public
Records Act provides that all documents received by a public
agency "shall at all times be open for a personal inspection by any
person.'31
The Public Records Act contains no express exemptions for collec-
tive bargaining. However, it does provide that certain records may
be exempt by provision of "general or special law. '375 The court in
368. PERC, 3 F.P.E.R. 121, 122 (PERC 1977) (Broward County Classroom Teachers
Ass'n).
369. FLA. STAT. §§ 119.01-.12 (1977).
370. 334 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 1976) (Marion County).
371. FLA. STAT. (1977).
372. 334 So. 2d at 583.
373. Id. & n.3.
374. FLA. STAT. § 119.01 (1977).
3759 Id. § 119.07(2)(a).
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the Marion County case relied on a provision of PERA to limit
disclosure of the authorization cards. The court held that under the
applicable PERA language there is no unfettered public right to
access to the authorization cards as public records. For example, an
employer is entitled to access only if he alleges in his request that
cards were obtained by "collusion, coercion, intimidation, or mis-
representation ....
Since no such allegation was made, the court concluded that
PERC was correct in withholding access. But the court also held
that the school board could have had access to the cards if it had
entered a good faith allegation based on one of the grounds enumer-
ated in section 447.307(2)." In response to PERC's concern that
such access would have a chilling effect on organizational rights, the
court said that the unfair labor practices section of PERA would
suffice to protect the rights of the employees who had signed the
cards. The court noted as well that stronger remedies, such as bar-
gaining orders, would also be available if lesser remedies under
PERA proved insufficient.378
In State ex rel. City of Bartow v. PERC,379 the documents sought
under the Public Records Act were compiled by the PERC investi-
gator during a preliminary investigation of charges of unfair labor
practices.310 The City of Bartow argued that the investigation mate-
rials were public records and therefore available to any person desir-
ing to inspect them "at reasonable times, under reasonable condi-
tions, and under supervision by the custodian of the records or his
designee. ' 38' PERC protested that disclosure would hamper its in-
vestigations of unfair labor practices and would increase opportuni-
ties for coercion of employees by public employers. 32
The court held that the investigatory materials were public re-
cords.383 They were not exempted from disclosure by PERA. Yet the
court was responsive enough to PERC's argument to hold that the
"reasonable times, reasonable conditions" requirement in the Pub-
lic Records Act was not met until PERC either dismissed a charge
as groundless or determined that there was substantial evidence of
a prima facie violation. 38 4 At that point, the investigatory materials
376. Id. § 447.307(2).
377. 334 So. 2d at 585.
378. Id.
379. 341 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
380. Under FLA. STAT. § 447.503(1) (1977), PERC must make a preliminary investigation.
381. FA. STAT. § 119.07(1) (1977).
382. 341 So. 2d at 1002.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 1003.
19781
344 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:263
would normally be open to public access.
The Bartow court explained that preliminary investigations are
"nonadversarial means of winnowing groundless charges" which
should not be delayed or disrupted by demands for disclosure of
investigatory materials.385 As soon as the process becomes adver-
sarial, however, disclosure is required. If a preliminary investigation
is proceeding too slowly and thus postponing disclosure unreasona-
bly, an application for disclosure may be submitted to PERC. The
PERC determination regarding the application is then reviewable
by a district court of appeal.8 6
As in the Marion County school board case, the Bartow court used
a pragmatic approach to achieve a reasonable, workable, and fair
result. In both cases, the court recognized the unique nature of labor
law in the public sector. 386-'
2. Public Labor in the Sunshine
Some aspects of collective bargaining by governmental employees
are directly affected by Florida's "Sunshine Law." The
"Government in the Sunshine Law," enacted in 1967,387 provides
generally that all meetings of any governmental body at which offi-
cial action is taken must be open to the public. The minutes of all
meetings must be promptly recorded and made available for public
inspection. Any person violating the Sunshine Law is guilty of a
second-degree misdemeanor. 38
Florida courts initially construed the term "meeting" liberally. In
1969, in Times Publishing Co. v. Williams, the Second District
Court of Appeal held that every step in the decisionmaking process
leading to formal action is an "official act. ' 3 That same year, the
Florida Supreme Court broadened this view in Board of Public In-
struction v. Doran.30 The meetings at issue were executive school
board sessions held to inform staff members about matters to be
considered at subsequent, more formal meetings. The public and
the press were barred because no "formal action" was taken during
385. Id.
386. See FLA. STAT. § 120.68 (1977) (Administrative Procedure Act). The act entitles a
party who is adversely affected by final agency action to judicial review of that action.
386.1. For a more detailed consideration of the Bartow and Marion cases, see 6 FLA. ST.
U.L. REV. 149 (1978).
387. Act of July 12, 1967, ch. 67-356, § 1, 1967 Fla. Laws 1148 (current version at FLA.
STAT. § 286.011 (1977)).
388. FLA. STAT. § 286.011 (1977). For recent developments in the interpretation of the
Sunshine Law, see 6 FLA. ST. U.L. Rav. 199 (1978).
389. 222 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
390. 224 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1969).
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the sessions. The court held that the new law applied because some
of the matters discussed might be the basis for foreseeable action
by the board. 9'
In Bassett v. Braddock, the first public labor case (pre-PERA) to
reach the Florida Supreme Court on the "sunshine" issue, the court
deviated from the Times and Doran standards. 2 The court framed
the issues as follows: (1) whether labor negotiators employed by the
board in preliminary or tentative teacher contract negotiations with
the teachers' representatives could negotiate outside of public meet-
ings without being in violation of the Sunshine Law; and (2)
whether the board could instruct and consult with its labor negotia-
tors in private without being in violation of the Sunshine Law.
3 3
The Bassett court answered the first question by holding that the
discussions did not qualify as meetings and thus were exempt from
the Sunshine Law. This decision was based on two interrelated
theories. First, a constitutional exception shielded the bargaining
sessions from mandatory public access. Second, a pragmatic theory
recognized the "uncontroverted testimony by respectable national
authorities in the field" that meaningful collective bargaining would
be destroyed if fully publicized at every step of the negotiations.3 4
The court noted first the language of the Sunshine Law providing
that meetings shall be open to the public "except as otherwise pro-
vided in the Constitution. ' 395 Because the right to organize and
bargain collectively is guaranteed by the constitution and because
the exercise of that right might be impaired if preliminary negotia-
tions were open to the public, the court concluded that such sessions
were exempt from the Sunshine Law on constitutional grounds. The
Bassett court described article I, section 6 of the Florida Constitu-
tion as a "protective umbrella" for public employee bargaining
rights which should be used to prevent the "sunburn" that could
result from the "intensity" of the "sunrays" emanating from the
Sunshine Law. The constitution provided a "polaroid filter" to pro-
tect "preliminary skirmishing" from "damaging 'ultra violet
rays.' ",396
While offering this extended metaphor, the court noted that the
purposes of the Sunshine Law were not being frustrated by its deci-
sion. Ultimately, the contract, and hence the policy discussions re-
391. Id. at 700.
392. 262 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1972).
393. Id. at 426.
394. Id. at 426-27.
395. FLA. STAT. § 286.011(1) (1977).
396. 262 So. 2d at 426.
19781
346 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:263
lating to it, would have to be approved at a public meeting held by
the employer "in the sunshine." Thus, the statutory requirements
would be met even though preliminary negotiations might take
place in private 97 The court distinguished prior decisions by classi-
fying preliminary negotiations as discussions and deliberations
which often "take place beyond the veil of actual 'meetings' of the
body involved. ' 398 The court reasoned that negotiating sessions are
not meetings, but rather are preliminary "discussions" which may
never result in official or foreseeable action.399
The second issue-whether the board could instruct and consult
with its negotiator privately-was decided in favor of privacy. The
court reasoned that public employers should have the same advan-
tages as the public unions during the negotiating process. And cer-
tainly one advantage for the unions is private strategy sessions. The
employer would not be "hiding" anything in such sessions, the court
observed. Rather, it would merely be trying to get the best bargain
available for the public. The court concluded that the employer
should be able to prepare for the bargaining table under the same
rules and under the same conditions as the employees. 00
The unique treatment given to collective bargaining by this judi-
cial interpretation can be appreciated more fully upon examination
of the subsequent cases and attorney general opinions in areas other
than labor negotiations. In Bigelow v. Howze, two of five city com-
missioners went on an out-of-state factfinding trip.41 The Second
District Court of Appeal held that a discussion by the commission-
ers in their hotel concerning a contract award was a violation of the
Sunshine Law. In another case, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed
a finding by the Fourth District Court of Appeal that a planning
commission of lay citizens was subject to the law although the citi-
zens functioned only in an advisory capacity. 0
In yet another case, the supreme court held that a discussion of a
student's suspension by a school board should take place in the
sunshine.4 3 The court reasoned that since the statute was enacted
for the public's benefit, it should be interpreted most favorably to
the public-that is, in favor of disclosure. 404 In addition, the court
397. Id. at 427.
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. Id. at 428.
401. 291 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
402. IDS Properties, Inc. v. Town of Palm Beach, 279 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1973), aff'd sub nom. Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison, 296 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1974).
403. Canney v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 278 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1973).
404. Id.
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refused to grant an exemption even though the legislative body
acted in a quasi-judicial manner. 0 Similarly, the Florida attorney
general expressed his opinion that employee grievance committee
hearings06 and luncheon meetings between individual school board
and staff members" 7 can violate the Sunshine Law, if held privately.
It should be noted that PERA was enacted after Bassett and
therefore may qualify the holding in that case. Section 447.605(1)
of PERA exempts discussions "relative to" collective bargaining
between the chief executive officer and the legislative body of the
employer. 0 This is consistent with the court's resolution of the
second issue in Bassett. 40 PERA specifically provides that such dis-
cussions shall be exempt from the Sunshine Law. However, under
PERA, negotiations apparently must be in the sunshine. Thus, sec-
tion 447.605(2) of the Florida Statutes, as enacted in 1974, provided
that "[t]he collective bargaining negotiations between a chief exec-
utive officer and a bargaining agent shall not be exempt from §
286.011, Florida Statutes. '410
Section 447.605(1) was interpreted in an opinion by the attorney
general which adopted a rule of strict construction, to mean that
only public employer discussions relating to actual negotiations
were exempt from the Sunshine Law under section 447.605(1), and
that policy matters such as the "stance" or "attitude" an employer
generally intends to adopt toward unionization, prospective collec-
tive bargaining, general personnel policies, "or the like" should be
held in the sunshine."' Curiously enough, this opinion did not cite
or otherwise discuss Bassett. Nevertheless, this interpretation by
the attorney general has never been challenged or reconciled in
court. In 1977, section 447.605(2) was amended to read: "The collec-
tive bargaining negotiations between a chief executive officer, or his
representative, and a bargaining agent shall be in compliance with
s. 286.011."411 In view of the 1977 amendment, a strong argument
can be made that Bassett is still good law and therefore negotiations
need not be public. The court viewed its decision in Bassett as in
compliance with the Sunshine Law:
405. Id.
406. 1974 FLA. Op. Arr'Y GEN. 074-40.
407. Id. at 074-197.
408. FA. STAT. (1977).
409. 262 So. 2d at 426.
410. Act of May 30, 1974, ch. 74-100, § 3, 1974 Fla. Laws 134 (current version at FLA. STAT.
§ 447.605(2) (1977)) (emphasis added).
411. 1975 FLA. Op. Arr'Y GEN. 075-48.
412. Act of June 24, 1977, ch. 77-343, § 23, 1977 Fla. Laws 1476 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
447.605(2) (1977)) (emphasis added).
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The public's representatives must be afforded at least an equal
position with that enjoyed by those with whom they deal. The
public should not suffer a handicap at the expense of a purist view
of open public meetings, so long as the ultimate debate and deci-
sions are public and the "official acts" and "formal action" speci-
fied by the statute are taken in open "public meetings." This
affords the adequate and effective protection to the public on the
side of the "right to know" which was intended."'
The potential conflict between section 447.605 of PERA and Bassett
has not been brought before a Florida appellate court for definitive
adjudication.
It is not clear whether discussions by public employers about
positions, attitudes, or policies relative to collective bargaining (for
example, whether to run a counterorganizational campaign against
the union), have in actual practice been held in the sunshine. It is
doubtful whether other public employers have taken the attorney
general's restrictive view of such discussions. However, the contract
negotiation sessions themselves have been held in the sunshine. The
general attitude seems to be that, despite the 1977 amendment to
section 447.605(2), actual negotiations will be in the sunshine. A
good argument can be made to the contrary based on the statute.
But the political facts of life in Florida are such that neither public
officials nor unions are likely to align themselves against bargaining
in the sunshine absent a clear and unequivocal statutory exemption.
There are no conclusive studies about the effectiveness of
"goldfish bowl" bargaining. Donald Magruder, the Executive Direc-
tor of the Florida School Boards Association, has assessed some of
the advantages and disadvantages of opening collective bargaining
to public scrutiny.41 The primary benefits he identified were in-
creased public awareness of the functions and problems of local
government and opportunity for the press and the public to see the
positions, arguments, and attitudes of both sides. Further, with the
public in attendance, both sides are constantly reminded of the
source of the money over which they are negotiating. The disadvan-
tages cited by Magruder were that collective bargaining sessions can
413. 262 So. 2d at 427 (footnotes omitted). Note that PERA requires that all contracts be
approved by the legislative body under § 447.309(1), Florida Statutes (1977), and that im-
passe resolution be approved by the legislative body under § 447.403. Legislative body meet-
ings are, of course, public under the Sunshine Law.
414. D. Magruder, The Influence of "Goldfish Bowl" Bargaining in Education (Apr. 2,
1976) (on file with D. Magruder, Executive Director of Florida School Boards Association,
Tallahassee, Florida). The Influence of "Goldfish Bowl" Bargaining in Education was pre-
sented at the Association of Educational Negotiators' convention in New Orleans on April 2,
1976.
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become forums for grandstanding and posturing; media reporting
hardens positions-statements made publicly are difficult to re-
tract; audiences are frequently composed primarily of union mem-
bers, with outbursts and demonstrations disrupting and delaying
negotiations; negotiations are more expensive-larger facilities are
required, press accommodations are often necessary, and notices
must be printed and distributed; and often the public and press
attend only sporadically, leading to inaccurate and fragmented pub-
lic opinion. From a questionnaire sent to school board members,
superintendents, school negotiators, and members of the news
media, Magruder concluded that the consensus among those re-
sponding was in favor of "goldfish bowl" bargaining, but that pri-
vacy should be permitted during impasse or if mediators or arbitra-
tors are employed.4"5
In November, 1975, the author of this article also sent out an
informal questionnaire to certain public employers and employee
bargaining representatives in Florida to assess generally the reac-
tions to the Sunshine Law and its effects on the bargaining process
to that point. The results were roughly similar to those obtained by
Magruder. More than sixty percent of the public employers antici-
pated problems with public collective bargaining sessions and
would have preferred private sessions. The majority of the union
representatives favored bargaining in the sunshine. Both sides re-
ported that members of the public attended less than half of the
sessions, and similar results were reported for media attendance. " '
The majority of those responding from both sides also agreed that
positions of the parties should be reported publicly whenever PERC
is asked to provide outside assistance and an impasse occurs; that
factfinding hearings should be open to the public; and that positions
and last offers of the parties should not be formally stated periodi-
cally or after each session. Generally speaking, the public unions
favored more disclosure and the public employers favored less.
Employee organizations generally preferred requiring mediators to
furnish reports on the parties' positions, and releasing factfinders'
reports to the public and the press at the same time they are sent
to the employer and the employee organization. Additionally, the
unions felt that agreements reached at the table should be made
public prior to ratification by either side.
415. Id. at 10.
416. Unpublished study (on file with author). The results of the informal questionnaire
are not offered as empirically valid. The results must be tempered by the fact that relatively
few persons were sampled and bargaining experience to that date (1975) had been relatively
modest.
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The Sunshine Law has had a decided impact on the operation of
PERC as well. Because many of PERC's functions are quasi-judicial
in nature, there has been some feeling at PERC that these functions
should be exempt from the Sunshine Law. In State Department of
Pollution Control v. State Career Service Commission, the First
District Court of Appeal held that deliberations of the commission
following a hearing incident to an appeal by a dismissed employee
were quasi-judicial in nature and therefore exempt from the Sun-
shine Law." 7 This holding was in response to a request by the parties
and the attorney general, as amicus curiae, for a final determination
classifying deliberations made after a case had been submitted to
PERC or to an appellate court for consideration. The court stated
that "[t]hose labors are, therefore, quasi-judicial and are not sub-
ject to Chapter 286, Florida Statutes. 41 8
The issue now appears to have been resolved by the action of the
Florida Legislature during its 1977 session. Perhaps in reaction to
the conflicting opinions of the courts, the section of PERA dealing
with PERC operations was revised to read as follows: "The delibera-
tions of the commission in any proceeding before it shall be exempt
from the provisions of chapter 286 [Sunshine Law].""' There can
be little doubt now, given legislative creation of such a specific
exemption, that PERC deliberations are closed to the public.
Collective bargaining in the sunshine is a fait accompli in Florida.
Surprisingly little litigation has resulted from the confluence of the
Sunshine Law, Bassett v. Braddock, and PERA. The general prac-
tice of honoring sunshine bargaining may perhaps be attributed to
a shared desire to open the bargaining process to public scrutiny.
More likely, it is due to a reluctance on all sides to oppose publicly
the popular concept of government in the sunshine.
417. 320 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
418. Id. at 849. The opinion ignored Canney v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 278 So. 2d 260
(Fla. 1973). In Canney, the court noted that a combination of legislative and judicial func-
tions in one body is clearly contrary to the separation of powers doctrine. The court also stated
that a board exercising quasi-judicial functions is not part of the judicial branch of the
government. The court said the Sunshine Law, enacted for the public's benefit, applies even
if a board is acting in a quasi-judicial capacity.
Two attorney general's opinions written after Canney cited and agreed with that case. One
opinion stated that members of a personnel board, acting as a quasi-judicial sentencing body,
may not vote by secret ballot in the trial of an employee following a public session and
deliberation. 1973 FLA. Op. ATr'y GEN. 073-370. A later opinion, also citing Canney with
approval, declared that the Sunshine Law applied to a quasi-judicial hearing of the Florida
Board of Dentistry, the subject matter of which was an investigatory inquiry. 1974 FLA. Op.
Ar'y GEN. 074-84.
419. Act of June 24, 1977, ch. 77-343, § 7, 1977 Fla. Laws 1476 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
447.205(10) (1977)). It should be noted that hearings and oral arguments remain open to the
public.
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III. CONCLUSION
Some final observations about Florida's experience with collective
bargaining for public employees are in order.
To begin with, Florida's designation of the Board of Regents as
the public employer responsible for negotiating contracts with fac-
ulty unions must be viewed as a wise choice. Experience so far has
shown this to be a desirable feature of the Florida PERA. The stat-
ute allows the Governor to make recommendations to the legislature
concerning impasse resolution between the faculty unions and the
regents as employer. In addition, the Governor's traditional role of
influencing legislative budgetary decisions has been left undis-
turbed. Thus, the prerogatives of the chief executive have not been
jeopardized. Yet the statute allows contractual development con-
cerning faculty employment relations in the university system to be
made initially by the governing board of that system and by faculty
unions through the bargaining process. This is as it should be.
There is a serious question as to whether PERC commissioners
should serve "at the pleasure of the governor" as provided in the
1977 amendments, even though gubernatorial appointments are
subject to senate confirmation. Undoubtedly there will be increased
pressure to dominate PERC politically in the future. For one thing,
rapid unionization of state and local government workers promises
a significant amount of increased political influence by public em-
ployee unions. The absence of a right to strike or use of interest
arbitration to resolve impasse disputes increases pressure on the
unions to influence the governmental power structure through in-
creased political activity. This might include PERC as a logical
target.
Likewise, PERC should not be merely an administrative arm of
the executive branch. With the rise in unionism among state work-
ers, pressure may increase to influence PERC unduly to take
employer-oriented positions through the Department of Adminis-
tration. While it is true that thus far executive interference has been
minimal, if not nonexistent, there is no guarantee of a hands-off
policy for the future.
PERC's effectiveness would be substantially diminished if it were
perceived as either pro-employer or pro-union. PERC should be
viewed primarily as a quasi-judicial body and not as merely another
executive agency. Ideally, the commission should be perceived as a
court and the people of Florida should expect and require the same
level of integrity from PERC that they expect from a court. Thus,
the commission should be insulated as much as possible from politi-
cal influence.
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The legislature should authorize longer terms and staggered terms
for commissioners. PERC staff workers and attorneys should be
exempted from restrictive job classifications modeled after other
state agencies. This would allow the commission greater flexibility
in hiring and compensating professional assistance at a high level.
The commission should be provided with broad authority to admin-
ister PERA, accompanied by fiscal independence in formulating its
budget and its presentation to the legislature. This would encourage
the development of the commission as a judicial body.
Perhaps the day will come when a merit selection process for
commissioners will be implemented akin to that which is already
employed in Florida for appellate judges.2 0 Such a system would
have to be developed so as not to challenge the Governor's constitu-
tional authority over the executive branch. This could be accom-
plished by the Governor's developing a formal merit selection pro-
cess (that is, a nominating panel) which would produce a list of
recommended candidates for the Governor's consideration. The sys-
tem should be administered by reputable appointees, and it should
be public enough to permit candidate suggestions from varied
sources and to ensure due deliberation of qualifications. Surely it
would be appropriate for the legislature to lay down general qualifi-
cations, as it already has done in the 1977 amendments.
Any selection process should take into account both the rightful
demands of labor and the crucial dictates of good government in
making the choices of commissioners. Neither a pro-labor nor an
anti-labor commission will truly serve the public interest. Florida
needs a commission with a fair and balanced perspective. Florida
needs a commission which will consider the future needs of a chang-
ing state as well as the fleeting necessities of momentary confronta-
tions between recalcitrant employers and impatient employees.
Was Florida's decision to include coverage of all public employees
under PERA, rather than just certain segments of the public work
force such as schoolteachers, a wise decision? It seems it was. It is
fair to say that the comprehensive coverage of PERA has presented
no more problems than would have occurred had only schoolteach-
ers, firefighters, and police been included. It has encouraged uni-
form labor policy development. Comprehensive coverage is desir-
able because it encourages a consistent labor policy for both state
and local government. Labor policy generated by limited geographic
considerations apart from the state interest avoids the practical
facts of labor relations life. The state has a continuing interest in
420. See'FLA. CONST. art. V, § 11, cl. (b); id. § 20, cl. (c)(5).
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maintaining labor peace throughout its educational system as well
as in maintaining all governmental services.
Florida has not adequately addressed the problem of supervisory
unionism. Because of PERA's silence, problems with supervisory
unionism have been dealt with in a piecemeal fashion. Thus, school
principals were excluded as managerial employees in 1975. PERC
declared that supervisors have the right to unionize by virtue of its
unit decision which places supervisory state workers in separate
units. And some have been excluded as management by stipulation
in preliminary negotiations over unit definitions.
But the problem of supervisory unionism should be addressed in
the statute. This was not done in Florida, and other states contem-
plating public sector legislation would be well advised to so do. For
example, the statute should face squarely the initial question of
whether or not supervisory employees should have the right to un-
ionize. If they do, the statute should determine whether supervisors
may belong to the same union or be affiliated with a union which
also represents employees they supervise. The statute should fur-
ther declare whether the scope of negotiable subjects should be more
narrowly defined where unionized supervisors are permitted to bar-
gain with management. The Florida Legislature has yet to address
this nagging problem as it should.
In contrast, the Florida statute has worked well in the matter of
defining bargaining units. The statutory criteria preference for
large, comprehensive units has proven both workable and desirable.
Defining bargaining units for state workers by statute may be desir-
able. In Florida, it was done primarily by PERC rule for state work-
ers, and this has proven to be highly efficient. The Florida technique
has avoided needlessly extended and expensive representation pro-
ceedings. Initial state worker unit definition by rule or statute tends
to diminish undesirable pressure for fragmented units.
Whether Florida's approach to impasse resolution by means of
factfinding is also workable is difficult to evaluate at this point.
There are, unfortunately, insufficient data and experience on
which to base clear, unequivocal conclusions. What little evidence
there is, however, leads to the tentative conclusion that factfinding
can work in Florida. Realistically, there are few alternatives: there
is already a constitutional ban on the strike,' 21 and the 1978 Consti-
tution Revision Commission has, foolishly I think, recommended a
. 421. The Constitution Revision Commission has adopted for submission to the people
only one proposal affecting labor. See note 85 supra. As incorporated into article I, § 6 of the
current constitution, proposal no. 14 does not affect the prohibition against public employees'
striking.
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carte blanche constitutional ban on interest arbitration422 regard-
less of whether the arbitration is by last offer, issue by issue, or
package, or whether it applies only to a narrowly defined group of
public employees. Consequently, factfinding would seem to be the
only plausible alternative for Florida should the people vote to
approve the recommendations of the revision commission,
It is probably fair to say that negotiations in the sunshine have
not presented insurmountable problems. Generally, open negotia-
tions have not substantially interfered with the bargaining process.
On the other hand, the legislative decision to remove PERC deliber-
ations from the sunshine has proven to be more functional by en-
couraging a more judicious approach to controversial issues. Open
deliberations encouraged a more political and ambivalent approach
to the deliberative process.
One of the appalling inadequacies in the Florida experience has
been the rather random and haphazard efforts at field studies and
research in attempts to evaluate the effectiveness of the Act. Unfor-
tunately, Florida has no industrial labor relations institute designed
to focus entirely on research in public labor relations. Moreover,
PERC has not been funded sufficiently to permit it to undertake
extensive research and data accumulation. Trade associations such
as the School Board Association and, to a lesser degree, the public
unions have produced some limited studies. But these studies,
whether accurate or not, have not produced widespread acceptance
because of their suspected bias. A resource to accumulate data and
to conduct unbiased research is essential to the improvement of the
bargaining process. So too, high-quality training institutes and the
like are necessary for governmental officials, and unionists too, if
responsible bargaining in the public interest is to become a reality.2 3
All in all, the Florida Public Employees Relations Act has worked
well, and Florida's experiment with collective bargaining for public
workers has been generally successful. Whether this success contin-
ues will depend, to a great extent, on the willingness of all parties
to public labor disputes to look beyond their own immediate inter-
ests and consider the long-range concerns of the state. To be sure,
self-interest will never be eliminated from labor negotiations. But
422. Proposal no. 14 of the Florida Constitution Revision Commission would add the
following language to article I, § 6: "Binding arbitration is prohibited to resolve impasse in
collective bargaining negotiations concerning wages, hours and terms and conditions of em-
ployment between public employees and a public employer." The people of Florida will vote
on this proposal in November.
423. In its 1978 appropriations act, the Florida Legislature established, with modest fund-
ing, a Center for the Study of Employment Relations at Florida State University College of
Law.
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broader state interests must also be served. In the spirit of civility,
the interests of the state as a whole can be furthered in the bargain-
ing process by labor and management alike.

